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INTRODUCTION 
() NE OF the central interests of businessmen and eco-
nomists is the pricing of commodities and services. For the 
businessman, prices are one of the main determinants of 
profits and of success or failure. For the economist, prices 
are at the heart of the mechanism for allocating resources to 
various lines of production and a central influence on the 
distribution of income. Thus it is not surprising that a high 
proportion of the literature of business and economics is 
concerned with this subject. 
In view of the large volume of material already pub-
lished,! it is desirable to indicate the contribution made by 
the present study. First, we are concerned with small busi-
nesses rather than large. Most of the literature on pricing 
(outside of agriculture) has concerned itself with large firms. 
This is true of the recent study of Kaplan, Dirlam, and 
Lanzillotti and of most of its predecessors. The outstanding 
collection of selected writings, edited by Backman in 1953,2 
contains considerable excellent material on large firms but 
none on small ones. Most studies dealing with industries 
consisting of many small firms treat them in the mass rather 
than individually, thus neglecting the decision-making proc-
ess within the particular firm. The present study is primarily 
concerned with individual cases. Only after a thorough 
analysis of individual pricing decisions is a broader perspec-
tive undertaken. 
This study differs from previous researches in that it has 
abandoned the questionnaire approach that has dominated 
pricing investigations in the past. It makes use, instead, of 
the case approach such as is used by Kaplan, Dirlam, and 
Lanzillotti in their volume and by a few other writers, 
though it has tried to achieve greater depth and flexibility 
in the interpretation of company statements on pricing than 
some case studies have demonstrated. Questionnaire studies 
generally suffer from a failure to develop in depth the 
1 The best survey of the literature up to 19 55 is Richard B. 
Heflebower's "Full Costs, Cost Changes, and Prices," in Business Con-
centration and Price Policy [A Conference of the Universities-National 
Bureau Committee for Economic Research], National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Special Conference Series No. 5 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 361-96. The outstanding 
works since that time are James S. Earley, "Marginal Policies of 
'Excellently Managed' Companies," American Economic Review, XLVI 
(March, 1956), 44-70; James S. Earley, "Recent Developments in Cost 
Accounting and the 'Marginal Analysis,' " Journal of Political Economy, 
LXIII (June, 1955), 227-42; A. D. H. Kaplan, Joel B. Dirlam, and 
Robert F. Lanzillotti, Pricing in Big Business (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1958); and Robert F. Lanzillotti, "Pricing 
Objectives in Large Companies," American Economic Review, XLVIII 
(Dec., 1958), 921-40. 
2 Jules Backman ( ed.), Price Practices and Price Policies: Selected 
Writings (New York: Ronald Press, 1953). 
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reasons for pricing decisions; they tend to accept at face 
value the brief replies of the respondents. The case approach, 
based on an intensive interviewing of key officials, carries 
more promise of uncovering inconsistencies in official state-
ments and of finding the deeper reasons for the final out-
come. 
This study, then, is concerned with decision-making 
processes, and thereby it brings to bear the point of view of 
organization theory as well as that of economic theory upon 
the establishment of prices. It focuses on the influences and 
pressures that have led to particular pricing outcomes, which 
involves close attention to the chains of reasoning of execu-
tives concerned with pricing. It considers the data-account-
ing or other-that are examined and analyzed by these 
executives. It also considers the theories, procedures, or 
rules of thumb which have been applied. In addition, it 
notes the internal organizational influences on the decisions 
-patterns of communication, of influence, of authority that 
help govern the final outcome. Wherever possible, it at-
tempts to trace the sequence of events that has led to a 
particular outcome, from the initial awareness of a problem 
through consideration of competing alternatives to the final 
decision. 
The reader may well ask whether this study is in the 
area of description or of prescription. Is it concerned mainly 
with describing the ways in which firms arrive at pricing 
decisions? Or does it attempt to supply advice on how such 
pricing should be done? A large volume of material on 
pricing, to which we shall refer from time to time, has been 
more concerned with prescription than description. Literally 
hundreds of pamphlets, bulletins, and textbooks specify how 
pricing should be done, but only a few examine how it 
actually is done. When description is attempted, it is fre-
quently superficial. For example, dozens of mail question-
naires inquire into "How do you set your prices?" Such 
questions naturally draw forth short and uninformative 
answers. A typical answer is that "We price according to 
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what our competitors are charging," a reply that is open to 
many interpretations and one which usually turns out to be 
only a partial answer to the question. 
This study stresses both description and prescription. It 
starts with the premise that no one can arrive at useful 
prescriptions simply by sitting at a desk and thinking the 
problem through. But at the same time it does not assume 
that what is done is necessarily best. By a direct confronta-
tion of logic and theory on one side and actual practice on 
the other, we may help find the limits of the theory as well 
as some of the imperfections of actual practice. Some beauti-
ful theoretical models, based on the most refined (and 
sometimes the most elaborate) deductive reasoning, may 
turn out to be only remotely relevant to actual practice 
because of the difficulties of obtaining the data or applying 
the mathematical processes required. On the other hand, 
some firms undoubtedly are losing opportunities for greater 
profits by mechanically applying rules of thumb or by 
following "hunches," without attention to the gains to be 
derived from more costly but possibly more productive 
procedures. The extent to which more refined models are 
relevant depends very much on the circumstances, preclud-
ing, therefore, simple prescriptions that can be applied in-
discriminately by all. 
In other words, this study brings together naive and 
sophisticated theoretical models and detailed descriptions of 
actual practice, in the hope that this confrontation will make 
a contribution to both the theory and the actual practice. 
In the chapters that follow we present conclusions that differ 
from previously published findings (mostly drawn from big 
business) -conclusions on the pervasiveness of full-cost pric-
ing, on the use of accounting methods consistent with 
marginalism, on the stress on "target returns," and on the 
inattention to market forces. These conclusions should con-
tribute to a fuller understanding of pricing decisions in small 
business, with emphasis placed both on the relevant and on 
the possible. 
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METHOD OF STUDY 
The building block from which this study is constructed is 
the individual case. An intensive examination of particular 
pricing decisions in particular firms precedes attempts at 
generalization-and helps account for a reluctance to reduce 
observations to simple generalizations. The premise under-
lying this approach is that we do not yet have sufficient 
knowledge of how particular firms go about setting prices. 
Case studies should extend our knowledge in this sphere and 
thus lead to generalizations more in conformity with actual 
practice. 
At the very outset, structured approaches to interviewing 
were rejected. Mail questionnaires would have failed to 
develop in depth the complex influences and thought applied 
in setting prices. Structured interviews, with definite lists of 
set questions, would have limited the interviewers in de-
termining just how each management solved its pricing 
problem. It was necessary to have complete freedom in 
directing the questioning to the particular situation. The 
interviewers did of course have lists of questions in mind, 
and usually had these jotted down on slips of paper, but 
these were used as suggestions for useful lines of thought 
that might be developed rather than rigid outlines of the 
direction the interviews might take. In no case was a single 
interview sufficient to answer all of the questions that arose. 
Between interviews, the research worker made lists of ques-
tions suggested by the first interview, so that more and more 
the questions were based on the particular situation. Fre-
quently the research group met to discuss individual cases, 
and these discussions led to a series of followup questions 
for later interviews with the same company. 
Obviously this type of information calls for considerable 
interpretation by the research workers. The facts do not 
speak for themselves. It is necessary to explain why the facts 
are as they are. It is necessary to relate the various facts to 
each other-to examine the extent to which organizational 
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arrangements, or internal patterns of influence, or personality 
conflicts, or lack of information, or custom, or the structure 
of the industry, or the risk of retaliation by competitors, or 
other factors have influenced the outcome. When the sub-
ject under study is the individual firm, it is highly unlikely 
that statistical techniques could bring out clearly the relative 
importance of these complex considerations. There is no 
way of avoiding personal judgments in the interpretation of 
the interview data. While we must admit that in some 
instances these judgments may be incomplete, or one-sided, 
or inaccurate, either because of the failure to obtain all the 
relevant facts or because of a misapplication of personal 
judgment, we believe that we have achieved a more realistic 
picture of these pricing decisions than could have been 
obtained in any other way. 
One last comment on methodology is in order. While 
we have examined a total of 88 cases, we make no pretense 
of covering a "representative sample" of small businesses. 
Our aim is not to say that a certain percentage of small firms 
do this, while another percentage does something else. Our 
sample is biased to start out with by the mere fact that we 
have interviewed managers who have been willing (and in 
some cases eager) to cooperate. We have usually contacted 
managers in convenient locations, so that the region covered 
is not representative. We have been somewhat arbitrary in 
the selection of industries to be included. Frequently we 
have decided to select a firm similar to one we have already 
examined, to determine whether a similar pattern of decision 
making is followed. At other times we have decided that we 
have included enough firms of a particular type and have 
moved on to other industries. 
Thus the basic unit of this study is the decision-making 
case. The sources of data are the interviews, supplemented 
by reports, worksheets, and minutes when these became 
available. The analysis consists largely of the subjective 
evaluations of the research workers. This approach brings 
out many features of pricing decisions in small business 
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which could not be examined and interpreted in any other 
way. 
The investigation which comes closest to the present 
study in method is that of Bjarke Fog, a Danish economist, 
whose work appeared in English after the present project was 
virtually complete.3 Fog also bases his study on interviews 
with the officials of firms; he focuses on the individual pricing 
case; and he makes subjective evaluations of his observations. 
RELATION TO PRICE THEORY 
AND MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 
The approach of this study is quite different from the usual 
one in economic theory. Economic theory is generally highly 
deductive in character; the present study starts with actual 
cases. Economic theory is usually concerned with broad 
questions of resource allocation and income distribution and 
thus starts with large units (the economy as a whole and the 
industry); this study begins with the individual firm and 
with even a smaller unit, the individual pricing decision. 
Economic theory, quite correctly, aims at broad, simple 
generalizations wherever this is possible; this study is con-
cerned with the complexity of detailed behavior and is less 
concerned with the broader generalizations which might be 
possible at a later date. When economic theory is concerned 
with prediction, it is usually prediction of some broad aggre-
gate; and it may be quite correct to ignore considerable 
individual detail in making such predictions. But when the 
aim is a greater understanding of the decision-making process 
within the individual firm, the traditional methods of eco-
nomic theory may no longer be appropriate. 
This is not to state that orthodox theory has ignored 
facts about single firms. Alfred Marshall, who made a 
3 Bjarke Fog, Industrial Pricing Policies: An Analysis of Pricing 
Policies of Danish Manufacturers (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publish· 
ing Co., 1960). This is a translation of Fog's doctoral thesis, 
Priskalkulation og prispolitik, at the University of Copenhagen. 
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synthesis of the economic analysis of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, showed considerable familiarity 
with industrial facts in all of his works and attempted to 
make his theories consistent with his observations. His suc-
cessors have been concerned with developing theories that 
would account for certain facts that did not seem to fit into 
Marshallian or other orthodox molds. Thus the theories of 
oligopoly and monopolistic competition are attempts to 
generalize about behavior for industries that do not appear 
to fit into the purely competitive or the monopoly categories. 
But most of these developments were very little concerned 
with decision-making processes within individual firms. 
We shall not make the claim that a close examination 
of the internal workings of single firms will necessarily lead 
to a reformulation of economic theory. It may well be that 
different methods must be developed for different purposes 
-and that the usual method of economic theory is quite well 
suited to dealing with the broader questions with which it 
is concerned. No doubt this theory will undergo revisions, 
and probably the study of individual firm behavior will 
contribute to those revisions, but it is doubtful that there 
will be a dramatic shift in the level of abstraction. After all, 
the aim of economic theory is not description of detailed 
behavior. Its aim is prediction of broad aggregates and the 
control that such prediction permits. Thus it is an open 
question whether or not case studies of pricing decisions 
can make a significant contribution to economic theory in 
its usual role. 
When it comes to managerial economics, economics as 
applied to the understanding and improvement of individual 
firm behavior, the situation is quite different. Much of 
managerial economics, like broader price theory, is partly 
deductive in character. It is concerned with the logic of 
decision making. But managerial economics is of necessity 
concerned with the firm and with a comparison of actual 
behavior with a priori deductions. Many issues in managerial 
economics, particularly in the area of pricing, are unsettled. 
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It is not yet clear how appropriate marginal analysis is in 
actual pricing decisions, in view of the complexity of the 
actual pricing environment. Nor is it clear whether full-cost 
pricing, which appears to be widespread in practice, is a 
defensible approach in view of its apparent conflict with 
marginalist reasoning. 
Thus, while the importance of this study to general price 
theory may be conjectural, we believe that our findings are 
important in the area of managerial economics. The study 
should help to resolve some controversies about the relevance 
of some pricing prescriptions; it may at the same time stimu-
late new lines of controversy, thus leading to further research. 
It should help small businessmen determine the extent to 
which economic reasoning can be helpful in their pricing 
decisions, providing suggestions about how the gap between 
theory and practice may be bridged. 
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PART I 
2 
SOME PRESCRIPTIVE 
VIEWS ON PRICING 
As A BACKGROUND for the case studies, it is desirable 
to survey some views of previous writers on prescriptions for 
pricing. Two chief theories of pricing appear in the litera-
ture: full-cost pricing and marginalism. Actually the distinc-
tions between them are not so simple. Therefore this chapter 
concerns itself with defining the variety of viewpoints falling 
within these categories. 
NAIVE FULL-COST PRICING 
In this monograph the expression "full-cost pricing" means 
pricing at a level covering total costs, including overhead, 
plus a predetermined markup. The expression "cost-plus pric-
ing" is treated as a synonym. Neither phrase is used to cover 
cases in which variable markups are added to full costs, 
although this usage is sometimes found in the literature. The 
advocates of full-cost pricing write at varying levels of 
sophistication. Some recommend this method as though 
there were no reasonable alternative. Others are quite fa-
miliar with alternative views and particularly with rnarginalist 
reasoning, but favor full-cost pricing because of the difficul-
ties of applying more flexible approaches. 
Not much need be said about the naive statements. If 
one has not given much thought to the problem, he might 
very well conclude that the way to price is to measure cost 
and add a percentage to provide a "reasonable" profit. Unless 
a firm covers its costs and returns a profit, as is often stated, 
it is difficult to see how it can stay in business. 
A great number of pamphlets and manuals advocate 
full-cost pricing without any evaluation of alternative ap-
proaches. Perhaps it is unfair to state that the authors are 
unaware of such alternatives, but quite frequently they do 
not provide any basis upon which the reader can evaluate 
them. Some of these publications do recognize the need to 
make "exceptions," but provide very little help in deciding 
when it is most desirable to make them. A letter from a 
national trade association, for example, deplores the lack of 
system in the pricing practices of its members. The associa-
tion "recommends that pricing be established through more 
'scientific' means. We have published a bulletin . . . in 
which we show the members ... how to establish a fair and 
equitable price for their finished product. Essentially, all we 
are pointing out is that the selling price should be based 
upon the expenses plus a fair percentage for profit."1 Perhaps 
there are reasons in the particular industry for such a policy, 
but the tone of the letter indicates that the leaders of the 
trade association believe that pricing based on something 
1 Letter from a trade association official to a member of the 
research team. 
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fairly definite such as costs is necessarily sound. The use of 
the expression "scientific" suggests a lack of awareness of the 
complexity of the pricing problem. 
Even the firmest advocate of full costs recognizes certain 
difficulties in the application of the principle. There are 
questions concerning the definition of "cost" itself, of the 
allocation of overhead cost, of the use of "actual" cost versus 
"standard" cost, and so on. Some of these questions will 
arise in dealing with individual case studies later in this 
report, but it is sufficient for the present to let "full cost" 
represent a number of variations in cost measurement, all of 
which aim at estimating all of the costs: labor, materials, and 
overhead. 
This approach usually provides for exceptions to the 
full-cost principle-markdowns on soiled and damaged goods, 
for example. But little insight is provided as to when such 
exceptions are appropriate and how much the price should 
be reduced. 
It might be argued that we have set up a strawman in 
this discussion of naive full-cost pricing, for it would seem 
that anyone with any business experience would know there 
is more to pricing than this. It is our impression, however, 
that some businesses do apply the full-cost approach in a 
mechanical way; some of the literature suggests no ways of 
looking more deeply into the question. It should be made 
clear, on the other hand, that much of the full-cost literature 
is anything but naive. It is best to postpone discussion of 
this more sophisticated literature until marginalist approaches 
are examined, for this will highlight the issues involved. 
NAIVE GOING-RATE RULES 
While some writers advocate routine pricing on the basis of 
costs, others favor pricing at the "going rate." Some publica-
tions suggest that all there is to pricing is the determination 
of what one's competitors are charging. Sometimes this is 
suggested as only a first step in those situations where little 
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other information is to be had. For example, a bulletin on 
motor courts recommends that a new court should start 
with a survey of the "general rate structure for comparable 
rooms at other courts in the area,"2 while admitting that 
these same rates may later turn out to be wrong. As with 
full-cost pricing, going-rate pricing is not necessarily super-
ficial; situations exist in which it may be the rational ap-
proach. But the particular literature under review, such as 
the bulletin just quoted, does not go into the deeper reasons 
for such a policy; and thus it does not provide a manager 
with a conceptual framework to assist him in deciding what 
rules apply to his situation and what principles to use in 
setting up his price rates. Nor does it explain how prices 
ever get changed. 
Full-cost pricing and going-rate pricing would appear to 
be at opposite extremes. One might expect that the former 
would be popular in cases in which full costs can be measured 
with some degree of accuracy (though with the conceptual 
difficulties that have already been mentioned) but demand 
is nebulous, while going-rate pricing would be usual when 
costs are difficult to measure. The conflict between the two 
procedures must not be overstated. One suspects, for ex-
ample, that some trade associations favor full-cost pricing on 
the very grounds that it does narrow down flexibility and 
does help insure that the competitors will come up with 
similar prices or bids. Thus full-cost pricing becomes a 
means for estimating the going rate and insuring its mainte-
nance. 
MARGINALISM IN PRICING 
When business economists began to apply concepts from 
economic theory to business problems, they quite naturally 
took over the marginalist mode of thought that had been 
2 Harry B. Love, Establishing and Operating a Year-Round Motor 
Court, U. S. Department of Commetce, Domestic Commetec Office, 
Industrial (Small Business) Series No. 50 (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1947). 
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developed and refined in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.3 Marginalism would appear to provide a rational 
basis for decision making. It is therefore in opposition to 
mechanical rules, such as the full-cost or going-rate principles. 
What marginalism really amounts to in the realm of de-
cisions is the comparison of the impact of decisions on 
revenue and on costs. Such reasoning is quite flexible. It 
does not require that attention be restricted to the effect of 
decisions on profits; it can take into account the extent to 
which the decision aids or detracts from other goals. When 
multiple goals are involved, however, a difficult problem of 
weighting them arises, so that in actual practice, attention is 
usually directed to profits (measurable costs and revenues), 
with correction for other considerations after the profit com-
putations have been completed. 
The general rule provided by marginalism should be 
stated clearly, for it is the basis for the following discussion. 
The rule states: If an alternative leads to a greater increase 
in revenue than in costs, it will increase profits and should be 
favored; if it leads to a greater reduction in costs than in 
revenue, it is likewise to be favored. As applied to pricing, 
the rule means that a decrease in prices is favorable if it so 
stimulates extra business that the revenue increases more 
than the added costs of the extra output; and an increase in 
prices is favorable if the loss of customers (normally there 
would be such a loss) is not enough to offset the increase in 
price and the reduction in costs. 
Since "incremental cost" and "incremental revenue" are 
more familiar in business than "marginal cost" or "marginal 
revenue," those terms will be emphasized in the rest of this 
report. The difference between the two is that "marginal 
cost" and "marginal revenue" are concerned with infinitesi-
mally small changes in costs and revenues,4 resulting from 
3 The most influential volume in demonstrating applications of 
marginalism to business problems has been Joel Dean's Managerial 
Economics (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951). 
4 A more precise definition in terms of the calculus may be found 
in advanced economics textbooks. 
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volume changes, while "incremental cost" and "incremental 
revenue" are finite changes resulting from decisions of many 
sorts not necessarily operating through volume changes. A 
rule in terms of these incremental concepts directs attention 
to whether or not incremental revenue exceeds incremental 
costs for a particular decision. For decisions that reduce 
costs, we shall sometimes use the expression "escapable costs" 
to denote those costs eliminated by the decision. 
A list of the implications of marginalism should be 
useful in clarifying its meaning in business practice. These 
implications will be discussed under the following headings: 
orientation to the future, separation of fixed costs from 
variable costs, the concept of opportunity costs, demand con-
siderations, market structure, and the incremental cost-
incremental revenue rule. 
Orientation to the future. AU business decisions are con-
cerned with the future rather than the past. The "dead hand 
of the past" should not dominate the decision-making proc-
ess; the past is useful only to the extent that it helps us 
estimate the future. This view warns us that we must be 
cautious in the use of accounting data, for many of these 
data are based on the "original" costs incurred in the past 
and are thus not necessarily relevant in the determination of 
incremental costs in the future. This is particularly clear in 
the case of depreciation expenses, which in accounting in-
volve the allocation over time of past expenditures rather 
than the estimate of some change in costs in the future. 
Separation of fixed and variable costs. The separation of 
fixed and variable costs is not an idea limited to marginalism; 
in fact, it does not always meet the full needs of margin-
alism and may, if misapplied, lead to nonmarginalist results. 
Some costs do not fall neatly into either category; for 
example, electricity bills usually include both a fixed and 
variable charge. Some costs rise with output in a stairstep 
fashion; for example, an additional supervisor may be added 
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when output reaches a particular level, resulting in a one-step 
increase in costs. Some costs may be fixed or "sunk" for· 
partial decreases in output, but may be "escapable" if the 
product line is abandoned; for example, machinery may be 
sold and the entire supervisory staff laid off if the whole line 
is discontinued, but this might not be possible with a one-
half reduction of output. In fact, modern business econ-
omists and managerial accountants have placed great stress 
on the need to tailor the costs to the particular problem at 
hand, for a cost that may be fixed for one decision could be 
variable or partially variable for another. Thus the separa-
tion of fixed and variable costs, while useful as a first 
approximation, is an incomplete attempt at marginalism. 
Opportunity costs. In economic theory and in managerial 
economics, it has long been recognized that the relevant cost 
concept in decision making is that of "opportunity costs." 
The cost of deciding to do one thing must involve a measure-
ment of the sacrifice of alternatives. In fact, "cost" must 
basically mean "sacrifice" -recognition of this fact is likely 
to be clarifying in considering a particular problem. If, for 
example, a company has limited plant capacity, a reduction 
of price accompanied by an increase in sales may require the 
abandonment of other profitable lines. Some measure of the 
sacrifice of the profits derived from those lines is essential 
to the complete application of marginalist reasoning. Or to 
take another illustration, if the company has idle space and 
equipment which cannot be sold or leased to anyone else, 
there is no need to consider the depreciation on that space 
and equipment unless it can be used in producing other 
alternative lines. If it cannot, then the relevant depreciation 
or rental cost is zero; no sacrifice of opportunities results from 
the use of these facilities. 
Demand considerations. Marginalist reasoning requires that 
both demand (revenue) and cost considerations be taken 
into account. If the demand is inelastic within a range 
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higher than present prices, the marginalist position would 
call for an increase in price. In fact, charging "what the 
market will bear" is completely consistent with marginalism. 
But a full application of marginalism would take into 
account the longrun effects of high prices: effects on good-
will, possible political repercussions and antitrust suits, as 
well as the entry of new competitors. Marginalism is not 
even inconsistent with the desire to maintain "fair" prices, 
if the owners and management of the firm derive satisfaction 
from acting according to a sense of responsibility to their 
customers and to the public in general. It is true that this 
interpretation of marginalism is so comprehensive as to make 
its use for prediction less useful than a narrower interpreta-
tion might be. But a description of actual behavior must 
include considerations of psychic income and goodwill. 
Market structure. Marginalism implies that the firm con-
siders the structure of its markets in reaching decisions on 
prices. Market structure is a major influence on demand 
elasticities. Economists have long recognized that in a 
market approaching perfect competition-one with a large 
number of firms and no differentiation of product-the 
demand facing the individual firm is highly elastic, so that 
the firm has little or no control over price. When a firm 
has a complete monopoly, it does not contend with the 
policies of other firms in setting prices; but it is only in 
rare circumstances that such complete monopoly control is 
possible. Most firms find themselves somewhere between the 
purely competitive and the monopolistic positions-in short, 
in the pattern of monopolistic competition or oligopoly. 
By oligopoly we mean a market in which there are few 
enough sellers so that each will take into account in making 
its pricing decisions the possible reactions of its competitors. 
If there are, let us say, five sellers, each might recognize that 
any change in his price will be noticed by competitors, who 
may react. It is then necessary to predict the character of 
that reaction in arriving at the price decision. In other 
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words the firm cannot make an estimate of demand without 
considering the impact on others of changes in prices. A full 
application of marginalism will take such demand considera-
tions into account. Thus in estimating the incremental cost 
and the incremental revenue from a decrease in price, it will 
be necessary to predict whether the competitors will also 
reduce price. The incremental revenue will be much less if 
the other sellers retaliate, and thus the reduction in price 
will be less profitable. Similarly, if the question is one of 
raising price, it is necessary to predict whether other firms 
will follow. If they do, the loss in revenue will be less than 
otherwise. 
One of the major subjects of this study is the relevance 
in actual small business practice of such reasoning about 
oligopoly. The main point to be made here is that the 
question of whether a firm is in a competitive, an oligopo-
listic, or a monopolistic market is basic to the application of 
marginalism in its pricing. 
The incremental cost-incremental revenue rules. In sum, 
then, marginalism in business decisions involves a compari-
son of the incremental revenue and the incremental cost 
resulting from that decision. If a decrease in price results in 
incremental revenue exceeding incremental cost, the decrease 
is profitable. An increase in price may result in a positive or 
negative incremental revenue-depending on the elasticity 
of demand. If the incremental revenue resulting from such 
an increase is positive, the decision is always profitable, for 
costs will drop as a result of the lower quantity of sales. If 
the incremental revenue is negative, that is, if a loss occurs 
because of a substantial drop in the number of customers, 
the question is whether the "escaped" costs exceed this loss 
in revenue. 
To summarize, we shall use IC to represent incremental 
cost and IR, incremental revenue, when these are positive. 
We shall use EC to represent escapable costs and DR for 
decremental revenue. 
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For a decrease in price: 
IR>IC- profitable 
IC>IR- unprofitable 
For an increase in price: 
EC >DR- profitable 
DR>EC- unprofitable 
SOPHISTICATED FULL-COST PRICING 
We have given our incremental rules such broad scope that 
they are little more than tautologies. We have defined the 
terms in such a way that the rules hold by definition. Since 
profits are the excess of revenues over costs, any decision 
that increases revenues more than costs must mathematically 
increase profits (or reduce losses). A critic might argue that 
we are playing with logic and not facing the needs of decision 
making. 
The rules are so broad as to incorporate full-cost pricing 
whenever it does contribute to profitability. In some cases 
marginalism and the full-cost principle may be consistent. 
This would be true if any movement away from prices based 
on full cost would affect revenues and costs in such a way as 
to reduce profits. The question is: When does such a posi-
tion exist? When will the routine application of a full-cost 
formula produce more profitable results than a more flexible 
groping for higher revenues or lower costs? 
This question takes us back to oligopoly. In oligopoly, 
full-cost pricing may make sense in view of the uncertainty 
about competitors' reactions to price change. The penalties 
for raising or lowering price may be great; the firm may wish 
to avoid taking the chances of incurring such penalties. If it 
raises price and other firms do not follow, a substantial drop 
in volume of sales may occur. If it lowers price and other 
firms do follow, the whole industry may suffer from the 
price warfare that results. Full-cost pricing may provide a 
stability in competition that must be quite appealing to 
many firms. If costs do increase, each firm can anticipate 
that his rivals (who are probably encountering similar cost 
increases) will boost prices about the same time he does. 
This accounts for the fact (to be brought out in some of the 
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case studies) that some managers, not presently on a con-
sistent full-cost basis, would like to see the whole industry 
move to such a system. 
Other possible explanations of full-cost pricing, con-
sistent with. the idea that full cost is a rational approach to 
the problem,5 are these: 
I. Profit maximization may not be the objective for all 
firms. Some may believe that prices based on full costs are 
"fair," and this sense of fairness may override any desire to 
increase profits by manipulating prices. It is interesting that 
moral judgments are applied not only to price increases; 
some managers have a very low opinion of price cutters. 
The expression "cutthroat competition" was undoubtedly 
invented by businessmen with such views, and when price 
cuts are deliberately used to drive out competitors, there 
may be much to be said for this position. 
2. Price changes in conformity with marginalist rules 
may be costly, especially because they require time and 
thought. 
3. Much uncertainty about the shape of the demand 
curve-about the probable response to price change-may 
make it too risky to move away from full-cost basis for pricing. 
4. The inclusion of overhead allocations in the basis for 
price may help assure that opportunity costs are recognized. 
In a firm with flexible production facilities, overhead alloca-
tions may serve as a crude estimate of alternatives. 
Thus it is not at all clear that full-cost pricing is in 
conflict with profit maximization in every case. The case 
studies will point up the relevance of this approach in smaii 
business. 
SOPHISTICATED GOING-RATE PRICING 
A similar analysis is applicable to pricing according to what 
competitors are charging. In some situations this may be the 
5 The strongest argument for full-cost pricing appears in P. J. D. 
Wiles, Price, Cost, and Output (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), 
pp. 43 ff. 
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"safe" policy-one that will least involve the risk of retalia-
tion. Many cases of pricing at the going rate are undoubtedly 
cases of price leadership. The rivals adopt the policy of 
charging what the price leader charges and of changing 
price only when he changes price. This does not necessarily 
mean that the same firm always acts as the leader or that 
there is an awareness of who is the leader. It does not always 
mean that the largest firm or the best known firm always 
leads in price revisions. Some studies of price leadership 
suggest that when a price change by one firm is confirmed 
by the dominant firms, the new price level is established. 
And there are cases in which a firm has increased prices, 
when the other firms were unwilling to do so, only to find 
that it could not maintain volume; such a condition has 
led to a return to the old price. 
Thus in an oligopoly situation, pricing at the going rate 
is not so much a sign of competition as of the desire to avoid 
unpleasant price rivalry. And, in a case in which flexible 
pricing might run the risk of low prices and profits for the 
whole industry, it can hardly be argued that this policy is 
unwise. The case studies which follow develop other reasons 
firms may wish to follow the going rate. For one thing it 
may be cheaper, in both money and effort, to find out what 
is being charged by others than to reason about demand and 
costs. 
Thus pricing on the basis of the prices of competition is 
not necessarily inconsistent with marginalism as interpreted 
broadly. It may instead be a simple, logical, safe method for 
avoiding the costs, worry, and strife that a more individual-
istic policy might involve. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The literature on pncmg has concerned itself with many 
issues not discussed here. There are questions of price dis-
crimination, delivered pricing, quantity discounts, price lin-
ing, resale price maintenance, and so on. Some writers 
distinguish between the pricing of new products and old 
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ones. And on new products they distinguish between situa-
tions in which a "skimming price" is appropriate and those 
in which it is profitable to "penetrate" the market with low 
prices. We have deliberately avoided these issues at this 
A CLASSIFICATION OF APPROACHES TO PRICING 
Approach 
Mechanical: 
Naive Full-Cost 
Pricing 
Naive Going-Rate 
Pricing 
Other Mechanical 
Pricing Formulas 
Rational (Marginal) : 
Full-Cost Pricing 
Going-Rate 
Pricing 
Flexible Evaluations of In-
cremental Costs and Incre-
mental Revenue Resulting 
from Price Change 
Description of the technique 
and comments 
Mechanical measurement of costs 
with the addition of a customary 
profit margin (exceptions in spe-
cial circumstances) 
Mechanical imitation of the prices 
of competitors without any analy-
sis of demand and cost considera-
tions 
Rules of thumb adopted by firms 
in a particular industry 
Consistent with marginalism when 
the decision maker adopts this 
method because of uncertainties 
about competitors' reactions, about 
demand and cost, etc. Also may 
appeal to sense of fairness. 
Often a rational avoidance of 
price conflict. Usually known as 
price leadership. Ethical consider-
ations also enter in. 
Requires the estimation of de-
mand and costs. Requires con-
sideration of longrun as well as 
shortrun repercussions. 
point, though some of them will appear in our analysis of 
particular cases. Our objective in this chapter has been to 
focus on fundamentals-and the most fundamental question 
in this study has to do with the opposition between rigid 
full-cost pricing and a more flexible marginalist approach. 
It is necessary to become more precise about our system 
of classification. This chapter has placed in opposition the 
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full-cost and the marginalist positions. But we have defined 
marginalism broadly and flexibly to take into account long-
run as well as shortrun effects of price change. Such a broad 
definition blurs the contrast with full-cost pricing, for a 
sophisticated full-cost policy may be consistent with margin-
alist principles when possible retaliation and the costs of 
flexibility are taken into account. Thus the dichotomy be-
tween marginalism and full-cost pricing is misleading. The 
real dichotomy lies between mechanical, unthinking pricing 
rules on one hand and rational approaches on the other. 
The table summarizes various subcategories of this general 
classification, with comments on each approach.6 
This classification provides a framework for the analysis 
of the cases which follow. We are interested in determining 
the extent to which small business managers do in fact 
reason about their prices and do apply marginal analysis. 
While this study does not cover a representative sample, it 
does include a wide variety of industries and thus provides 
some insight into the kinds of practices that are followed, 
as well as into the reasons for these practices. But we wish 
to go beyond description and inquire into the possibility of 
improving the pricing policies of small businesses. Would it 
be profitable for some small firms to move from mechanical 
rules to more flexible policies? This type of question requires 
considerable judgment, but we shall not avoid making use 
of such judgment. By comparing the actual practices of a 
variety of firms we hope to reach some conclusions about 
the possibilities of improving the practices of some of them. 
6 This classification is closely related to a distinction made by 
Earley, in Amer. Econ. Rev., XLIV, 44·70, between those companies 
that do and do not follow marginalist approaches. But Earley is not 
exclusively concerned with pricing, and he does not consider the pos· 
sibility that marginalism and full-cost pricing may in some cases be 
perfectly consistent_ He does not consider going·rate pricing at all. 
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3 
COST AND DEMAND IN SMALL BUSINESS 
PRICING: THE CASE STUDIES 
{] T IS NOW time to tum to the findings of the present 
research project. This study covers 88 individual companies, 
with from one or two employees to more than 200. They 
comprise a great variety of industries, but may be classified 
as follows: 
Retailers 26 
Wholesalers 6 
Services 21 
Combined Retail and Service Firms 2 
Manufacturers 28 
Garden or Landscape Nurseries 5 
The main issue in this chapter and the next is whether these 
companies follow the precepts of marginalism in pricing or 
instead follow mechanical formulas, such as full-cost pricing.1 
The detailed case discussions appear in Part II, which 
the reader may wish to examine before reading further. 
Since the case writeups involve considerable subjective analy-
sis the reader should determine for himself the degree of 
his confidence in the judgments and interpretations that 
have been applied. This chapter and those to follow include 
short illustrative extracts from the cases, with references to 
Part II where necessary. 
SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
The first striking point is that few of the firms are producers 
of a single product. The manufacturers produce a variety of 
goods selling in different markets. The retailers provide a 
variety of retailing services. The service outlets also perform 
a variety of tasks. The cases that come closest to single 
product units include the billboard company, which main-
tains standard-size panels (the fact that these are scattered 
geographically does not seem to have an impact on decision 
making), and the theater (which does, however, have a 
differentiated clientele that is important in pricing decisions). 
In view of the difficulty of finding clearcut cases of single-
product firms, it is safe to conclude that multiproduct firms 
are overwhelmingly predominant in this study. This means 
that the usual assumption in economic theory of a single 
homogeneous product requires modification before the theory 
can be related to these cases. 
This chapter is concerned with the relative importance 
of cost and demand factors in pricing. The major conclu-
sions from the 88 cases are: 
I. Most of the companies do not adhere strictly to a 
1 We postpone for the moment a discussion of the possibility that 
in some cases full-cost pricing and marginalism may be consistent. 
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full-cost approach to pricing.2 They do not confine them-
selves to figuring up costs and then adding a predetermined 
margin. They show more flexibility than such a formula 
would allow-a flexibility over time to changing conditions 
and a flexibility at a given moment of time to different 
conditions in different segments of the market.3 
2. An important minority of the companies do, how-
ever, follow fairly rigid patterns in pricing, with emphasis on 
cost factors and deemphasis of demand factors. These cases 
require close examination to determine whether these rigid 
practices seem reasonable under the circumstances. 
3. Where full costs are used, their major impact is 
usually not in the form of a rigid base for a mechanical 
formula. It is rather in providing a resistance to downward 
price flexibility, not an inflexible point at which price will 
be set, but a floor below which it will not be allowed to fall. 
Full-cost formulas do provide a convenient reference point 
in pricing. When a manager is too busy to do otherwise, he 
may be willing to accept a mechanical solution to his 
decision-making problem. \Vhen the competitive pressure 
becomes greater, he may feel compelled to break away from 
this formula. The result is a degree of flexibility, but 
flexibility with restraint. 
4. Many of the cases (especially those in retailing and 
wholesaling) demonstrate that where there are markups, they 
are not always based on estimates of full cost. Instead, they 
are often based on wholesale price or manufacturer's price 
2 It is desirable to repeat what is meant by the expression "full-cost 
pricing." Much of the confusion in the literature arises from a lack of 
clarity in definition. We define it to mean a rigid system of adding a 
predetermined markup to the total of labor, materials, and overhead 
costs to arrive at price. We therefore would not include in full-cost 
pricing a system that starts with full costs but adds a markup varying 
according to market conditions. Some of the literature uses the term 
to refer to any system built upon full costs, but this broader definition 
blurs the issues. In short, the mere use of full costs does not imply 
full-cost pricing. 
s The expression "flexibility" is discussed more fully in a later 
section of this chapter. 
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with little or no attempt to allocate the fixed costs or even 
the variable costs other than wholesale costs. This is what 
Heflebower calls "gross margin pricing."4 
5. The markups used by a single firm are usually not 
uniform for all products. Important differences in markups 
from one line to another are made, usually with some 
attempt (at least subjectively) to relate them to cost 
differentials or, more importantly, to differences in demand. 
6. A few of the companies escape almost completely 
from pricing decisions by following some external guides on 
prices. In some cases this amounts to following the lead of 
larger firms in the industry. In other cases it consists of 
following the suggestions of manufacturers or wholesalers. 
(On prepriced or fair trade items this pattern is especially 
strong.) In still other cases the practice is one of simple 
imitation (which is very much like price "followership" 
except that the firm being imitated may not be a competitor). 
7. In a substantial minority of the cases the markup 
concept is not mentioned and, in fact, appears to be irrele-
vant because of the nebulous character of the costs. The 
firms do not mark up on costs unless they are confident 
that some "objective" estimates of cost are available. 
8. A few of the cases illustrate a trial-and-error process 
of pricing which apparently approaches the optimum posi-
tion suggested by marginalist economic theory. While clear-
cut cases of this are few, there is no doubt that many other 
firms do in fact base an important part of their pricing 
decisions on past experience of a trial-and-error character. 
FULL-COST PRICING WITH MODIFICATIONS 
A strict adherence to the full-cost principle is the exception. 
Very few of the firms confine themselves to an estimation 
of average costs and simply add a rigid predetermined 
margin. The great majority devote considerable attention 
to the prices of competitors and other pressures from the 
4 Heflebower, p. 367. 
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demand side. Hence this study questions a recent conclusion 
which contends that those who know their costs (or think 
they know them) base their prices on them if they can.5 
Most of our cases do not support this conclusion if it implies 
that pricing is completely cost oriented. Many of the 
businessmen interviewed spoke as though they priced on 
cost, but a closer questioning revealed that their actual 
practice was much more complex. 
It is true that many firms do estimate their full costs 
and that they do take these into account in their pricing. 
But this is far from saying that all of them automatically 
apply rigid predetermined markups to these costs. In fact, 
most of them take these costs as the starting point in pricing 
and make adjustments according to the circumstances. A 
few case excerpts will illustrate this point. 
Contractor A estimates the full cost of producing a house, but 
he modifies the price to meet market conditions. Even his 
concept of cost reflects variable estimates of the opportunity 
costs of his time. His time is less valuable in the winter, when 
business is slack, than at other seasons; he adjusts his estimates 
of cost accordingly. He also shades price on a cash sale of a 
house, recognizing the avoidance of a risk as compared with 
sales involving complicated financing. Thus the stress on full 
cost does not mean inattention to demand. 
Printing Company A also pays considerable attention to full-
cost estimates. While the management insists that prices should 
be kept on a full-cost basis, actual practice is more flexible. The 
managers are critical of "rate cutters," who, they claim, are 
responsible for the low industry profits, but they themselves 
show some willingness to adjust to market conditions when the 
necessity arises. 
5 Wiles, p. 22. Similarly, Spencer and Siegelman conclude that 
the "most widely used method of pricing employed by business firms is 
known as cost-plus pricing." See Milton H. Spencer and Louis 
Siegelman, Managerial Economics (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 
1959), p. 292. They mean by cost-plus pricing the same thing as full-
cost pricing in this study. But their conclusion is opposed to the one 
here. Perhaps the difference is that they are concerned with large 
firms, where routinized full-cost formulas simplify the multifold de-
cision-making processes, while this study is concerned with small firms. 
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Furniture Company D starts with a cost estimate, including an 
allocation of indirect labor and factory overhead. But the man-
agement modifies the target return to meet market conditions. 
These cases demonstrate that an initial reference to full cost 
does not mean that demand is ignored in pricing. We could 
present still additional illustrations of how firms modify 
their prices to meet market conditions. In fact, despite the 
unrepresentative nature of the sample in this study, the 
following generalization seems warranted: Most small busi-
nesses that claim to base prices on full costs do in fact take 
demand into account in their actual pricing. 
This generalization reflects the fact that managements 
do not give up all their flexibility when profitable opportuni-
ties appear on the horizon. If the rewards for breaking away 
from a pat formula are great enough, or if the penalties for 
refusing to break away are great enough, most firms will 
modify the prices based on costs. 
CASES OF THE RIGID 
ADHERENCE TO FULL COSTS 
We shall now consider that minority of cases in which there 
is a strict adherence to full-cost formulas in pricing. These 
are the extreme full-cost cases. 
Furniture Company A adds a 90 percent markup to direct labor 
and materials. Even though most sales are on a bidding basis, 
the management adheres rigidly to the markup, taking no 
advantage of favorable markets and avoiding lower prices to tap 
new markets. The firm could sell a greater volume at present 
prices; in a sense a queue has formed for the company's products. 
The company rations its capacity by simply refusing to bid on 
certain jobs, thus cutting itself off from part of its potential 
market. 
Is this behavior reasonable? Several reasons favor the prac-
tice. The firm can always expect to have a cushion of 
business to fall back on if the regular business declines. It 
can and does bid on government contracts (still at a 90 
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percent markup) when there is excess capacity in its plant. 
This provides some security for profits and employment. 
Furthermore, the company would find it necessary to expand 
capacity if it tried to supply all potential customers. There 
is a risk that this added capacity would not always be needed. 
In view of the uncertainty about the future, can we really 
say that this refusal to adjust capacity to the market is unrea-
sonable? It may instead be the best way of assuring longrun 
profits. Or perhaps the management prefers a certain flow 
of profits to a less certain flow. One cannot say that such 
a pattern of behavior is irrational. 
Thus the full-cost policy of this furniture company may 
be interpreted as a perfectly reasonable attempt to put long-
run profits ahead of shortrun exploitation of the market. 
Perhaps it reflects an attempt to maximize the longrun 
utility of the owner's income, taking into account that a 
gamble on higher shortrun profits involves chances for both 
gains and losses, and that the expected utility of the gains 
may be less than the expected utility of the losses. This 
suggests a conclusion to be developed later: that the per-
sonality and objectives of the owner-manager are important. 
A less cautious type of manager-one more prone to take 
risks-might well break away from the full-cost policy to 
increase his shortrun profits, in the hope that this would 
also lead to higher longrun profits. 
It should be clear that, even in this most extreme of our 
full-cost cases, demand is indirectly an important influence. 
The fact of the excess demand at given prices is the very 
condition permitting the mechanical reference to cost. If 
demand were much reduced, it seems certain that this firm 
would be forced to more flexible pricing policies, since the 
idle capacity would create great temptations to reduce price. 
The two feed stores included in this study are also rather 
strict followers of definite markups (in this case absolute 
rather than percentage markups) on cost. The markup is 
on the wholesale cost rather than manufacturing costs; these 
cases might better fall into the section on "gross margin 
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pricing" which comes later. But the point is that this cost-
plus price policy is possible because the market in general 
follows the same pattern; the retail prices generally are above 
the wholesale cost by the amount of the margin. 
It is important to note that this rigidity in markup can 
mean considerable flexibility in the price itself. This is 
certainly true for these feed stores, for the base for their 
markups is constantly changing. Thus one should not accept 
too freely the idea that cost-plus pricing and price rigidity 
necessarily go together. 
The printing cases provide added illustrations of this 
policy of extreme full-cost pricing. Printing Companies C 
and D claim to be strong adherents of full costs through 
good times and bad. The manager of Printing Company C 
even insists that he would recognize higher unit fixed costs 
when volume is down. Some costing systems in the printing 
industry have the effect of showing higher costs at lower 
volumes. The industry does not follow the practice of 
estimating standard costs at "normal" percentages of ca-
pacity which is common in the steel and automobile indus-
tries. If the full-cost theory were followed strictly, this 
would mean higher prices in bad times than in good. This 
would not appear to be a feasible policy. Printing Company 
C probably gets around this by varying its markup. But it 
is strange that such companies use cost estimates which 
move countercyclically. One suspects that costs are less 
important in their pricing than they believe. 
FULL COSTS AS RESISTANCE POINTS 
OR REFERENCE POINTS 
The argument so far has been ( 1) that full-cost pricing in 
the small businesses examined in this study (and presumably 
in small business in general) is less prevalent than shown in 
some studies of big business, and ( 2) that most of the 
companies starting out with cost in pricing do show some 
adaptation to market conditions. The evidence indicates 
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that the firms usually do take both demand and cost into 
account and do often move away from full costs when it 
seems profitable to do so. 
Does this mean that we should ignore full costs as an 
influence on prices? Not at all. It is clear that in a sub-
stantial proportion of our cases there are references to full 
costs in pricing that, at the minimum, offer some resistance 
to full flexibility. This conclusion is illustrated in the fol-
lowing case extracts. 
The Laundry Firm included in the study shows some flexibility 
in its markups on full cost. But the management insists on full 
cost before the markup as a floor below which it will not go. 
The result has been a loss of some offseason business that would 
have added more revenue than costs. 
Printing Company A also resists lowering price below full cost. 
The management believes that cutting price depresses the market 
and reduces industry profits and that it damages customer good-
will. Furthermore, there is a danger that jobs taken below cost 
will interfere with the production of more profitable work, since 
it is very difficult to time jobs exactly so as to use up idle 
capacity. 
The Air-Conditioning Contractor refused to go below full cost 
on an important contract that would have added profits by 
making use of capacity. The management is willing to vary the 
profit markup and even to adjust salaries, but plans to continue 
using full cost as a floor even while it recognizes that it some-
times loses opportunities for added profits as a result. 
Not many other cases illustrate full costs as resistance points 
in pricing so clearly as these three. But it seems reasonable 
to suppose that most of the other companies that compute 
full costs are influenced by these figures. They use these 
cost estimates more often as "reference points" than "resist-
ance points"; the result is reduced price flexibility both 
upward and downward. Estimates of full costs are "informa-
tion." They may not seem always to be the most relevant 
kind of information. But in business situations in which 
information is scarce and the shapes of the demand and 
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cost functions are uncertain, it seems quite reasonable that 
management should be influenced by the figures that do 
exist. Thus full costs take on an importance not indicated 
by pure economic theory. They provide "reference points" 
that help management reach decisions rapidly when a more 
complete analysis might mean costly delay. They do not 
require a rigid, unthinking application; our cases suggest 
that they are only one element entering into pricing 
decisions of most of the small firms that use them. 
MARKUPS ON WHOLESALE COST: 
"GROSS MARGIN PRICING" 
The retail firms covered by this study refer without exception 
to wholesale cost rather than full costs in their pricing. 
They add markups sometimes expressed as percentages of 
wholesale cost and sometimes as percentages of retail price. 
It is true that these markups reflect costs as well as demand 
influences, but the point is that accounting estimates of 
these costs above wholesale price usually do not enter into 
the pricing decisions.6 The accounting for such costs is done 
on a wide basis-usually storewide-with no allocation to 
particular items. Therefore, any reflection of the "costs" of 
particular items involves considerable managerial judgment 
of a subjective nature. 
The markups on wholesale cost, like those on full cost, 
are variable. No stores in our sample use the same markup 
percentage on every line of goods. There are differences, 
however, among the pricing practices of these stores. The 
most important differences are these: 
1. The extent to which the analysis for pricing is 
internal (within the firm). Some of the stores do all their 
own pricing; at the other extreme, some simply follow the 
suggested prices (including "fair trade" prices) of manu-
facturers or wholesalers. 
6 The departmentalized college store is an exception; its manage-
ment does base margins on allocated overhead costs. 
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2. The degree of flexibility in price over time. Some 
stores change prices frequently; others, at the opposite 
extreme, seldom run "sales" or mark down prices. Those 
stores selling highly seasonal goods and fashion goods are 
generally more likely to mark down than others. 
The first example is a case of low flexibility in pricing. 
Gift Shop A follows suggested prices on some items. It classifies 
the remaining items as "competitive," with a 50 percent markup 
on wholesale, and "other," with a 100 percent markup on 
wholesale. The markups are not a result of internal manage-
ment analysis but rather of custom, imitation, or advice from 
wholesalers. The manager does not change markups; she avoids 
special sales, though she occasionally "gives a price" on an item 
that has been on the shelves a long time. 
The owner-manager of this gift shop determines the inflexi-
ble price policy. She is not the type to experiment with 
prices. She would object on ethical grounds to exploitation 
of demand differentials; she also believes this would be bad 
business. The fact that her successors in the business (who 
purchased it from her) have adopted more flexible price 
policies, with special sales and widespread markdowns, 
suggests that personal goals and traits are important influ-
ences on pricing. 
There is a continuum from low to high flexibility in 
the remaining retailing cases. Some stores restrict markdowns 
to annual or semiannual sales, refusing to modify price at 
any other time. Some experiment continually with price 
policy. The four department stores and five men's clothing 
stores covered in Part II illustrate such differences in price 
flexibility. These cases suggest a hypothesis that deserves 
further study: Stores that sell to low income or medium 
income customers appear to give more attention to price 
policy and are more flexible in pricing than those that sell 
to the wealthy. This hypothesis seems reasonable. The 
stores supplying wealthy customers have probably more to 
gain from nonprice considerations, such as service, store 
appearance, and atmosphere. In fact, they gain from the 
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creation of a "store image" which deemphasizes price com-
petition and assumes that the customer is above petty com-
petitive comparisons. And they probably face less severe 
competition from their rivals. Thus price policy seems to 
depend in part on the class of clientele to which the store 
is appealing. 
VARYING MARKUPS BY CUSTOMERS 
AND PRODUCT LINES 
The great majority of the companies using markups in 
pricing vary those markups from one product to another. 
This practice may be called "cross-sectional flexibility," since 
it reflects a willingness of management to adapt pricing to 
the conditions facing the particular commodity. The prac-
tice is also referred to as "individualization" of pricing. The 
detailed case discussions in Part II contain sections on 
variable markups including discussions of the adaptation of 
markups to different segments of the market. Part of these 
variations are in the form of price discrimination-the ex-
ploitation of differentials in the individual willingness and 
ability to pay for the product. Part consist of adapting the 
markups on product lines to competitive conditions. Gen-
erally high turnover items carry low markups; this fact 
reflects both the lower costs of stocking those goods and the 
greater competition and the relatively high elasticity of 
demand. 
Sometimes the markup differentials are based on custom 
or the suggestions of outside parties rather than an internal 
analysis. But these external guides in turn appear to be 
based on rough evaluations of market forces. The internally 
determined markups even more clearly reflect an evaluation 
of what is possible in terms of demand and competition. 
This suggests an important generalization: The small busi-
nesses using markups in pricing at least partially adapt those 
markups to market forces, or they follow custom or external 
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suggestions that take those forces into account. No doubt 
some of the businesses are more successful than others in 
doing this; the methods used in this study could hardly 
measure the extent of such success. But the study clearly 
indicates that the managers of these small businesses are 
not naive followers of a policy of a single markup percentage 
on cost. 
PRICING WITHOUT MARKUPS 
It would be a mistake to conclude that pricing always 
involves some reference to cost estimates. None of the 
nursery companies gives much attention to costs of indi-
vidual products. This does not mean that such companies 
ignore costs in pricing; some of the managers claim their 
prices are based on cost. But what they mean is vague 
"feelings" about cost. The only cost information available 
in these companies is for the most part to be found on the 
income statements for the firm as a whole. These state-
ments tell the managers whether satisfactory profits above 
costs are made. The statements do not provide information 
about the costs of individual items, on which markups are 
possible. How do nurseries price their products? The 
process is difficult to describe. But in the five cases in this 
study, considerable stress is placed on competition and the 
prices people are willing to pay, as well as on the level of 
profits. 
A quite different case is the radio and television repair 
shop. The owner charges a standard price on each service 
call and each bench job without regard to the time put in 
on the job. Obviously this practice precludes the use of a 
markup on each job. 
Such cases suggest another hypothesis: When costs are 
nebulous (when it is difficult to determine either the full 
cost or the wholesale cost of an item) markups are not used 
in pricing. The revenue and cost figures on the income 
statements serve a homeostatic function of indicating overall 
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whether performance is satisfactory.7 If it is not, the result 
may be price changes, but the accounts do not indicate which 
items will be repriced or how much these revisions should be. 
TRIAL AND ERROR AND 
OTHER DEMAND INDICATORS 
Most firms are uncertain about the nature of their cost and 
demand functions. How is it possible for them to apply 
reason to pricing, when the very information that is appli-
cable is highly uncertain? This is not so difficult a problem 
as it may seem at first. Trial and error may help a firm 
estimate which prices are more profitable or less and thus 
make the direct measurement of cost and revenue functions 
unnecessary. The billboard case illustrates this quite force-
fully. 
The Billboard Company is aggressive in raising rates to the level 
the traffic will bear. The company seeks information on what 
other firms are charging. More important, it experiments with 
pricing, finding out whether higher rates actually lead to lower 
volume. There is little doubt that this firm is increasing profits 
by this type of price manipulation. 
Few of our cases indicate quite so clearly the successful 
application of trial and error in pricing. It is reasonable to 
suppose, however, that a high proportion of the companies 
use past experience with higher and lower prices as a guide 
to future practice. 
It is quite clear that no company covered by this study 
uses refined techniques of market research or psychological 
analysis. There is no evidence of a single locally financed 
statistical study in the whole sample. No manager attempted 
to draw a demand curve of the sort popular in economics 
1 The analogy with a homeostat, which will hunt for a new equi· 
librium when it is disturbed, seems useful in interpreting much 
business behavior. Many managers are motivated by their income 
statements to make decisions because of their dissatisfaction with overall 
income. 
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textbooks. But the majority of the firms did recognize 
demand forces. Where do they get information on those 
forces? 
I. First, the trial-and-error process just discussed is a 
source of information. Small firms do not usually keep 
records of this experience; they do not apply systematic 
analysis. But they do learn subjectively from the past what 
happens when prices of different items are increased or 
decreased. More systematic record keeping might help im-
prove performance, for it is easy to draw the wrong con-
clusions from experience that is not evaluated carefully. 
2. In particular, information on "volume" is mentioned 
by many managers as an influence on pricing. This information 
is readily available. In a small business even casual observa-
tion tells something about the volume of sales. And some 
of these companies do maintain systematic records item by 
item on the quantities sold. When the volume of an item 
falls off, the management may take this as an indicator that 
lower prices are needed as an offset. This kind of volume 
information does not indicate the elasticity of demand and 
thus does not indicate whether a price reduction would be 
profitable. But the volume may indicate whether or not the 
demand has shifted. In short, volume information provides 
signals that may suggest the need for decision, but it is not 
very helpful in predicting the results of such decision. 
3. Information on the prices charged by others is useful 
in evaluating competition. A few of the companies make 
systematic surveys of the prices of others. (The college 
department store is an illustration.) Since most of the com-
panies are differentiated to some extent from their com-
petitors, they cannot assume that the demand is perfectly 
elastic at the prices charged by competitors. They can set 
their prices in relation to those of competitors, on the basis 
of subjective evaluations of the importance of price differ-
ences. Again they usually rely on past experience. 
4. Another demand indicator is the time it takes to 
sell a product. This is closely related to volume, but in some 
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cases (such as the building of houses) production is discon-
tinuous over time and the manager thinks in terms of the 
time the product is unsold. The manager knows this for his 
own products. He can also estimate the time it takes 
competitors to sell theirs. In the case of houses, he sees 
want ads and "for sale" signs that indicate how the market 
is going. He also can get information on the prices being 
charged. The time it takes him to sell his own houses not 
only tells him something about the market, but it also 
exerts a financial pressure that may force him to reduce price. 
5. Some demand information comes completely from 
the outside and has nothing to do with the firm's own 
experience. For example, the bowling alley made a thorough 
survey, not of competitors (it is a monopoly), but of the 
experience of other firms in similar localities. This survey 
provided highly informative data on what prices were ac-
ceptable to customers. Such information is also available 
from outside data-collecting organizations. The same bowl-
ing alley profited from a national survey of rates and volume 
made by an accounting firm. Wholesalers and manufac-
turers, trade journals and trade associations, also constitute 
sources of demand information. No doubt this information 
from external sources varies widely in reliability and rele-
vance, and no doubt some managers misjudge its importance 
to their own operations. 
A NOTE ON FLEXIBILITY, ADAPT ABILITY, 
AND MECHANICAL DECISION RULES 
The discussion so far has avoided a terminological problem 
that deserves attention. We can speak of pricing decisions 
as flexible, as adaptable to market conditions, as imaginative, 
or as nonmechanical. These terms are not synonymous; each 
applies to a somewhat different aspect. 
I. The first aspect is flexibility. It has to do with the 
extent of change, of price differences. It should be possible 
to measure flexibility on an objective scale, according to 
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whether change is frequent and large and whether differences 
in markups from product to product are numerous and 
significant. Difficulties occur in determining whether a 
firm's practices are flexible or not. In fact, practices that 
seem flexible in one industry may appear rigid in another. 
Unfortunately, flexibility itself involves several dimensions. 
There is flexibility over time: the extent of changes from 
period to period. There is also cross-sectional flexibility: the 
extent to which the firm uses different rules for different 
segments of its business. To make the matter even more 
complicated, there may be complete rigidity in the pricing 
formula resulting in high flexibility in the prices themselves 
(as in the feed store cases already discussed) . Flexible prices 
and flexible pricing are not the same thing. Another com-
plication is that "price lining," which on the surface may 
seem a rigid conformity to preset prices, may actually involve 
a flexible variation of qualities fitted into the particular price 
lines. 
2. The second aspect is adaptability. This measures the 
extent to which the prices conform to the conditions of the 
market and to the requirements for maximizing the firm's 
objectives. There is a reasonable presumption that a firm 
with flexible prices is usually adapting to a changing environ-
ment; much of the discussion in this and the next chapter is 
based on such a presumption. But there are important 
exceptions, which we shall discuss, in which a rigid pricing 
pattern may be a sound adaptation to the market. For 
example, in oligopoly, flexibility may set off a chain of 
undesired reactions. Also, when there are hundreds of pricing 
decisions and the cost of individual analyses is too high to 
justify constant revisions, flexibility may be too expensive in 
terms of managerial and clerical time. 
3. The third aspect is the extent to which pricing is 
mechanical or programed. This measures the extent to which 
pricing is done by formula rather than on an ad hoc basis. 
The presumption is that nonmechanical pricing will be both 
more flexible and more adaptable; in many cases this pre-
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sumption seems reasonable. Imaginative pricing would ap-
pear to require considerable judgment that cannot be fitted 
into mechanical rules and that requires flexibility and 
adaptation to changing conditions. But again the issue is 
complex. A mechanical markup on a changing wholesale 
cost may mean high flexibility over time as wholesale price 
quotations vary. Mechanical rules permit a programed 
delegation of pricing decisions and savings of management 
time that may mean a profitable adaptation to the circum-
stances. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter does not support those previous surveys of 
pricing which suggest that a mechanical, cost-oriented ap-
proach to pricing prevails in business. A close examination 
of the cases in this study indicates considerable flexibility in 
pricing, with a great deal of adaptation to demand. The 
mechanical pricers are the exception rather than the rule. 
It would appear that small businesses are flexible in pricing 
both because of external forces (competitive pressures) and 
internal organizational simplicity (few decision makers). 
Thus this flexibility is a result both of the weakness of the 
small firm in the market place and its strength in internal 
communication. 
This chapter has touched on the issue of marginalism 
but has not faced up to it squarely. Chapter 4 will deal 
more directly with the question of whether these small 
businessmen do behave the way marginalist theory describes 
them and whether they strive for maximum profits. 
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MARGINALISM AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
IN SMALL BUSINESS PRICING 
§HIS CHAPTER deals with two central, interrelated 
questions about pricing in small business: ( 1) Do the firms 
follow the precepts of marginalism in their pricing? ( 2) Do 
they attempt to maximize profits? 
Previous studies are in conflict on these issues. Some 
note management's ignorance of both the marginalist theory 
and of the kinds of information required by that theory. 
Other studies are impressed by the attention management 
(in some large firms, at least) gives to cost differentiation and 
market forces as evidence of marginalist tendencies. Some 
writers emphasize that profits are only one of a set of 
multiple objectives, while others are impressed by the 
persistent force of the profit motive. 
An examination of the cases supports an intermediate 
position on these questions. Our study indicates little direct 
measurement of marginal or incremental variables but reveals 
trial and error and other approaches that may be at least 
partially consistent with marginalism. The stress on profits 
appears to vary from company to company, partly because 
of differences in the motivation of management and partly 
because of competitive pressures. There is enough variety in 
the cases to preclude dogmatic generalizations. 
DIRECT MEASUREMENTS OF MARGINAL VALUES 
Some critics of economic theory have argued that business-
men cannot use marginal analysis unless they can measure 
their revenue and cost functions accurately. Do the com-
panies in this study attempt such measurements? There is 
extremely little evidence that they do. In fact, there are few 
cases in which serious attention is given even to the most 
elementary separation of fixed and variable costs. The fol-
lowing cases are among the few illustrating any systematic 
attention to the fixed-variable cost dichotomy. 
The Bowling Alley made use of break-even charts which required 
a separation of fixed and variable costs. Management developed 
the break-even analysis in deciding whether to enter the bowling 
business. The charts assumed that costs were linear, with 
variable costs directly proportional to volume. They recognized 
only one semivariable cost; it was split between the fixed and 
variable categories. The breakdown had little influence on 
pricing, which was more concerned with what the market would 
bear. 
Printing Company A also is aware of the distinction between 
fixed and variable costs and of the fact that labor costs are fixed 
for short period fluctuations in volume. The low level of 
incremental (variable) costs offers a temptation to reduce prices 
when capacity is idle, but management tries (not always suc-
cessfully) to resist this temptation. 
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Perhaps the recognition of the low level of incremental costs 
had some influence on pricing in this printing company, for 
the firm did depart from its full-cost formula at times. But 
cost estimates were among many influences on pricing, and 
they took a secondary role. 
The next case illustrates estimates of "direct" costs, 
which again might function somewhat as incremental costs. 
The discussion shows, however, that they have even less to 
do with marginalist reasoning and with actual pricing than 
the variable costs estimated in the preceding cases. 
Department Store A uses an accounting system which provides 
data on "direct" costs in individual departments. In manu-
facturing, "direct costing" has to do with finding variable costs; 
but in the system of retail accounting used by this store, the 
"direct" costs include costs that are fixed as well as variable. 
The cost breakdown is of no use in estimating changes in total 
costs resulting from decision making. Furthermore, it plays no 
part in the company's pricing. 
Other case citations are unnecessary. There are other firms 
(but only a few) giving formal attention to fixed, variable, 
or similar cost categories, but no cases suggesting that this 
cost analysis had much influence on pricing. At the same 
time, most of the managements must have been generally 
aware, in a subjective way, that their full costs were not 
always the most relevant factors in pricing; otherwise there 
would not have been so much flexibility in pricing as we 
have shown. The retail stores, for example, were certainly 
aware that most of their costs above wholesale were fixed. 
The markdowns on special sales certainly reflected a rough 
kind of incremental reasoning, even if they did not involve 
pencil-and-paper estimates. 
The discussion so far has emphasized cost estimates. 
The conclusions would apply even more forcefully on the 
demand side. No firm in the sample used any quantitative 
estimates of "marginal revenue" or "elasticity of demand." 
If marginalism requires quantitative estimates of incremental 
values, it must be rare in smaii business. But this is not what 
marginalism requires if it is defined broadly. 
Returning to formal cost breakdowns, a further com-
ment on their relation to marginalism is in order. We shaii 
show that marginalism does not necessarily depend on such 
breakdowns. But how about the reverse relationship: Do 
breakdowns into fixed, variable, and similar categories imply 
marginalism? Earley's study of large firms might lead one 
to such a conclusion, for Earley places much stress on the 
segmentation and differentiation of costs as evidence of 
marginalism.1 The cases just cited would raise doubts about 
such a conclusion, for our companies made little, if any, use 
of the cost breakdowns in decision making. Earley presents 
evidence that his firms did use the breakdowns, in both 
pricing and other types of decisions. There is a clear differ-
ence between the cases in his study and in ours; this may 
indicate an area in which smaii firms have lagged behind the 
"excellently managed" large firms. It may instead mean that 
small firms do not require such breakdowns. 
SUBJECTIVE MARGINALISM 
The discussion so far might be taken to indicate the 
irrelevance of marginalism as a description of small business 
behavior. Such is far from the case. As Machlup has stated, 
"We should understand that the construction of a pattern 
for the analytical description of a process is not the same 
thing as the actual process in everyday life; and we should 
not expect to find in everyday life the definite numerical 
estimates that are part of the scientific pattern."2 
Did the firms in this study manage by subjective esti-
mate and trial and error to approach the position indicated 
by marginal analysis? This is not a question which leads to 
exact conclusions. Even in a single case it would be difficult 
1 Earley, Amer. Econ. Rev., XLVI, 44-70. 
2 Fritz Machlup, "Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research," 
American Economic Review, XXXVI (Sept., 1946), 547. 
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to "prove" or "disprove" that the manager behaved in a 
manner consistent with economic theory. 
There is certainly evidence of practices in many of our 
firms that point in the direction of marginalism: 
I. The approach by trial and error to prices that led to 
higher profits. 
2. The widespread practice of varying markups on 
different lines of goods. 
3. The flexibility of markups over time in some of the 
firms, with apparent adjustment to changing market condi-
tions. 
4. The ability of managers with relatively inflexible 
policies to justify these policies in terms of the undesirable 
impact on revenues (and sometimes costs) of alternative 
practices. 
5. The probability that imitative pricing and the rigid 
adherence to suggested prices permits firms to apply prices 
which outsiders have learned from experience are consistent 
with demand conditions. 
TWO STEPS IN FULL-COST PRICING: A PARTIAL 
RECONCILIATION WITH MARGINALISM 
Is full-cost pricing as practiced by some of our small firms 
inconsistent with marginalism? This section will argue that 
it may not be. It is important to recognize that there are 
two steps in the application of a full-cost formula: (I) the 
choice of the formula itself, including determination of the 
markups; and ( 2) the routine use of the formulas in setting 
individual prices. 
Our cases suggest that market forces and tradition play 
a key role in the first step. The firms do not select the 
formulas at random. They choose markups that are viable. 
A furniture company that charges a 6 percent profit markup 
on some lines and I5 percent on others has probably found 
that competition makes such a pattern desirable. If the 
companies aim at "target returns" (the interviewees some-
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times referred to such targets), these are probably more an 
expression of what is possible than a ceiling on what these 
firms wish to earn (though we shall also cite evidence of 
firms that appear to restrain their effort to increase profits). 
Once the formulas are established, there is much to be 
said for their mechanical application. This is especially true 
where there are hundreds or thousands of pricing decisions, 
as in printing. The routinization of pricing relieves manage-
ment of the necessity for individual analyses. In a sense, the 
formula is a means by which market forces are brought to 
bear on the individual pricing decision. 
Thus full-cost pricing is not necessarily antithetical to 
marginalism or profit maximization. It reduces the costs of 
decision making. It may also make particular sense in an 
oligopolistic market in which departure from full costs may 
set off a chain of undesirable competitive reactions. (This 
point is a central topic of the next chapter dealing with 
market structures.) The firm may find it more profitable to 
concentrate on nonprice competition which involves fewer 
risks of retaliation. 
In any case, most of the companies that refer to full 
costs in pricing do not apply the formulas in a rigid way. 
Small businesses have an advantage over more bureaucratic 
large firms in that they can more readily depart from their 
rules when they see fit to do so. In our cases, full costs act 
as resistance points or reference points that influence pricing 
but do not impose mechanical solutions. Full-cost pricing 
as practiced by these firms is not in direct antithesis to 
marginalism, though it may interfere with complete flexi-
bility in pricing. 
SHORTRUN VERSUS LONGRUN 
FACTORS IN PRICING 
Pricing decisions today have an impact on immediate and 
longrun profits. A decision that increases immediate profits 
may be inconsistent with longrun profit maximization. Thus 
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it is possible to rationalize some pricing behavior that appears 
in the shortrun to be unprofitable in terms of longer run 
repercussions. 
Earley defines marginalism in terms of a "preponderance 
of short-range over long-range horizons."3 He argues that 
rapid innovation makes longrun estimates of costs and 
revenues less relevant than they might seem in static 
economic analysis. This point is well taken, but innovation 
does not destroy the complete relevance of longrun con-
siderations in pricing. Furthermore, our companies are un-
doubtedly subject to less innovative change than Earley's 
sample of progressive, large firms. Some of our firms are 
influenced by longrun considerations, and it seems reason-
able that they should be. 
An extreme illustration should make this clear. All of 
our printing firms receive some orders without predetermined 
price quotations. They could maximize their immediate 
profits by boosting their charges on the orders when they 
are complete. The manager of Printing Company B is 
instead extremely careful to see that his cost accumulations 
(the basis for the final bill) involve no padding. Obviously 
he is more concerned with the impact of his charges on 
future business than on how much profit he can extract from 
individual jobs. This illustration is based on an extreme 
definition of short run. We shall cite another, less extreme, 
case in which the evaluation of longer run effects play a 
strategic role in pricing. 
Concrete Products Firm A does not charge all it can get in the 
immediate market. It does not exploit its semimonopoly position 
to the fullest; it chooses instead to build a reputation for low 
prices that creates longrun relationships with the customers 
(contractors). The manager hopes that this policy will con-
tribute to a gradual growth in sales over the years. 
The references to "goodwill" in several cases were further 
evidences of longrun influences on pricing. Printing Corn-
s Earley, Amer. Econ. Rev., XLVI, 59. 
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pany A hesitated to charge either more or less than full cost 
plus a predetermined markup, partly because of a fear that 
greater flexibility might damage customer relations. The 
management wished to avoid the impression of exploiting 
the market and of giving special deals to some customers. 
This is another reason that full-cost pricing is not necessarily 
inconsistent with marginalism, if we interpret marginalism 
to include such longer run forces. The decision maker 
should take into account the discounted loss in revenue 
that might result from the feeling that his prices are "unfair." 
This is not to say that all of our cases reveal a strong 
influence of longrun factors. Some firms in fact appear to 
charge as much as the immediate market will permit. An 
illustration is the clay refractory, which has developed a 
new product on which it charges 80 percent more than on 
the old, despite the fact that it costs about the same. The 
manager believes that eventually competition will force his 
price down. In the meantime, he is making large profits. 
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
Profit maximization is a common assumption in economic 
analysis. This does not mean that economists believe that 
exclusive attention to profit is a correct description of 
behavior; most economists have been willing to recognize a 
multitude of motivations. The justification for the profit 
maximization assumption is that for broad segments of the 
economy it is operational; it leads to useful predictions. 
When we examine the decision-making process in detail, 
we can no longer be satisfied with this assumption. One 
major research question is the relative role of profits and 
other objectives in pricing decisions. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to assign precise weights 
to the objectives influencing business decisions. The fol-
lowing discussion, based on a subjective evaluation of cases, 
suggests that there are degrees in the strength and persistence 
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of the profit motive from one firm to another. Profit 
maximization is not the single, all-pervasive goal in pricing. 
Gift Shop A has already been mentioned as a firm with fairly 
rigid policies on pricing. The owner maintains strong religious 
and ethical objections to charging what the market will bear. 
She is sensitive to the opinion of her customers (many are close 
acquaintances). She disapproves of some high markups she 
observes on the same items carried in stores in other cities. 
The behavior of this owner-manager illustrates a point made 
by Oxenfeldt: "Businessmen have not been able to separate 
their business lives completely from their social relationships. 
While the ethical standards of business are very different-
one would call them lower-from those governing most 
personal relationships ... , businessmen are partly motivated 
by ethical notions."4 
An even clearer illustration of restraint in profit max-
imization is the book department of the departmentalized 
college store. This case is of special interest even though it 
is hardly representative. 
The Departmentalized College Store sells books to students 
below list price, earning a lower margin than is usual in similar 
stores elsewhere. The store could earn a larger profit by charging 
more. It instead feels an obligation to hold down student costs 
by operating on a low profit basis. 
The store is owned by the college. There can be no doubt 
that this fact is central to the understanding of its price 
policy. The college has, in a sense, placed the store in a 
public utility category. Casual observation suggests that in 
private business the profit motive does in fact exert a greater 
pressure than in this store; it is difficult to imagine this 
degree of altruism on a widespread scale in our small firms. 
Nevertheless, there are other examples in our study of 
firms that appear to seek "fair" rather than maximum profits. 
They include: 
4 Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market Practices 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 579. 
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1. A shoe store in which the partners claim to adopt a 
"live and let live" policy. They do not seem to exploit their 
monopoly position in "prescription" work (jobs involving 
special heels, braces, etc.). Perhaps this fact is not a result 
of profit restraint alone; it may also reflect the avoidance of 
the work and "worry" required by a fuller attention to 
profits. 
2. The radio and television repair shop that charges 
standard rates on all bench jobs, despite apparent opportuni-
ties for price discrimination. The statement of the owner 
that he would be forced to discriminate if this business were 
his only source of income suggests that he is not now 
extracting the maximum possible profits from his customers. 
This may illustrate a more general point: that the stress on 
profits depends in part on competitive pressures. An owner-
manager who is satisfied with his present status-who is 
earning what he considers a reasonable income and who is 
not threatened by competitive pressures-may not search as 
diligently for added profits and may be more concerned 
with "fairness" and "goodwill." 
There are, however, many cases in the study in which 
the stress on profits is clear and intense. At the other end 
of the continuum from the cases with which this section 
started is an auto repair shop which illustrates a stress on 
profits that takes the firm into practices that many might 
consider on the borderline of ethical business conduct. 
Automobile Repair Shop A refers to full cost in its pricing. 
But the manager achieves flexibility by adding or subtracting 
"frills." When he thinks that a customer is cost conscious, for 
example an insurance company, he takes care to do only the 
work that is necessary. In other instances he is more "liberal" 
in adding extra jobs that boost the total bill and the total profit. 
The manager also sometimes reduces costs by replacing with 
used parts for customers who do not watch for this possibility. 
The contrast between Gift Shop A and the automobile repair 
shop demonstrates clearly that there is a substantial range in 
the intensity of the search for profits through price manipula-
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tion. The manager of the gift shop would find it impossible 
to resort to the practices found in the auto repair shop; they 
would violate her code of ethics. The manager of the 
repair shop would surely be more flexible in his search for 
profits if he were running the gift shop. Thus the per-
sonalities and objectives of the individuals play a significant 
role in pricing; it is not entirely a matter of cost and demand, 
but it is also a matter of tastes and personal propensities. 
It is true that the market environment sets a boundary on 
what is possible. The price policies of the gift shop might 
mean failure in the auto repair shop, where the flexible 
striving for profits might be essential for survival. But there 
is no denying that the personal element is important, as is 
clearly seen in the change in the price policies of the gift 
shop that came with a change in ownership. 
CONCLUSIONS ON MARGINALISM 
AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
This chapter does not conclude with dogmatic generaliza-
tions on marginalism and profit maximization in small 
businesses. The practices of the firms are variable. Very few 
use direct incremental measurements in pricing. A majority 
probably at least move in the direction of marginalism by 
trial and error and by imitation. There are four reasons that 
some firms fall short of an extreme version of the marginalist 
position: 
I. Some managers are motivated not only by the desire 
for profits but by other objectives, particularly of an ethical 
character, that call for restraint in profit seeking. If margin-
alism is interpreted broadly, as many economists prefer, to 
include all objectives, this point is not in conflict with the 
theory. 
2. The information and skills required by a full applica-
tion of marginalism are not easily available. Most of these 
firms cannot afford a great deal of experimentation with 
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pricing, so that even the trial-and-error approach is limited 
in its capacity to indicate maximum profits. 
3. Some managers are satisfied with less than the 
optimum. They are more concerned with making a reason-
able living than with getting the highest possible profit. 
They often simplify life by accepting outside pricing guides, 
such as the suggestions of manufacturers and wholesalers. 
4. Some managers simply do not accept the logic of 
marginalism, refusing to price any product at a level that 
does not return a profit above full cost. 
COMPARISONS WITH OTHER CONCLUSIONS 
Perhaps the best way to review the findings in Chapters 3 and 
4 is to compare them with conclusions of other authors. 
1. P. W. S. Andrews-A businessman will "try to avoid 
quoting a price which he could not maintain in the long 
run .... Goodwill is too precious a commodity, and takes 
too long to build up, for it to be thrown away on a wrong 
pricing policy."5 Our study supports the importance of such 
longrun, goodwill considerations, but with varying degrees 
from one case to another. Our study does not support so 
widespread a reference to cost as the base for pricing as 
Andrews6 and other British observers seem to find. 
2. James S. Earley-"Most of these companies [in his 
sample of 'excellently managed' companies] apparently either 
consciously pursue the advantages of price-cost differentia-
tion or make so many exceptions to uniform full-cost-plus 
pricing that it has ceased to be recognized as an objective."7 
Earley's conclusion is in strong contrast to that of full-cost 
theorists; it is of course based on a different sample, one 
which is also entirely different from the one in this study. 
5 P. W. S. Andrews, "Industrial Analysis in Economics," in 
Thomas Wilson and P. W. S. Andrews (eds.), Oxford Studies in the 
Price Mechanism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951}, p. 163. 
6 See his Manufacturing Business (London: Macmillan Co., 1949), 
especially chapter 5. 
7 Earley, Amer. Econ. Rev., XLVI, 56. 
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Our findings are somewhere between; we find many refer-
ences to full cost but many departures from full-cost formulas 
because of market conditions. We find much less application 
of cost breakdowns than Earley discovers in his larger firms. 
3. Alfred R. Oxenfeldt-"[B]usinessmen just don't know 
their cost and demand curves and do not know how 
alternative actions would affect future costs and demand 
conditions .... [T]he businessman's problem is not essen-
tially mathematical but consists of estimating the effects of 
various marketing policies upon sales-both in the near and 
more distant future .... Thus, the price theorist primarily 
tells the businessman how to analyze data which the 
businessman does not have."8 Our findings are consistent 
with the first part of this quotation. But it does not follow 
that we must accept the rest, for marginalism does not 
require the knowledge of cost and revenue functions this 
quotation seems to imply. We believe that at least some 
of the managers of our concerns move in the direction 
indicated by price theory by trial and error and by imitating 
the successful practices of other firms. A great deal of the 
behavior we have observed can be partly rationalized m 
terms of the usual marginalist theory. 
4. Robert F. Lanzillotti-Management's "approach to 
pricing is based on planned profits. The company proceeds 
on the assumption of a need for a certain amount of capital 
to undertake the investment in plant expansion and new 
facilities. . . . The only way in which price policy can be 
viewed in such companies ... is in terms of profits-investment 
ratios. This criterion serves as an effective guide for pricing 
decisions at divisional and departmental levels. If we are to 
speak of 'administered' decisions in the large firm, it is 
perhaps more accurate to speak of administered profits rather 
than administered prices."9 This stress on "target returns" 
8 Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, "Pricing in a Declining Market," in 
Marketing's Role in Scientific Management [Proceedings of the Thirty· 
ninth National Conference], ed. by Robert L. Clewett (Chicago: 
American Marketing Association, 1957), p. 186. 
9 Lanzillotti, Amer. Econ. Rev., XLVIII, 938. 
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on investment in large business does not seem to apply to 
our small firms. Only a few firms (such as Furniture Com-
pany D) referred to percentage targets at all, and even then 
the target was expressed as a percentage of revenue, not of 
investment. It seems fair to say that more frequently the 
managers of our firms, when they were influenced by targets, 
thought in terms of absolute income rather than percentages. 
An example is one of the nurseries, the owner of which was 
influenced by his income statements to revise prices. This 
determination of whether profits are "satisfactory" is very 
common in our cases. 
5. Alfred E. Kahn-In commenting on the same cases 
which were the basis for the preceding quotation, Kahn 
reaches quite different conclusions. He argues that "the 
target return seems ... to reflect what the executives think 
the company can get; and to the extent actual earnings 
diverge from the target, it is because the market turns out 
to allow more or less."1° Kahn points out that what seems 
"fair" varies and suggests that this is due to the fact that 
what the market permits varies from industry to industry. 
While it is difficult to prove the case one way or another, 
our firms would seem to support the view that the targets 
of these firms are adapted to what is possible. But this does 
not force us to the extreme view that only profit max-
imization is operative as a goal. We have, in fact, presented 
evidence of conflicting goals in some of our companies, along 
with indications of restraint in the emphasis on profits. 
6. Fritz Machlup-"It should hardly be necessary to 
mention that all the relevant magnitudes involved-cost, 
revenue, profit-are subjective-that is, perceived or fancied 
by the men whose decisions or actions are to be explained 
... -rather than objective-that is, calculated by disin-
terested men who are observing these actions from the 
outside and are explaining them (statisticians and economists 
as theorists-not as consultants). 
10 Alfred E. Kahn, "Pricing Objectives in Large Companies: 
Comment," American Economic Review, XLIX (Sept., 1959), 671. 
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"Business men do not always 'calculate' before they 
make decisions, and they do not always 'decide' before they 
act. For they think that they know their business well 
enough without having to make repeated calculations; and 
their actions are frequently routine. But routine is based on 
principles which were once considered and decided upon 
and have then been frequently applied with decreasing need 
for conscious choices. The feeling that calculations are not 
always necessary is usually based upon an ability to size up 
a situation without reducing its dimensions to definite 
numerical values."11 
These quotations seem completely consistent with our 
findings. Or perhaps more accurately, they help interpret the 
findings. Machlup does not insist that profits are the only 
objective. He recognizes that marginal analysis must imply 
"subjective estimates, guesses and hunches." He does not 
deny that much business behavior may be "non-rational, 
blindly repetitive, deliberately traditional, or motivated by 
extra-economic objectives." Nevertheless, he stands firmly by 
marginal analysis. 
There is some disagreement among economists as to 
whether marginalism should be defined as broadly as Mach-
lup desires. Henry Oliver takes the view that this reduces 
marginalism to a mere statement that a businessman "will 
consider everything that may increase his income and every-
thing that may increase his outgo and then try to strike the 
best balance."12 Oliver makes the valid point that flexibility 
in margins does not mean marginalism; it may instead mean 
only "partial marginalism." Many of our cases support this 
conclusion; the small firms in our study are not constantly 
revising prices with changing costs and demand, but usually 
make revisions only after some time has elapsed. 
Robert A. Gordon joins Oliver in the criticism that 
Machlup's interpretation of marginalism is too all-encom-
11 Machlup, pp. 521, 524-25. 
12 Henry M. Oliver, Jr., "Marginal Theory and Business Behavior," 
American Economic Review, XXXVII (June, 1947), 376. 
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passing; Gordon believes Machlup's approach can rationalize 
whatever the entrepreneur does.13 In large part this is a 
semantic question: Marginalism can be defined narrowly or 
broadly, just as full-cost pricing can be defined to imply 
either rigid or flexible markups. This study does not accept 
marginalism as narrowly defined, implying direct knowledge 
of marginal revenue and marginal cost; nor does it support 
full-cost pricing with rigid markups. It does give evidence 
of "partial marginalism" and of the use of full costs with 
flexible margins. And it does indicate multiple objectives 
and degrees of ignorance, inertia, and, in some cases, even 
bad logic. 
7. Herbert A. Simon-"While economic man max-
imizes-selects the best alternatives from among all those 
available to him; his cousin, who we shall call administrative 
man, satisfices-looks for a course of action that is satisfactory 
or 'good enough.' 
"Administrative man . . . is content to leave out of 
account those aspects of reality-and that means most as-
pects-that are substantially irrelevant at a given time. He 
makes his choices using a simple picture of the situation 
that takes into account just a few of the factors that he 
regards as most relevant and crucial."14 
Simon's point of view is somewhat different from that 
of the economist. Both views appear to be relevant in our 
study. The view of the economist fits some of our cases 
more clearly than others. Our decision makers appear to be 
"intendedly rational," to use one of Simon's phrases. They 
are striving to maximize the goals they have set for them-
selves. But they are bounded by their shortage of informa-
tion and by the complexity of the situations with which 
they are dealing, so that it is not surprising that they fall 
short of the optimum. 
13 Robert A. Gordon, "Short-Period Price Determination in Theory 
and Practice," American Economic Review, XXXVIII (June, 1948), 
265-88. 
14 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (Zd ed.; New York: 
Macmillan Co., 19 57), pp. xxv-xxvi. 
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The contrast between economic theory and organiza-
tion (administrative) theory as exemplified by Simon, can 
be overdone. Each casts light on the kinds of behavior 
covered by this study. Profit maximization is a primary goal 
in many of our cases. Many of the firms move by trial and 
error in directions consistent with marginalism. But decision 
making is complicated by a multiplicity of goals and by 
uncertainty. It is quite understandable that many of our 
firms settle for satisfactory solutions and do not worry too 
much about whether they have achieved the "best" prices 
possible. Furthermore, there are other ways of achieving 
greater profits which may be more certain and less subject 
to retaliatory action. These include all the forms of non-
price competition such as advertising and other types of sales 
effort. They also include attempts to cut the level of costs 
through improved managment or innovation. Some firms 
are inattentive to price because they have more to hope for 
from alternative types of decisions. 
Thus a synthesis of economic theory, with its stress on 
profit seeking and marginal analysis, and organization theory, 
with its multiplicity of goals and bounded rationality, is 
necessary to cover the whole range of cases in this study. 
The variety in motivation and in the ability to evaluate the 
outcome of decisions makes it impossible to apply a single, 
simple theory to all our firms. 
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5 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
WE HAVE demonstrated that in pricing, most of our 
88 small firms give considerable attention to market condi-
tions-to the behavior of competitors and to the resultant 
characteristics of demand. Up to this point, however, we 
have given little direct attention to these market character-
istics and how they come to play on the pricing of individual 
firms. 
A CLASSIFICATION OF CASES 
This chapter follows the orthodox classification of markets 
in economic theory, fitting the cases into these well-known 
categories: ( 1) monopoly, ( 2) oligopoly, ( 3) monopolistic 
competition, and ( 4) cases approaching pure competition. 
Because it is difficult to classify some cases into these 
categories, it is necessary to consider hybrids. We shall also 
consider the borderline cases that defy classification because 
of the absence of clearcut criteria. 
Monopoly. None of our firms enjoys a "pure monopoly" 
position; they all face competition from some kinds of 
substitutes. Monopoly, however, is not absolute but a 
relative matter; in the usual usage it implies absence of 
"close substitutes." It should not be surprising that some 
of our firms are monopolies in this sense, despite their small 
size. This fact results from the geographical limitations of 
the markets for their products. The clearest cases of monop-
oly in our study are the following: 
1. The billboard company, which operates in small 
towns where there are no competitors (at least none offering 
"standard-size" panels) . The monopoly power of this com-
pany results from barriers to entry of new competitors. Such 
competitors would find it difficult to establish the contacts 
necessary for success. They would have difficulty winning 
business from the national advertising agencies, which prefer 
to deal with a single firm in small towns. They would have 
trouble getting local businessmen to transfer their advertising 
to a new outlet. 
2. The bowling alley which (when completed) will 
operate in a town of 15,000. The management expects to 
maintain its monopoly position by the mere fact that the 
town is too small to support two bowling alleys. The man-
agement believes that no town within 30 miles is large or 
prosperous enough to attract competition. 
These two companies have monopoly power arising not 
only from their present insulation from competition but 
also from barriers to such competition in the future. The 
billboard monopoly rests primarily on product differentiation 
advantages-it would be difficult for entrants to draw cus-
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tomers away from the established firm. The bowling alley 
monopoly is based more on economies of scale-if a one-lane 
bowling alley were as economical as a sixteen-lane alley, 
there would be a threat of competition. 
The remaining monopolies are in a much weaker 
position. One is a trampoline center in a large city. It has 
the advantage of being the first in that location, but it suffers 
from the disabilities that other trampoline centers can enter 
the city with only a small investment and that the demand 
for trampolines is based on a fad which may soon fade out. 
It is questionable whether the theater should be included 
in the monopoly sector at all, for it faces competition from 
substitutes that are rather "close." It is the only enclosed 
theater in the city in which it is located. But television, 
drive-in movies, and perhaps the theaters in cities only a 
few miles away cut into its business and reduce its ability to 
increase prices. 
How has the monopoly position of these companies 
influenced their pricing behavior? It has been argued that 
profit maximization may not be so strong a force in monop-
oly, that monopolies are not compelled to seek the optimum 
position. Hicks, for example, has stated that "the best of 
all monopoly profits is a quiet 1ife."1 Our strongest monop-
olies do not support this conclusion. If anything, the 
billboard company and the bowling alley show a greater than 
average attention to profits in their pricing. The billboard 
company management has been quite aggressive in searching 
for maximum profits. The bowling alley managers made a 
very thorough survey of practices in similar alleys before 
deciding on price. Apparently both have succeeded ex-
tremely well in approaching optimum profits. It seems that 
the billboard company is more able to experiment with 
pricing because of its monopoly position. 
1 J. R. Hicks, "Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory 
of Monopoly," in American Economic Association, Readings in Price 
Theory, The Series of Republished Articles on Economics, vol. VI 
(Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1952), p. 369. 
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These two cases are perhaps not representative. But 
they do suggest that whether a monopoly exploits its position 
in the market depends heavily on the ambitions and drives 
of its management. This is a point at which traditional 
economic analysis provides no framework for predicting 
individual firm behavior; it does not take into account the 
individual objectives and aptitudes that account for part of 
the pricing pattern. 
The other two monopolies (the theater and the trampo-
line center) are weak in several respects. They have little 
protection against entry. One is subject to competition from 
substitutes so close that its very classification as a monopoly 
is questionable. Both face innovations that threaten their 
existence. The competition they face is more in the nature 
of the "creative destruction" described by Schumpeter, in 
which temporary monopolies are replaced by new mo-
nopolies based on new tastes and new technology.2 The 
only hope for survival for these firms is to join the in-
novators-to produce new services to take the place of the 
old. The theater is likely to survive longer, for the change 
in tastes that has reduced its profits is a gradual one. The 
trampoline center may already have passed its peak; it is a 
good case of "perishable distinctiveness," in which pricing 
can do little to prevent the inevitable deterioration of de-
mand. The trampoline center, therefore, has much to gain 
from a "high" price policy (one which takes great advantage 
of the fad while it lasts, without much concern about 
relating price to cost). There is little benefit to be gained 
from worrying about the impact of present prices on 
future business, since social attitudes and tastes, rather than 
2 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1942), pp. 81·86. Schumpeter argues 
that the really important competition is that which comes from "the 
new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the 
new organization ... competition which commands a decisive cost 
or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of existing firms but at their foundations and 
their very lives." 
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past prices, will govern future volume. The theater, on the 
other hand, is not in a position to exploit a high temporary 
demand. It must try through its pricing to maintain the 
habit of movie attendance, keeping in mind the closeness 
of substitutes. 
No wonder it is difficult to measure monopoly power. 
A measurement would have to take into account barriers to 
entry. It would have to recognize the time the monopoly 
control can persist in the face of innovation. It would have 
to ascertain the closeness of substitutes. In addition, it would 
recognize differences in the desire and ability to exploit an 
existing monopoly position. 
Perhaps the fact that all four of these companies 
produce services is significant. Services do not travel long 
distances. In fact, in all these cases the customer comes to 
the product, a fact which limits the size of the market and 
restricts competition from firms elsewhere. Monopoly must 
be rather common in service industries, especially in small 
town locations. The monopoly power varies, depending on 
the ease of entry, the closeness of substitutes, and the rate of 
innovation. 
Oligopoly. Some observers fail to recognize that the mere 
existence of a large number of firms in a particular industry 
does not assure that such an industry is competitive. If the 
industry is broken up into a number of independent markets, 
with only a few suppliers in each, there exist the conditions 
of oligopoly familiar in such national markets as steel or 
automobiles. At least 25 of our 88 firms are oligopolies. As 
we shall see, others are partly oligopolistic (some products 
selling under other market conditions). And there are still 
other cases that are difficult to classify. In any event, it is 
fair to conclude that, outside of agriculture and mining, 
oligopoly is quite common in small business, though prob-
ably not dominant. 
The existence of oligopoly, however, does not lead to a 
standard pricing pattern, since this study shows examples of 
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collusion, of price leadership, and of the adoption of common 
pricing formulas based on full costs. 
We start with a case of collusion. Two of the cement 
contractors in our study are members of the same cartel in a 
medium-size city. These firms have joined with others in 
presenting price lists to builders. While there are com-
petitors outside the cartel, the cartel members are the only 
ones equipped to handle certain kinds of work. They 
periodically meet to review prices and costs, making adjust-
ments in price when they believe cost or market conditions 
justify a change. The cartel agreement does not extend to 
small repair jobs-it would obviously be difficult to control 
pricing on such jobs because of their nonstandard character. 
The competition on these smaller jobs is so severe that the 
cartel members tend to neglect such work except to fill up 
idle time. 
The prices quoted to builders by the cartel are about 
15 percent above those of competitors. This would seem 
to be a situation in which the ease of entry would limit price 
increases. Apparently the shortage of skilled labor (concrete 
finishers) and the reputation of cartel members for high 
quality work act as barriers to the entry of new firms. 
We have found no other cases of collusion in this study. 
Most managers prefer not to talk about such a subject, 
and it seems probable that there may be other collusive 
agreements not uncovered. 
The remaining oligopolies do not require so much 
attention. Most of them are retailers or service outlets in 
communities too small to support a large number of com-
petitors. Though these firms are keenly aware of the prices 
of their competitors, this does not lead to a single behavior 
pattern. One clothing firm is willing to experiment with 
prices in a market in which price competition is generally 
restrained. Some of the firms follow the prices set by 
others, illustrating the pattern of "price leadership" common 
in oligopoly. This price leadership does not always consist, 
however, of exact imitation of price. Sometimes it means 
64 
a pattern of a fairly fixed differential from the price of the 
leader.3 The truck leasing firm, for example, maintained a 
price list 10 percent below its larger competitor (and even 
then temporarily broke away from this policy when it 
changed location). 
The two flour mills and the meatpacker are examples 
of a different type of oligopoly from that discussed so far. 
Their markets are dominated by big national companies. 
The small firms do keep their prices in line, partly out of 
fear of retaliation, and partly because they think the 
national prices make sense in terms of changing costs (e.g., 
wheat prices). Flour Mill B, however, is able to raise prices 
to 5 percent above the general market because of the 
reputation of its product among consumers. No doubt the 
demand for the products of these firms is highly elastic to 
price increases, and with the danger of a competitive match-
ing of reduced prices, it is easy to see why they keep their 
prices in line with those of the large firms. 
Monopolistic competition. Monopolistic competition, as one 
would expect, is even more prevalent among our cases than 
oligopoly. The firms in this category face a large number 
of competitors; they do, however, produce a differentiated 
product, and they have some control over pricing. They are 
not mere "price takers," such as would be the case under 
pure competition; but the range within which they can 
vary prices is limited by the closeness of substitutes. 
There is not much one can say about pricing under these 
conditions beyond what is already clear. These firms gen-
erally do relate their prices to competition; they are aware 
that competition is more severe on some lines than on others 
and price accordingly. They may not always set prices at 
levels that will return the maximum profits, but most of 
them are at least trying to do so. These firms, like the 
3 This fact supports Bain's discussion of a "system of differentials 
among ... prices." Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 8. 
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oligopolies, give considerable attention to nonprice compe-
tition; some of them rather than emphasize pricing clearly 
prefer to stress sales effort, advertising, the quality of service, 
and the maintenance of adequate inventories. This category 
includes laundries and dry cleaners, builders, electricians, 
repairmen, a variety of retailers, and furniture manufacturers. 
A discussion of closer approximation to pure competi-
tion is postponed until later in the chapter; there is little 
evidence of this market structure in the present study. 
Hybrids. It is a mistake to assume that a firm must fall into 
either one market structure or another. Most firms produce 
multiple outputs; some sell partly under conditions of 
oligopoly and partly in monopolistic competition. For ex-
ample, some produce for a national market and must face 
competition from dozens or hundreds of concerns over the 
country; no doubt the elasticity of demand is very high for 
such production. But the same firms produce for local 
markets. Competitive conditions are not the same on each 
type of work even within a local market. 
Furniture Company A benefits from a near monopoly 
position on some business. Customers seek its bid before 
contacting other suppliers. It is true that this firm would 
suffer a loss of volume if it raised prices above its present 
levels. But it clearly faces heavier competition when it bids 
on school or federal government contracts. This particular 
firm does not vary its pricing policies according to these 
differences in competition; it simply refuses to bid on most 
of the highly competitive jobs. 
The silver firm has a much stronger monopoly position 
on some parts of its business than on others. The college 
store has a near monopoly in the textbook business, but 
faces competition from groceries, clothing stores, and drug-
stores on its other lines. Neither of these firms exploits its 
monopoly position to the fullest, but the differences in 
margins have some relation to the competition. 
We have presented enough illustrations to support the 
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conclusion that many small businesses operate simultaneously 
in several market structures and that they often adapt their 
pricing to those different structures. But this is only one 
of the problems we encounter in classification. In a sub-
stantial proportion of the cases it is very difficult to determine 
whether the structure is oligopoly or monopolistic competi-
tion.4 If management is aware that competitors will react 
to a change in its prices, it will take this into account-we 
can call this situation oligopoly. If it instead considers itself 
too small to have any direct impact on the policies of others, 
it falls into monopolistic competition. Unfortunately, it is 
very difficult to separate these two states of mind. 
To take a specific example, can we say that a men's 
clothing market consisting of five firms in one small city is 
an illustration of oligopoly? The firms are quite aware of 
each other's pricing practices. They take into account 
possible reactions to their prices. But they also face compe-
tition from other clothing outlets-department stores and 
stores in nearby towns. And there is little evidence of high 
monopoly profits. We probably should recognize submarkets 
within the markets for men's clothing. The managers of 
high quality stores are not concerned with lower quality 
outlets in the same city. The high quality stores probably 
come closer to facing the conditions of oligopoly than do 
the others, which would help to explain the greater rigidity 
of their prices. Also there are suggestions in our cases that 
the retail markets are more competitive in the larger cities 
with numerous outlets. But all this is conjectural and 
illustrates the difficulty of classification. 
No doubt future research will fill in some of these gaps. 
4 Economists have always refused to draw the line between the 
two on the basis of a single, definite criterion, such as the number of 
firms. It would be desirable to draw the line on the basis of some kind 
of measure of behavior. For example, one might follow Chamberlin 
in making the recognition or nonrecognition of possible retaliation as 
the key criterion. Edward H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition, Harvard Economic Studies, vol. XXXVIII (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933). 
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At the present state of knowledge the complexity of the 
pricing situation precludes any neat classifications that would 
permit simple predictions. Pricing involves a complicated 
network of market forces, personality factors, tradition, and 
skills that cannot be summarized in simple models. We are 
not able to separate every case of oligopoly from every case 
of monopolistic competition or even to draw the line 
between what is monopoly and what is not. 
ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL ISSUES 
Up to this point the main task of this chapter is to classify 
the cases by market structure. The objective of the remainder 
of the chapter is to develop more fully some special con-
siderations given only fleeting attention up to now. By con-
centrating on controversial issues, this section will clarify 
how this study differs from preceding ones. The main con-
troversial issues are these: ( 1) Is it correct to describe 
small business as competitive rather than monopolistic? 
( 2) How relevant is the kinked-demand theory in small 
business pricing? ( 3) Can full-cost pricing limit competition 
even under conditions of large numbers of firms? ( 4) Is the 
theory of pure competition relevant in small businesses of 
the sort covered by this study? ( 5) Is the theory of monop-
olistic competition relevant, and does it serve a purpose not 
filled by the theory of pure competition? 
The competitive character of small business. George Stigler 
has found that competition is more usual in the United 
States than monopoly.5 His classification of industries chal-
lenges the view common in the 1930s that monopoly (in-
cluding oligopoly) was predominant. Stigler includes most 
oligopolies in his monopoly sector but, even so, finds that 
competition covers twice as much of the economy (measured 
in terms of national income) as monopoly. 
5 George J. Stigler, Five Lectures on Economic Problems (London: 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1949), pp. 46-59. 
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Our study of small business suggests that Stigler's find-
ings have important limitations. Apparently Stigler classified 
most industries with large numbers of firms nationally as 
competitive. Our findings indicate that in local markets a 
firm may be insulated from the competition in other loca-
tions. Stigler includes advertising in the competitive sector, 
but we have found a clear case of a local billboard monopoly. 
Stigler also includes contract construction and retail trade 
(other than liquor, gasoline, and milk) in competition, but 
we have found important examples of oligopoly and even 
collusion in such markets. In fairness we must admit that 
we have not shown that these departures from competition 
mean a significant degree of monopoly power. Apparently, 
some companies are earning profits above those usual in 
competition, but our data do not permit firm conclusions. 
The findings of this study are inconclusive on the relative 
importance of oligopoly and monopoly in small business. 
But they establish that both conditions do exist and suggest 
that they are widespread. 
The relevance of the kinked-demand theory. The present 
study is inconclusive on the relevance of the well-known 
kinked-demand theory. The theory is supposed to explain 
the rigidity of prices that is claimed to be characteristic of 
oligopoly. According to the theory, the firm maintains 
stable prices because of the perceived elasticity of demand to 
price increases and inelasticity to price decreases. Com-
petitors, it is claimed, do not follow the price increases but 
do retaliate against price decreases. 
Some of the managers in the study appeared to fear the 
consequences of both price increases and price decreases, as 
the theory would suggest. This is true of one concrete 
products firm, the chemicals company, the flour mills, and 
the meatpacker. But such reasoning also appeared outside 
of oligopoly and without reference to retaliation. The 
manager of Shoe Repair Shop A believed that volume would 
fall off sharply if he increased price but would react little to 
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price decreases. Many of the small retailers expressed similar 
opinions on perceived demand.6 Three different interpreta-
tions of these findings are possible: ( 1) Some of these 
markets may actually be oligopolies of the "chain" variety 
described by Chamberlin (in which management is con-
cerned with only its most immediate competition); ( 2) 
prices may be approximately at the point on a smooth curve 
separating elasticities greater than unity from those less than 
one; or ( 3) the managers may simply be rationalizing their 
inertia in failing to change prices. 
One of the weaknesses of the kinked-demand theory is 
its failure to explain the obvious fact that prices do change. 
Stigler has demonstrated that in some oligopolies, prices are 
more flexible than the theory would allow.7 It is possible 
that full-cost pricing is a device for reconciling kinked-
demand thinking with the fact of price change. Firms pric-
ing on the basis of full costs can achieve such flexibility if 
they are certain that their competitors, who are also experi-
encing cost changes, will follow the same pricing procedures. 
Some of the cases, including Flour Mill B, the laundry, and 
the auto rental firm, appear to be consistent with such an 
interpretation. These firms do change prices as costs change, 
but only in the expectation that competitors will do likewise. 
Thus the prices move, but the kinks move with the prices. 
Even with this interpretation, the kinked-demand theory 
fails to explain how the markups on full costs are established. 
It is often stated that such markups are "traditional." 
Probably those markups become traditional which prove 
viable-which permit the firms to survive and earn a profit 
without encouraging new competition. All in all, the kinked-
6 Spencer and Siegelman discuss cases of kinked demand based on 
custom. See Managerial Economics, pp. 283-84. Perhaps some of our 
managers are correct in assuming that consumers respond sharply to 
prices increased above the customary level, but will not respond to 
decreases below that level. 
7 George J. Stigler, "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and 
Rigid Prices," in American Economic Association, Readings in Price 
Theory, pp. 410-39. 
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demand theory is only a partial and somewhat unsatisfactory 
explanation of price behavior in either large or small firms. 
Full costs as a control over competition. In oligopoly a cer-
tain amount of control over price can be achieved through 
adoption of common pricing formulas based on full cost. 
This type of limitation of competition seems a reasonable 
description of behavior where there are so few firms that 
each recognizes the risks of moving away from such a 
formula. But the strongest advocates of full-cost pricing 
that we have found are in printing, an industry characterized 
by large numbers of competing firms. There may be pockets 
of oligopoly in printing, based on special skills and equip-
ment, but most of the selling is surely done under conditions 
of monopolistic competition. The theory of monopolistic 
competition suggests that these are not the conditions in 
which firms would profit from abandonment of price 
flexibility for some kind of formula. 
Yet many printers are much concerned with full costs. 
They are trying to win industrywide acceptance of common 
accounting methods. They are encouraging other printers to 
adopt full-cost pricing in the hope that this will reduce "cut-
throat competition." They have developed strong ethical 
feelings against those that do price below cost. They are 
concerned with the low level of profit on sales in the industry 
and hope that they can bring the price cutting under control. 
A few quotations from a letter of one retired printer 
will illustrate this thinking: "We always tried to price on 
cost of production regardless of demand. It seemed to us a 
means of holding customers and keeping a reputation for 
integrity .... The worst battle printers had to fight ... was 
that of trying to bring about better relations with other 
printers-trying to stamp out the cut-throat competition."8 
s Fuller quotations appear in Part II. This is an illustration of a 
sincere condemnation of price competition on ethical grounds by a 
manager who at the same time is full of praise for the American 
competitive system. 
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The question here is how printers can hope to enforce 
such a control over competition. If they were temporarily 
successful in raising prices and increasing profits by such 
means, how could they hope to keep out new competitors 
attracted by higher profits? And in view of the fact that the 
very proponents of full-cost pricing do not consistently stick 
by the rules, it seems doubtful that they can induce others 
to do so. 
The fact is that after decades of emphasis on full-cost 
pricing the printers are as much bothered by cutthroat 
competition as ever. This suggests that these attempts at 
control have failed. On a priori grounds alone any attempt 
at stabilizing prices in such an industry would seem doomed 
to failure. The temptation to shade prices to fill idle 
capacity is too great. Yet it will be interesting to see how 
the continued attempts at regulation of price through ac-
counting fares in the future, for now there is greater 
attention than ever to the adoption of common accounting 
methods throughout the printing industry. 
Approximations to pure competition. So far this chapter has 
neglected one of the four market structures listed at the 
beginning. It has given no attention to industries approxi-
mating perfect competition. There is a simple explanation 
for this. We have found only one case falling into this 
category. Almost all of our companies do have price policies; 
they establish their own prices within a range; they do not 
simply sell at "market prices." They are "price makers" 
rather than "price takers." The one exception is the case 
of the rock quarry, the management of which claims it has 
little control over price. The firm tries to increase profits by 
control of costs rather than by manipulation of price. 
No doubt the selection of firms for this study explains 
the absence of more competitive conditions. An extension 
of the project into the areas of agriculture or mining would 
have revealed examples of "price takers." As a matter of fact, 
some preliminary interviewing in the coal mining industry 
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does suggest something closer to perfect competition. It is 
true that the mining officials interviewed do not content 
themselves with accepting the market price. Some of them 
advertise in trade journals or on signs along the highway. 
Some of them have built up "contacts" and "selling 
connections" that clearly give them an advantage. Further-
more, some coal mines have built up a greater reputation 
for dependability of delivery or quality than others. Coal is 
not a homogeneous product and is not sold exclusively on a 
price basis. At the same time, our preliminary interviewing 
does indicate that the price discretion of these firms is 
extremely limited. Perhaps price increases of only 2 or 3 
percent would result in a total loss of sales. Certainly in 
selling to the 1V A market, where coal is purchased on a 
strict bidding basis, there is little room for choices about 
price. 
Despite the unrepresentative character of the cases in 
this study, it is safe to conclude that small business is more 
frequently characterized by monopolistic competition rather 
than close approximation of pure competition. When we 
take a close look at these firms, we find that they do have 
some control over price and they do make pricing decisions. 
The relevance of the concept of monopolistic competition. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the distinction be-
tween pure competition and monopolistic competition is 
significant when it comes to the pricing policies and 
practices of individual firms. In pure competition there is 
no problem of decision on prices, since the prices are given 
by the market. In monopolistic competition there is concern 
with prices and there are organizations, rules, procedures, 
or mechanisms by which prices get set. In perfect competi-
tion a manager may spend time forecasting future prices and 
making decisions about selling now or later, or about expand-
ing or curtailing production. In monopolistic competition 
there are the added problems of setting the level of prices 
themselves. Even the cases of imitation and of mechanical 
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markups do not suggest perfect competition; instead they 
indicate the adoption of a routine that saves internal man-
agement time. 
Why, then, have some economists been so skeptical of 
the relevance of the concept of monopolistic competition 
and so willing to fall back on the theory of perfect com-
petition? Hicks, Stigler, and other prominent economists 
have taken this skeptical position.9 These economists are not 
particularly interested in the internal decision processes in 
setting prices. They are concerned instead with making 
predictions of broad aggregates. They doubt that a "realistic" 
description of decision-making processes is necessary for 
that purpose. As Stigler states: "The role of description is 
to particularize, while the role of theory is to generalize-to 
disregard an infinite number of differences and capture the 
important common element in different phenomena."10 
Thus the relevance of the theory of monopolistic 
competition is in dispute when it comes to social economics. 
But this study is also one in business economics-in decision 
making-in which it is desirable to look closely at the trees 
as well as the forest. If we have described individual com-
pany practice in detail, it is because we believe that there 
is much to learn about pricing decisions from such descrip-
tions. 
CONCLUSION 
The study finds significant proportions of monopoly and 
oligopoly in a sector of the economy which is usually 
described as competitive. In particular, it finds limited 
competition in local services in which the market is restricted 
geographically by the technical incapacity to transport such 
services long distances. The interviews indicate kinked-
demand reasoning not only where it might be expected 
(oligopoly) but also where it would not be expected 
9 Hicks, pp. 371·74; and Stigler, Five Lectures, pp. 23-24. 
to Stigler, Five Lectures, p. 23. 
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(monopolistic competition with large numbers of firms). 
The study also reveals attempts to control price competition 
by adoption of common price formulas not only where 
success might seem possible (oligopoly) but also where the 
free entry of firms and large numbers would seem to doom 
such attempts from the outset. 
The study points up the great difficulty of classifying 
firms by market structure. A multiproduct firm may operate 
simultaneously in oligopoly and monopolistic competition. 
Because of lack of clarity in defining the differences between 
the categories and difficulties of measurement, the line be-
tween oligopoly and monopolistic competition is particularly 
unclear, but there are even problems in determining whether 
or not a firm is a monopoly. It follows that we are not yet 
prepared to predict individual firm behavior on the basis of 
market structure. This, along with the multiplicity of com-
pany goals, the diversity of personality factors, and the com-
plexity of traditions, means that a scientific theory capable 
of predicting detailed price behavior does not yet exist. 
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6 
CONCLUSION: THE PRESCRIPTIVE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
A STUDY OF pricing may aim at a variety of objectives: 
( 1) more complete description of actual company behavior; 
(2) improvement of the economist's ability to forecast price 
changes broadly; ( 3) improvement of the knowledge of busi-
ness behavior required for social control; ( 4) improvement 
of the ability to predict behavior of the individual firm; and 
( 5) improvement of the internal pricing practices of business 
itself. The present study stresses the first and last of these 
objectives. 
The interview approach used in this study contributes 
to a deeper probing into the details of pricing behavior than 
is possible in any other way. Practices which upon first 
questioning appear to be rigid and unimaginative often turn 
out, on further investigation, to be more flexible and resource-
ful. Previous mail questionnaire or structured interview 
studies may have reached different conclusions from those 
in the present study partly because of a failure to examine 
closely enough the actual pricing processes. The widely 
accepted conclusion that full-cost pricing prevails is probably 
based in large part on this failure. 
It is unnecessary to review the detailed descriptive find-
ings of this study; the individual chapter conclusions serve 
that purpose. It also seems unnecessary to repeat the reasons 
that the present research has made little contribution to 
prediction and control, though it is possible that in the 
future a fuller understanding of individual price behavior 
will increase our understanding of the inflationary process. 
This chapter restricts its attention to some comparisons with 
previous studies and to the prescriptive implications of the 
findings. 
RELATION TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The present study reaches conclusions somewhat different 
from earlier studies which generally have stressed big busi-
ness. 
1. It does not find the rigid adherence to full-cost 
pricing indicated by some previous studies, though it does 
find full costs serving as resistance or reference points. In 
general, markups are flexible in small business. The pattern 
of behavior in small business supports the conclusions of 
Cyert and March that group decisions (more usual in large 
firms) are more dependent upon predetermined policy and 
that longer chains of communication (also more usual in 
large firms) inhibit change.1 
1 See Richard M. Cyert and J. G. March, "Organization Factors 
in the Theory of Oligopoly," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXX 
(Feb., 1956), 44-64; and Richard M. Cyert and J. G. March, 
"Organization Structure and Pricing Behavior in an Oligopolistic 
Market," American Economic Review, XLV (March, 1955), 129-39. 
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2. The present study does not lend support to sug-
gestions that business is adopting incremental accounting 
techniques consistent with marginalist theory. In small firms, 
accounting appears to have a limited role in pricing de-
cisions, and when it does play a role, it leads to stress on full 
costs and averages, rather than on incremental costs and 
demand considerations. The extent to which small business-
men are marginalists results not from their use of accounting 
but from their experimentation in the market, their willing-
ness to evaluate demand and costs subjectively, or their 
imitation of the practices of other firms. 
3. The present analysis differs greatly from a British 
study of 20 firms (including 12 small firms), which finds 
strong evidence of full-cost pricing.2 One of the differences 
is semantic; the author of the British study defines full-cost 
pricing to permit adjustment of the margins to market con-
ditions. The author neglects to give adequate attention to 
how those margins are determined, giving relatively little 
attention to demand forces. The author states that the man-
agers of small firms believed demand to be almost infinitely 
elastic, a conclusion quite different from ours. He also claims 
that shortrun profit maximization is unacceptable for most 
of his firms, while our case studies reveal considerable variety 
on this score. 
4. The present study does not find a stress on "target 
returns," which have been emphasized in recent studies of 
big business. 
5. The present study finds evidence of oligopoly and 
monopoly in small firms and some of the same kind of 
kinked-demand thinking previously found in studies of large 
firms. It finds evidence, however, that the kink is not always 
attributable to feared retaliation against price changes. 
6. Small firms in some industries, such as printing, 
appear to strive for control over price competition through 
adoption of common accounting and pricing techniques. 
2 D. C. Hague, "Economic Theory and Business Behavior," Re· 
view of Economic Studies, XVI (1949-1950), no. 3, pp. 144-57. 
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Such approaches may work in oligopolies composed of either 
large or small firms, but it seems doubtful that such attempts 
to control price cutting can be operative in industries with 
large numbers of competitors and relatively free entry. 
The present study comes closest in conclusions to 
Bjarke Fog's recent volume, Industrial Pricing Policies: An 
Analysis of Pricing Policies of Danish Manufacturers. Fog 
finds, for example, that flexibility in the margins added to 
full cost is more pervasive than rigidity. Fog goes further 
than the present volume in attempting to reconcile margin-
alism with full-cost pricing; our cases suggest that while 
"partial marginalism" is widespread, behavior is so diverse 
that we cannot safely make a broad generalization. The 
similarity of many of Fog's conclusions with those reached 
here may suggest that economists are approaching a con-
sensus on pricing practices: a consensus that recognizes a 
considerable variety in procedures and outcomes and that 
avoids extreme generalizations about full costs, marginalism, 
target returns, or profit maximization. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRICE POLICY 
Probably the most significant contribution of this study to 
practice is in describing what firms do. The manager of a 
small business will discover from the preceding chapters a 
variety of ways of attacking the pricing problem. This should 
stimulate him to reflect on his own practices and to consider 
alternative policies. If he is addicted to one of the myths 
about pricing found in some business circles, this study 
should help him achieve wider perspective on what is pos-
sible. For example, this study lends little support to the 
view that pricing on the basis of cost is "scientific" and 
raises doubts about the profitability of constant markups on 
cost; it does not, on the other hand, support the view that 
imitation is always merely a lazy manager's escape from 
decision making. It recognizes that some managers may be 
quite correct in concentrating on other problems, such as 
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the maintenance of adequate inventories, or sales promotion, 
or employee morale. The last thing we would wish to 
convey is that the pricing problem of every business is the 
same. 
As a result, the suggestions that follow vary in relevance 
from one firm to another. Most of the following discussion 
shows the influence of the writings of Joel Dean, who has 
succeeded more than any other writer in expressing economic 
analysis in a form that is useful to the businessman. In 
some cases Dean's conclusions require modification to meet 
the conditions of small business rather than the large firms 
with which he was more directly concerned. 
Individualization of pricing: cross-sectional flexibility. Our 
study indicates that many small businesses do succeed in 
adapting prices of each product to the diverse conditions of 
demand and competition. This suggests that those firms 
following rigid pricing formulas or following mechanically 
the advice of manufacturers or wholesalers, or simply imi-
tating the prices of others, might consider whether greater 
imagination in pricing is justified. This is a problem of 
benefits versus costs. We do not advise all firms to abandon 
their present simple or mechanical approaches, for the costs 
in terms of management time may be too great. We do 
suggest that managers should consider the problem and 
make a conscious choice between careful individualization 
of prices (cross-sectional flexibility) and the simpler me-
chanical rules. 
Flexibility of prices over time. We have found diversity in 
the willingness of small firms to vary prices with changing 
economic conditions. We do not argue that every firm 
would benefit from greater flexibility. But some firms 
could undoubtedly profit from adaptation of prices to chang-
ing conditions-to attain greater use of idle capacity or to 
ration capacity when it is short. Surely the policy of a few 
firms of following full costs when volume is low and when 
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overhead costs per unit are consequently high could lead to 
pricing themselves completely out of the market. The 
policy of other firms in refusing to bid below full cost when 
the incremental revenue clearly exceeds the incremental cost 
and when there are no longrun penalties for such behavior 
is equally difficult to justify. 
Longrun welfare of the firm. As a qualification to the 
previous subsection, we can see considerable logic in the 
emphasis some firms place on the longrun dangers of too 
much price flexibility. Future business and the managers' 
relations with their communities may be affected by the 
impact of prices on customer goodwill and the firm's reputa-
tion for "fair" prices. Each manager must evaluate the 
importance of such considerations in his own circumstances. 
He must determine for himself what values are important to 
him and make his decisions accordingly. 
Complementary sales and company "image." The firm 
should consider not only the impact of shortrun prices on 
future volume; it should consider the effect of the price of 
one commodity on the sale of others. This study includes 
cases of the careful consideration of the interrelation among 
the prices of different commodities. A firm should not 
through its pricing destroy the kind of "image" it is trying 
to create in the minds of the public. This may mean 
avoidance of "odd prices" (prices at 99 cents, for example) 
by a firm that is trying to maintain a reputation for con-
servatism and quality. It may mean avoidance of scattered 
high markups by a store that is trying to maintain an "image" 
of a low-price family shopping center. Again the importance 
of such considerations varies from firm to firm. Some firms 
selling in an "informed" market may have nothing to gain 
from attention to such interrelations in demand; the buyers 
may purchase strictly on a price and quality basis. 
Avoidance of full-cost pricing. Our findings indicate that 
rigid full-cost pricing is less common in small business than 
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previous studies (and some of Dean's statements) suggest. 
But some firms are heavily influenced by full-cost formulas 
and might well benefit from reconsideration of their pricing 
practices. While the arguments against full-cost pricing arc 
strong, there may be more to be said for it in some circum-
stances, such as oligopoly, than Dean is willing to admit. 
At the same time, we are skeptical that it can accomplish 
the stabilization of prices and profits that appears to be its 
objective in competitive industries, such as printing. The 
question of whether full-cost pricing does contribute as much 
to the maintenance of customer goodwill as some managers 
claim deserves further research. 
Attention to demand and competition. The preceding dis-
cussion indicates that most firms should give high priority 
to demand considerations in their pricing. Many managers 
look upon costs as something "real" while demand involves 
"guesswork." The fact is that there are many different 
cost concepts, and that the accountant's usual historical 
measurements of costs are extremely questionable when it 
comes to making decisions for the future. Demand may be 
difficult to estimate, but it is relevant. Managers should not 
avoid weighing factors merely because these factors are 
subject to errors of estimation. Doing so would be compar-
able to the United States' ignoring the Soviet Union defense 
program because there is so much uncertainty about it. 
Our findings indicate that most small businesses do 
give attention to demand and competition-much more than 
the managers themselves recognize in many cases. But the 
mythology of costs is no doubt keeping other firms from 
giving as much attention to demand as is appropriate. 
Sources of information on demand. If it is true that prices 
should be demand oriented, where can small businesses hope 
to get the requisite information? The manager himself is 
capable of making judgments about demand. For example, 
he no doubt can estimate the sensitivity of customer pur-
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chases to changes in prices on particular items. If a customer 
is in a good position to compare the prices of competing 
suppliers, the demand for his product is likely to be highly 
elastic. If the customer does not have the basis for such 
comparisons, the manager can develop considerable skill in 
estimating differences in demand elasticities simply through 
close observation and careful reasoning about consumer 
behavior. 
Trial and error may provide considerable insight into 
price-volume relationships. Some of the most convincing 
cases of successful pricing are those in which management 
has varied price and has observed the demand and profits 
response. No doubt such experiments are more costly and 
risky in some businesses than in others. But past experience 
with responses to price changes is a major source of informa-
tion about demand. 
Very few small businesses engage in any kind of formal 
market research. Such research might provide more objec-
tive, statistically supported data on demand characteristics. 
The problem is again one of costs. Small business may have 
too small a volume to justify these expenditures. 
Relating prices to the product's life cycle. One of Dean's 
most important contributions to the study of pricing is his 
recognition of the importance of a product's life cycle. He 
stresses the difference between new products just entering 
the market and mature products facing a deterioration of 
demand. On new products he makes a distinction between 
"skimming price" and "penetration price." On some new 
products a firm may find it profitable to charge a price 
considerably above cost to take advantage of an inelastic 
demand and to safeguard profits. In other cases a high 
elasticity of demand, a high response to promotional effort, 
the economies of large-scale production, or the threat of 
entry of competition may warrant a low penetration price. 
Two cases in the present study suggest a situation that Dean 
does not discuss. These two companies are producing new 
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products that are threatened by a rapid degeneration of 
demand. But they are charging a skimming price. This is 
probably a profitable policy, since it appears that the demand 
is inelastic and that it wi11 deteriorate without regard to 
current prices. 
Dean suggests that firms with mature products-those 
facing competition from new substitutes-should reduce 
price as the deterioration sets in. He qualifies this con-
clusion for conditions of oligopoly, recognizing that price 
wars might result. The theater and one of the concrete 
product firms in this study have fonowed the opposite 
course of maintaining high prices despite the inroads of 
substitutes. In both cases their policy seems appropriate. 
The demand is inelastic despite its decline. The theater has 
actuany increased prices for children despite the inroads of 
television-and this decision seems reasonable in view of the 
probable low elasticity of demand. 
PRICING AND INCREMENTAL REASONING 
It is much more important to develop a way of reasoning 
about pricing than it is to learn specific rules. Correct 
reasoning can be adapted to particular circumstances; rules 
by their nature are inflexible and may be wrongly applied. 
A decision maker who has a correct understanding of incre-
mental reasoning is capable of a flexible adjustment of policy 
to circumstances. 
Many sman businessmen are intuitive incremental rea-
soners. They may not have heard of incremental costs or 
demand elasticities, but they reach decisions that are con-
sistent with these concepts. But obviously, other business-
men are falling short of a fun application of incremental 
reasoning. Some managers argue that they must make 
profits on every job, by which they mean that there must 
be a markup above fun costs; others take overhead cost 
anocations too seriously. And undoubtedly, some avoid 
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experimentation with pricing simply because it is beyond 
their experience. 
In such instances, the best service this volume can 
perform is to encourage the fuller application of incremental 
reasoning. This would mean more careful consideration of 
the impact of decisions on changes in revenues and costs. It 
implies the consideration of both the longrun and shortrun 
effects of price changes, recognition of the possible reactions 
of competitors, the separation of fixed and variable costs 
(and even finer categories of cost), and the consideration of 
the interrelated character of product demands. 
Unfortunately in this area, as in others, "a little learning 
is a dangerous thing." Frequently, incremental reasoning 
is taken to imply prices equal to incremental costs. This is a 
misunderstanding. Incremental reasoning requires recogni-
tion of both cost and demand considerations. It means low 
prices only when demand elasticities are high at levels below 
average costs and when there are no alternative uses for 
facilities. Perhaps the last point deserves particular attention, 
because it has not been stressed up to this point. It is 
obviously unprofitable to produce a commodity or service 
with a low contribution to overhead and profit if the same 
facilities can be used to produce more profitable items. 
Sound incremental reasoning involves all of the follow-
ing steps: 
l. Consideration of price-volume relationships ( elastici-
ties of demand) to determine what happens to total revenue 
at various prices. 
2. Comparison of those price-volume relationships with 
incremental costs to determine the most profitable price on 
each item. 
3. Estimation of the contribution to overhead and 
profits on each product that can be produced with the 
given facilities. 
4. Selection of those products and sale at prices that 
will assure the largest contributions to overhead and profits. 
5. Investment in new facilities (or in the replacement 
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of old) according to the estimated profits in the future of 
alternative products at optimum prices, taking all costs into 
account. 
Despite all that has been said here, some businessmen 
will persist in setting prices on the basis of full costs because 
they feel that "they must cover all their costs to avoid bank-
ruptcy." They argue that in the long run, prices must cover 
all costs-an assertion which is perfectly true but not very 
helpful. There is no such thing as a longrun pricing decision. 
There are instead sequences of shortrun decisions within, 
perhaps, a longrun policy. Any decision must be made at a 
moment in time. The decision maker may take the longrun 
impact of his price into account; we have argued that he 
should do so. But the decision is still shortrun. If the best 
shortrun price will not cover all costs, including fixed costs, 
the only escape is to look for alternative products or to fail 
to replace the facilities as they wear out. Thus the longrun 
decision is an investment decision and not one in pricing. 
We have argued that full-cost pricing is reasonable in 
some circumstances. But this is true because in the short 
run the impact of changes from full costs is unfavorable. 
Thus this is not an exception to incremental reasoning and 
not even an exception to the principle that fixed costs are 
irrelevant. All of the justifications of full costs that we have 
presented are justifications in terms of demand and not in 
the name of the "recovery of fixed costs." 
The principles in this chapter are quite general. The 
individual decision maker must employ his skill in par-
ticular applications. Unfortunately, there is no rule book 
that will provide a simple answer for each specific case. Far 
from arguing that business economics can supplant the skill 
of the individual businessman, we make the more modest 
claim that a knowledge of fundamental principles along 
with a study of concrete pricing practices can help him 
sharpen those skills. 
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PART II 
THE INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES 
PAR. T II PRESENTS summaries of the individual case 
studies, organized by industries or by categories within 
industries. Space limitations prohibit detailed discussions of 
all the cases; brief comments on the general findings of some 
take the place of detailed summaries. Two criteria determine 
which cases are discussed briefly rather than in detail: 
( 1) repetition of patterns already covered, and ( 2) uncer-
tainty about the interpretation of the findings. 
FIVE GARDEN AND LANDSCAPE NURSERIES 
The five nurseries covered by this study have one important 
common characteristic-they all grow a majority of their 
own plant materials. Nurseries which buy materials at 
wholesale would undoubtedly display different character-
istics. more like those of the retailers. Cost plays a reduced 
role in pricing by nurseries growing their own plants, for 
cost is extremely difficult to measure and presents over-
whelming conceptual difficulties. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that these firms stress competition in their pricing 
decisions. 
NURSERY A 
Description. The firm engages in the propagation, growing, 
and retailing of plants. It also handles landscaping, some 
wholesaling, and a small volume of catalog business. About 40 
employees and 400 acres. 
Chief considerations in pricing. l. Costs are difficult to 
determine because of the time it takes plants to mature and 
the extreme variability of losses as a result of weather. Demand 
and competitive conditions, therefore, appear to be the impor-
tant influences on pricing.! But the fact that the size of wage 
increases affects the extent of price rises indicates that cost does 
have an influence. 
2. The whole structure of prices in the industry is appar-
ently related to differences in labor costs, which are generally 
high in the north and low in the south. The management 
does not watch the prices of firms to the south or north very 
closely, but it does "feel" that its prices are in between. The 
management pays some attention to what competitors in their 
own location are charging, especially the national chains. 
3. Some plants for which local conditions are superior 
can be grown in large blocks. The management sets lower 
prices on them in line with the lower costs. 
Price differentials; variable markups. Markup has little 
meaning because of uncertain costs. Retail prices are the same 
to all customers whether catalog, phone, or personal sale. 
Prices stay the same throughout the year, except for the May 
sale. Wholesale prices are also inflexible throughout the year. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. The willingness to sell overstocked items at lower prices is 
partial evidence that the firm is not tied strictly to costs in its 
pricing. 
2. In theory, one would expect attention given to oppor-
tunity costs-the rationing of limited land to those plants that 
provide highest return. In practice, the company does not give 
opportunity costs careful consideration except in extreme cases 
in which demand is falling off. In other words, the company 
does not seem to know precisely whether a reallocation of land 
would increase profits. 
3. The demand for particular plants can be quite im-
portant in determining whether to increase or decrease price. 
1 Throughout these case presentations there will be interpretations 
of this sort. We also translate the interviewees' statements into the 
jargon of economics. For example, we have supplied such terms as 
"elasticities" and "market structures." 
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For example, a juniper which sold in earlier years at $3.00 now 
sells at $2.50. The decline in demand and the fact that 
competitors were lowering their prices were influential. Another 
illustration-one Taxus Browni was in short supply in relation 
to demand in 1952-1953. But the supply has increased, so 
that the price has been reduced to a more normal level. 
Market structure. The firm is the largest nursery in the 
city, facing competition from three or four other local firms, 
plus national chains. There is some protection from com-
petition because of the firm's reputation for quality. The firm 
has some control over its own prices-demand is far from 
completely elastic. Perhaps the situation is best described as 
differentiated oligopoly. There is some attention given to pos-
sible reactions of competitors to price changes. 
Other points. I. There is an annual sale in May. The 
company cuts prices on overstocked items and on lower quality 
plants, and on predug and dormant plants that have not sold. 
2. Prices are extremely inflexible during most of the year. 
The firm sets prices in September and adheres to them despite 
the market situation. 
3. The management prefers round-number pricing ($6.00, 
$6.25, $6.50, and $7.00). But there were exceptions in 1958-
1959-one item sold at $6.95, another at $8.95; there was a 
feeling that there would be resistance to higher prices. The 
reasons for the round numbers are: (I) They are in the tradi-
tion of an old established firm; ( 2) they are more dignified 
and in strong contrast to chain and mail-order prices. 
4. In 1960 the firm experimented with a few special 
prices-$1.11, $2.22, and $4.44 (distress items the firm had 
not been able to sell). 
5. The firm sells some patented plants on which the 
national price is set by the firm holding the patent. The 
patent holders license the nursery and charge a royalty. The 
result is a high unit profit on these sales because of the lower 
local labor costs. 
6. The company does not have a clear idea of whether it 
is making or losing money on particular items. It keeps on 
propagating items on which it may be "losing money." 
7. The firm does some forecasting-mainly trend projec-
tion. Past tendencies are projected into the future to give 
estimates of sales. These estimates are highly subjective. 
It is unnecessary to present the remaining four nursery case 
studies in detail, since they introduce no significant new 
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points. In all of them costs are nebulous, but the manage-
ments are influenced by "feelings" about cost. All of the 
managements recognize the important role of the market-of 
competition and demand. All of them feel that they are 
earning lower profits on some plants than on others, largely 
because competition will not permit higher profits on some 
plants (competition from the south on low-cost flowering 
shrubs is an illustration). All of them pay attention to 
overall "income" and are stimulated to take action if it 
falls to an unsatisfactory level. 
Most of these nurseries buy part of their supplies at 
wholesale and apply a markup. In this sphere of their 
activities they are like other retailers, examples of which 
follow. 
FOUR AUTOMOBILE REPAIR SHOPS 
The four automobile repair shops covered by the study fall 
into two types: ( 1) Two of them are independent garages, 
one of them specializing primarily in body repairs, the 
other in brake and wheel work; ( 2) the other two are 
automobile sales agents with repair departments. The last 
two companies are not satisfied with the profits earned from 
repair services but feel compelled to maintain such depart-
ments in conjunction with their selling activities. 
Only one case is presented in detail. It is one of the 
clearest cases of marginalist thinking in pricing. The owner 
adjusts his prices to both demand and cost conditions, and 
even varies the quantity of work to the demand situation 
of each customer. 
REP AIR SHOP A 
Description. A one-man concern with only three employees, 
specializing in body repairs but doing other types of automobile 
repairs also. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. Initially, price appears 
to be on a suggested or full-cost basis. The company estimates 
parts prices according to national manuals (Motor's Crash 
Book Service or Glenn Mitchell Catalogue Service) which give 
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the manufacturers' suggested prices. Time ($4.00 per hour) 
is estimated in two ways: (I) from national time standards in 
the above books (this company can usually beat those stand-
ards), and ( 2) from experience. On body repair work, experi-
ence and judgment are the bases. The estimate is a guaranteed 
bid except for motor trouble that might not be seen at first. 
2. Demand considerations are important. For example, 
the owner states that he arrived at the $4.00 per hour charge 
in this way: (I) It is the price charged by some of his com-
petitors; (2) while other competitors charge $4.50, he wants 
to keep his rate down in order to win a sufficient number of 
bids. But he also mentions that his overhead costs are lower, 
so that it is not necessary to charge so much to cover costs. 
Price differentials; variable markups. I. The markup on 
parts is determined by the manufacturer, being the difference 
between the retail prices listed in the books already mentioned 
and the wholesale prices on the invoices. General Motors 
suggests a higher markup than other manufacturers, though not 
on all of its makes and not on all parts for each make. The 
markup on foreign car parts is low. The company gives an 
insurance company a IO percent discount on parts (I5 percent 
on Chevrolet) . 
2. There are ways of varying prices not obvious at first. 
For customers seeking competitive bids and watching estimates 
closely, the company avoids any frills. In times when business 
is off, management watches estimates more closely, especially if 
the firm can start on work at once. All this implies there are 
differentials but probably within a small range. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
I. If the shop is full, the owner is liberal in his estimates (thus 
reflecting "opportunity costs," though this expression is not 
used). If there is idle capacity, the company does not go below 
full costs-instead it watches to make certain no unnecesary 
items go into the estimate. Flexibility is achieved by varying 
the number of extras to include in the job, for example, by 
painting scratches that otherwise might be neglected. 
2. The firm can reduce costs by replacing with used parts 
(the insurance companies watch for this) . This gives a higher 
markup and profit. 
3. The elasticity of demand is an influence on some work. 
For example, one regular customer with a large number of 
vehicles gets more favorable bids to encourage repeat business; 
he is informed and can shift his business rapidly. 
Market structure. There are several dozen competitors in 
the city, but only a few specializing in body repairs as this firm 
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does. There is differentiation of product by reputation and 
dependability. On jobs for insurance companies there is con-
siderable competition in bidding. 
The other three companies apply the same mechanics in 
pricing (reference to the national manuals on parts prices; 
the use of standard times from such manuals). They do not 
show such clear evidence of price discrimination or of full 
exploitation of demand differentials. In fact, these com-
panies state that longrun goodwill considerations prevent 
the adjustment of price to temporary demand shifts or to 
differences in demand elasticities. It may be that the 
interviewing did not reveal the full picture on pricing; we 
are somewhat skeptical of all the denials of price discrimina-
tion. In the first case, the owner appeared to reveal his 
practices openly and frankly; this may not have been so true 
in the other three cases. 
THREE OTHER REPAIR SERVICE COMPANIES 
The interviews also included two shoe repair shops and one 
radio and television repair concern. These firms are extremely 
small, all with revenues at or below $50,000 per year. 
The first shoe repair case appears to be one of the 
strongest demand-oriented cases. The owner gives little 
attention to cost in pricing. 
SHOE REPAIR COMPANY A 
Description. A proprietorship that has been in existence 
for 42 years. The manager, who is the son-in-law of the founder-
owner, is presently diversifying the business, chiefly by selling 
electrical appliances and new shoes. Only the shoe repair 
business is discussed here. Located in a town of 8,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. Demand is very important 
to the manager; he feels that his prices are as high as they can 
be. He repeatedly stated that people would stop having shoes 
repaired if his prices were any higher. (Apparently many of his 
customers buy shoes costing $7.00 or $8.00 a pair.) The firm 
has raised prices only once in the past eight years. 
Price differentials; variable markups. Since costs have risen 
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differentially, the margin on some services is greater than that 
on others; this is not a result of an intentional policy. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
l. The shoe repair business is looked upon partly as a drawing 
card for other types of business. 
2. The manager considers demand highly elastic for up-
ward price movements, completely inelastic for downward move-
ments. His primary fear is substitution of purchases of new 
inexpensive shoes for the repair of old ones. 
Market structure. There is one competitor in town, much 
smaller than this firm. The firm's market extends to smaller 
towns within a 15-20 mile radius, some of which have shoe 
repair shops. Probably it should be termed an imperfect 
oligopoly (prices are not uniform) . 
Other points. The owner is quite explicit about his desire 
to maximize profits, though pessimistic about his ability to 
increase profits through price changes. 
The second shoe repair case will not be presented in full. 
It is a partnership in a larger city, facing competition from 
about ten other firms. The partners show no evidence of 
systematic thinking about pricing. They sometimes absorb 
cost increases, but they claim they do this to achieve price 
stability rather than because of competition. Whatever 
differentials in markup exist are apparently a result of dif-
ferential cost changes rather than intentional policy. The 
owners claim that competitors' prices are ignored, yet in-
vestigation revealed that their prices are within the range of 
prices charged by competitors. The owners believe an in-
crease or decrease in price of 15 percent would have little 
effect on volume; they also would not anticipate price 
reactions from competitors. When asked why they do not 
exploit this alleged inelasticity of demand, they replied that 
they believe in "live and let live." Thus, this case appears 
to be one in which the owners do not seek maximum profits 
but instead are content with a satisfactory income. 
The fact that these partners are busy with routine work 
each day may help account for their inattention to price 
policy. Their profit aspirations seem to be low; they derive 
satisfaction from the work and service itself. 
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The last case in this section presents an interesting 
combination: a strong demand influence on price with little 
attention to cost, along with inflexibility in adjusting prices 
to particular jobs. There appear to be strong reasons for not 
adjusting the repair charges to the particular customer or 
even to the magnitude of the job. The case suggests that 
marginalism is not necessarily contradictory to a degree of 
inflexibility in price. On the other hand, the owner's state-
ment that, if this were a full-time business, he would be 
forced to engage in price discrimination suggests that he is 
not now fully maximizing profits. 
RADIO AND TELEVISION REP AIR COMPANY 
Description. A proprietorship, the owner engaging in busi-
ness on a part-time basis. The shop is in the basement of the 
owner's home. Located in a town of 8,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. There are two prices for 
labor on television repairs: $3.00 per service call (if inside city 
limits; 10 cents a mile extra if outside) and a "bench charge" 
of $6.50 (the bench charge is for work done in the shop). 
These prices are only rarely modified. The bench charge is $6.50, 
whether the job takes 15 minutes or three hours. Prices for all 
other services are similarly fixed. Parts are priced according to 
a list by the manufacturers. 
2. The owner says that these prices are as high as they 
can profitably be. This implies that demand and competition 
place a ceiling on price in that higher prices would result in 
longrun losses of goodwill and volume. 
3. The owner says that charging by the hour leads to 
arguments and poor relations with customers. He prefers a flat 
rate, which he believes helps him maintain goodwill and obtain 
repeat business. 
Price differentials; variable markups. A markup is not used. 
Profits vary among jobs of different lengths. The owner states 
that on a few occasions he has charged $7.50 for "bench time." 
On these occasions, the customer was rather wealthy. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
I. The owner does not appear to be highly concerned with 
costs, either full or incremental, when he sets his rates. 
2. The prices reflect the owner's view of demand. He 
stated several times that he could not "get any more" in such 
a small town. The usual kinked-demand theory is not ap-
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plicable, since the owner does not know what competitors are 
charging, and he does not think they would react to changes 
in his prices. 
Market structure. There are four or five competitors in 
town. The firm does business in a wider market, however, 
involving towns within a 15-20 mile radius of the firm's location. 
Probably this should be termed an imperfect oligopoly. 
Other points. The owner states that, while it is a profitable 
sideline, radio and television repair is not a lucrative full-time 
business. He further states that, were he to engage in the 
business on a full-time basis, he would be forced to practice 
customer-wealth-determined price discrimination-a statement 
which appears somewhat inconsistent with his view that prices 
were as high as they could be. 
THREE ENTERTAINMENT SERVICE COMPANIES 
The next group of service companies consists of three firms 
in the entertainment business. One of the cases will be 
presented in detail, followed by brief discussions of the other 
two. 
The first case, a bowling alley, shows a strong depend-
ence on outside information in price decisions-even evi-
dence of imitation of other firms; yet it is one of the clearest 
cases of careful marginalist reasoning. Interviews with the 
management suggest not only a strong desire to maximize 
profits, but also a thorough study of the market and the 
experiences of other firms. This firm is in a strong monopoly 
position, there being little likelihood of entry of a competitor 
in the limited market served by the bowling alley. 
BOWLING ALLEY 
Description. A manufachtrer of wooden parts which is 
going into a bowling alley subsidiary as a sideline business. Only 
bowling alley charges will be considered here. Located in a 
small industrial city. 
Chief considerations in pricing. Since this is a new busi-
ness, there has been no experience with costs or demand. The 
proposed rates ( 45 cents per line) are based on rates charged 
by high-priced alleys in similar small cities. Thus, there is 
considerable imitation in pricing. The assumption is that the 
revenue will be highest at this price. While the rates (prices) 
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are not based on costs, the firm would not have gone into this 
business without a prospect of revenues above cost. "We should 
pay off the entire investment in about nine years if our linage 
equals or falls slightly below the national average." 
Price differentials; variable markups. l. There has been no 
consideration of markup--no interest in unit cost, but instead 
in overall income-cost projections. 
2. This firm does not differentiate in price between 
bowling leagues and individuals, as many other alleys do. It 
offers low rates-35 cents-for children only on Saturday morn-
ing and late afternoon of school days. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. The managers have constructed break-even charts under 
several assumptions on costs and sales, giving an estimate of 
what volume will be necessary to earn profits. The company 
expects a volume that will provide $25,000 profits per year. It 
appears that the shortrun incremental cost is less than one-
fourth of the incremental revenue ( 12 cents per line as compared 
with 56 cents per line-the latter includes revenue from shoe 
rentals, etc.). Losses would be high if the volume fell one-third 
below estimates. 
2. While the management has not thought directly in 
terms of elasticity of demand, there is clear evidence of its 
influence. The management believes demand is inelastic up 
to a price of 45 cents. This is based on a thorough interview 
study of comparable alleys. It is also based on the prediction 
of no entry of competitors. The alley will be in a small city 
that probably will not support a second alley. Furthermore, 
there is no town within 40 miles large enough or with income 
high enough to support an alley. 
Market structure. The firm expects to have a monopoly 
position, with little danger that new firms will enter. There is 
no fear of retaliation. 
Other (Joints. 1. The company has been influenced in 
setting rates by the equipment supplier, who recommended the 
45-cent rate. Two of the surveyed companies increased their 
rates from 35 cents to 40 cents in 1959 and said they both 
could just as well have gone to 45 cents. 
2. The owners recognize uncertainty. "The main unknown 
quantities are how much business we can generate and how well 
we have estimated costs." 
The second company is a large moving picture theater in a 
city of 20,000. The owners believe that their present prices 
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of 65 cents for adults and 25 cents for children are optimum. 
They believe demand would be elastic to price increases but 
inelastic to price decreases, but they do not give the fear of 
retaliation as the reason. (This point receives considerable 
attention in Chapter 5 of this volume.) Thus demand 
appears to be the overwhelmingly important influence on 
pricing. Costs are difficult to evaluate; the building would 
be valueless in any other business. Incremental costs are 
undoubtedly low, consisting of film rentals (a flat fee or a 
percentage of receipts), popcorn, and little else. This com-
pany is in a semimonopoly position, there being no other 
theaters in the city, but there is competition from drive-in 
movies and television. 
The third company was only three weeks old at the 
time of the interviews. It is an outdoor trampoline center. 
Like the bowling alley case, this one illustrates imitative 
pricing. The owner found that companies in other cities 
were successfully charging 50 cents per person per half hour. 
Costs are difficult to evaluate because of the great uncertainty 
about how long this fad will be popular and how rapidly 
competitors will enter the field. 
FOUR MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE COMPANIES 
The first case in this group is of special interest. It illustrates 
more clearly than any other case in this study how the man-
agement uses the process of trial and error to approach 
optimum prices. Interviews with the management of this 
company leave little doubt that the owners do in fact 
approximate closely the prices providing maximum profits. 
The case also illustrates the importance of the personalities 
and objectives of the owners in pricing; similar companies 
nearby earn lower profits largely because their managements 
are less aggressive in their pricing practices. 
BILLBOARD CoMPANY 
Description. A partnership owning standard-size billboard 
panels in several small towns (population 5,000-15,000). Man-
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aged on a part-time basis by the partners with no permanent 
employees. 
Chief considerations in pricing. The interviewee was vague 
on the relative role of demand and costs, but indicated clearly 
that this was not a full-cost and markup situation. In fact, 
the company appears to be highly successful in approaching 
maximum profits through trial and error in pricing; the firm 
raises prices until it sees clear evidence that volume is seriously 
affected. As a result, the rates quoted by this company are 
higher than in most similar towns where management is less 
aggressive in achieving maximum profits. While the owners 
speak of pricing by "rule of thumb" or by "the seat of the 
pants," they seem to be quite successful in reaching an optimum 
position by these trial-and-error methods. 
Price differentials; variable markups. I. The firm does not 
allocate costs to single billboards, but concentrates on overall 
performance. 
2. The firm charges everyone the same rate, probably 
because of the fear of loss of goodwill if price discrimination 
were discovered by the customers. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. The incremental costs are so low in the short run that they 
are irrelevant-if the firm maximizes revenue, it roughly 
maximizes profits. The low level of incremental costs permits 
concentration on demand factors. 
2. Apparently, though the management does not use the 
expression "elasticity," it considers demand inelastic up to 
prevalent rates for the following reasons: ( 1) Advertising 
agencies are not much interested in holding down costs and 
thus are not sensitive to rate changes; ( 2) advertisers plan their 
volume of advertising with little reference to rates, so that they 
are unlikely to curtail the number of ads because of high rates 
in some towns. One advertiser does give trouble and helps set 
a ceiling on rates by threatening to withdraw business if rates 
are too high, but it is the exception. 
Market structure. There are no other firms in these towns. 
There is little danger of entry because of the difficulty of attract-
ing accounts from the established companies. 
Other points. The personalities of two partners are im-
portant. They are interested in making money and apparently 
are in harmony on the trial-and-error approach to raising rates. 
The next firm, a truck-leasing company, is one of the few 
cases of a follower of price leadership in this study, and even 
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it is not so clear an illustration as one finds in large business. 
The firm appears at first to follow price changes of its lead-
ing competitors, after deducting 10 percent. The firm's 
costs are difficult to define, so that cost seems to play a 
secondary role in pricing. But six months after the initial 
interview the firm had moved to new quarters, where costs 
were higher. This put a squeeze on the company's expected 
profits and led to an increase in prices that did not follow 
the 10 percent rule. At the same time the management 
expected its competitors to raise prices soon because of 
creeping inflation. Perhaps the firm was at this time acting 
as a barometric price leader rather than a price follower. 
An illustration of unsystematic price followership is 
that of a small drycleaner in a large city. This firm also finds 
it difficult to estimate its costs. It sets its prices midway 
between those of the high-priced and low-priced plants. 
However, the firm does not imitate its big competitors in 
offering "specials." It faces over one hundred competitors, 
while the truck-leasing firm faces only ten, some of which 
are not really competing directly in its type of business. 
Thus this inexact type of price followership does not seem 
to be related in a precise way to the number of firms in the 
market. 
The last firm in this category is a laundry-one facing 
competition from 20 or 30 other laundries. The owner-
manager is one of the few in this study to express his 
objectives in terms of a "target" return. He stated that his 
policy was to achieve a 5 percent net profit on sales. (Note 
that the target is expressed in terms of profit on sales rather 
than on investment, the latter being more usual in big 
business.) This firm maintains a price schedule about 10 
percent above that of its competitors. The owner spoke in 
terms of "what the traffic would bear." Apparently the 
public is not fully informed about these price differences; 
also the firm provides more extra services than its com-
petitors and has a reputation for quality. The firm is willing 
to cut price to full cost (but not below) on off-season 
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business, such as motel business in the summer. It also 
offers a low "family bundle" price, which is "less profitable" 
than the remaining business; this service draws more profit-
able business into the firm. This type of price differential is 
common in the industry. 
This laundry is very conscious of the longrun impacts 
of price change. The management believes it could raise 
prices profitably in the short run, but that this would lead 
to a gradual deterioration of business. It does not believe 
that reduced prices would be profitable, but it is not con-
cerned with price retaliation. The managers, like many 
others in this study, do not appear to have given much 
systematic thought to pricing. 
SEVEN CONTRACTORS 
A common thread runs through the seven cases on con-
tractors. All of them appear at first to be cost oriented, 
starting with cost and adding predetermined markups. But 
a closer examination shows that demand is important in 
determining (in some cases) how much to charge different 
customers or (in other cases) how much to vary price 
according to seasonal or cyclical changes in business. At the 
same time there are considerable differences in the behavior 
of these firms. Two of them are members of a cartel, so 
that the demand-oriented flexibility in price is limited to 
certain repair jobs not controlled by the cartel. 
CoNTRACTOR A (HoME BUILDER) 
Description. A contractor building six or seven medium- to 
high-price homes per year. He subcontracts much of the work 
to other firms, but he hires his own carpenters. Employees vary 
from one to five. Located in a city of 50,000 to 100,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. There are two pricing 
situations. ( l) Bidding on a house to be constructed in the 
future: The contractor bids on a cost basis (modified by demand, 
as will be indicated). He asks more on these bids than on a 
finished house, because the customer might ask for changes 
that would take more of his time. He very definitely considers 
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his time to be a cost. ( 2) Pricing a house already built or 
partially completed (70 percent of his business): Prices are on 
a cost basis (except for modifications to be indicated) . He 
includes his own time as a cost rather than applying a per-
centage markup. 
2. This contractor does not price on a square-footage 
basis, as do many other builders. This does not reflect dif-
ferences in costs of fixtures, his own time, etc. Instead he 
prepares a detailed record or estimate of actual costs. 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. The charges for the 
contractor's time vary with business conditions and the weather. 
2. In bad times, such as 1957, he reduces price to get his 
money back, to help finance additional houses. In 1957 he had 
two houses for over a year before selling them-and shaded 
price to do so. He refrains from building new houses until he 
has sold ones already built. This exerts a pressure to reduce 
prices. But he stays out of debt and thus is not under as 
extreme pressure to sell as some of his competitors. 
3. He bids lower on houses to be built in the winter, for 
several reasons: ( 1) His time is not so valuable then, because 
building activity is off; ( 2) he wants to hold his men (carpenters 
primarily) together so that they will be available the rest of the 
year. He bids partly on the basis of personality of customers. 
If they appear to be demanding, he recognizes the added costs 
of meeting their demands in his bids. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. Since almost all of his costs are incremental, except depre-
ciation on his equipment and the costs of his own time, he 
does not make a clear distinction in his mind between incre-
mental and sunk costs. But his willingness to reduce price in 
bad times or winter might be taken as a reflection of incremental 
reasoning. 
2. The charge for his time is evidence of the application 
of the opportunity costs concept. For example, he bid rather 
high on one proposed house because he knew it would take a 
large amount of his personal time and would keep him from 
doing other jobs. His reduction of these charges for his time 
in winter and in bad times is a reflection of the fact that 
opportunity costs are lower then. 
3. His costs vary with general demand conditions. His 
nonunion labor is cheaper in winter and in bad times. He 
takes this into account in pricing. 
4. Apparently he makes little distinction between the 
elasticities of demand of different customers, but is more con-
cerned with the differences in costs they might occasion. 
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5. He does sometimes shade price for a customer who has 
cash. This cuts down on the red tape and reduces the risk of 
delays in loan negotiations. 
6. In pricing houses already built, he takes into account 
prices of comparable houses and sometimes adjusts his price 
accordingly. He tries to avoid building a house too expensive 
for its neighborhood. 
7. One way he shades price, if demand conditions require 
it, is by offering to do added work without charge. 
Market structure. This is a very small builder with several 
dozen competitors. There is probably little direct retaliation to 
price change partly because of noncomparability of products and 
devices for secrecy in shading prices. The owner is influenced 
in setting his prices by the prices of others. There is some 
differentiation in product because of reputations for quality, 
differences in appearance of houses, and the personality of the 
builder. This contractor sells some houses through real estate 
agents and others directly. Sometimes he shades price when 
real estate commission is avoided. 
Contractors B and C (both electrical contractors) are more 
specialized. Contractor B does electrical work in residences 
and small commercial establishments. He also thinks in 
terms of cost-plus. But he varies his markup according to the 
class of business (higher charges for residential rewiring). He 
shades prices to attract large volume work and is very 
flexible in prices on commercial and industrial work. He is 
influenced by "standard charges" generally asked by his 
competitors on some classes of work. 
Contractor C operates either on a cost-plus basis or on a 
predetermined rate per outlet or per foot of wiring. He 
shades prices when business is off (a demand factor). He 
also shades prices on jobs near his office because of ease in 
supervision (a cost factor) . One reason for shading prices 
in bad times is to hold the work force together (a considera-
tion mentioned by other firms). Despite the admission of 
such considerations, the management resents the low prices 
of some competitors and claims that it does not reduce 
price below labor plus materials plus 10 percent. The 
normal price is labor plus materials plus 10 percent for 
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overhead plus 15 percent for profit. Some customers are 
regular; prices for them are negotiated and the 15 percent 
profit is almost always earned. But about 40 percent of the 
work is on a bidding basis and is quite competitive. 
The next two firms are cement contractors, both belong-
ing to the same cartel arrangement and thus subject to less 
strong competitive pressures. Because of the similarity of 
the two cases, only one is presented here. Both firms show 
some reluctance to vary margins even on noncartel work; 
this is especially true of Contractor E, who is not discussed 
in detail. The cartel arrangement quite clearly prevents the 
degree of price flexibility illustrated in the other cases. 
CoNTRACTOR D 
Description. A concrete contractor in a medium-size city in 
the East. Two-thirds of the business comes from builders; 
the remainder, from homeowners. 
Chief consideration in pricing. l. Cost is the most im-
portant element in setting prices. There is some demand-
induced variation in quoted prices: When the firm is very busy, 
it quotes higher prices to homeowners; when its business is very 
bad, it quotes lower prices. 
2. The work for builders is usually priced on a straight 
full-cost basis, governed by a cartel arrangement. 
3. This firm and four others jointly present price lists to 
builders. The joint action extends only to "new work" done 
for builders. The firms meet periodically to review prices and 
costs and to make adjustments if they seem desirable. 
Price differentials; variable markups. The chief instance of 
variable markup for homeowners is the firm's policy of lowering 
its markup on very large jobs; beyond the "normal-size" job the 
markup varies inversely with the size of the job. The firm is 
also willing to cut its margin when business is slow. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. The firm seeks to quote prices which cover full costs even 
when business is bad, but there is a reluctant willingness to go 
below full costs on small jobs in slack periods, primarily to 
keep employees busy. 
2. Probably demand is more elastic on the larger home-
owner jobs, thus helping account for the lower markups on such 
jobs. More bids are sought on the larger jobs, and thus the 
market is more competitive. 
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Market structure. The firm does business in two types of 
markets: In its work for contractors, it is a member of a cartel; 
in other types of work (most of which is repair work for home-
owners) there is very keen competition, especially from small, 
one-man firms. The firm has let the latter type of business 
suffer rather than meet the competition from the small firms. 
Other points. 1. The difficulty of getting good concrete 
finishers is one factor tending to limit expansion of firms in this 
industry. The need to provide continuous employment for 
finishers makes even more surprising the reluctance of the 
firm to price below full costs. The owner prefers to have his 
men work on maintenance duties around the shop. 
2. The cartel's prices to contractors are about 15 percent 
higher than those of its competitors. It seems that this is 
possible because the members do exceptionally good work. 
3. The firm gets a profit and loss statement every six 
months; if a price adjustment seems necessary, a meeting of the 
cartel considers the situation. 
Contractor F engages in a more diversified business. The 
somewhat flexible policies of this contractor, including price 
discrimination and the adjustment of price to shifts in 
demand over time, suggest an intensive striving for profits. 
But the owner's statements contradict this, and there are 
strong reasons (because of the close relationship of one 
researcher to this manager) for accepting these statements. 
Perhaps we can say that he does vary prices to increase his 
profits, but he does not push this practice as far as possible. 
CoNTRACTOR F (GENERAL CoNTRACTOR) 
Description. A contractor doing painting, roofing, paper-
hanging, and house repairs, and building garages and additions 
to houses. A one-man firm, with one employee in summers, 
none in the winter. The firm was established in 1948. Located 
in a large city. 
Chief considerations in pricing. Both cost and demand are 
important in pricing. Prices for the various services are arrived 
at in different ways. 
1. General repair work on buildings is usually priced on a 
time and materials basis. The labor (time) charge is usually 
higher in the summer, when business is good, than in the 
winter. Markup on materials is also varied somewhat, chiefly 
wealth-induced price discrimination. 
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2. For most other services, there are more or less standard 
rates (so much per square foot for building and painting, so 
much per roll for papering, etc.) . Departures from these rates 
arise from both cost and demand considerations: the difficulty 
of getting to the job, the amount of preparation necessary, the 
wealth (and willingness to spend) of the customer, and the 
amount of business on hand. The demand-induced departures 
should not be overemphasized, either in frequency or degree. 
Price differentials; variable markups. There is some price 
discrimination, within rather narrow limits, and some seasonal 
price variation. The importance of the latter cannot be stated 
precisely, because there is no policy on variation. It is usually 
difficult to know if it is necessary to quote lower prices in slack 
times, and this firm seems to prefer a lower chance of getting a 
contract at the "standard" price to a better chance of getting 
it at a lower price. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. The management is cognizant of the opportunity cost of 
forgoing more profitable work if its resources are tied up in work 
which is less than normally profitable. 
2. Both the amount and elasticity of demand are con-
sidered. More attention is paid to longrun than shortrun de-
mand. This firm considers longrun demand to be highly elastic, 
even for established customers, and does not take full advantage 
of the strong demand in summers. (Jobs are turned down in 
the summer due to lack of time. ) The firm depends on regular 
customers and does not want to get a reputation for high prices. 
Market structure. Competition is very keen in all the 
services performed by this firm. There is some product dif-
ferentiation arising from quality differences. 
Other (Joints. l. The owner is not a venturesome entre-
preneur. His chief considerations are the independence gained 
by "being his own boss" and a strong sense of achievement in 
doing good work. (He loses money on a job rather than do 
shoddy work.) He is a self-employed tradesman rather than a 
businessman. 
2. The upward departures from "standard" prices are a 
means of making up for lost profits on jobs that were more 
costly than estimated; otherwise, the owner has ethical objections 
to price discrimination. 
Contractor G is engaged in air-conditioning and sheet-metal 
work. The firm's pricing procedure is to estimate meterials 
and labor costs, and add a percentage for overhead (based 
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on the estimated ratio of overhead to total costs for the 
year) and another percentage for profit. The firm varies the 
profit markup to meet competition in bidding, but claims 
never to go below full cost. Some flexibility in full cost 
arises from the willingness of the owners-managers to cut 
their salaries when business is off. One of the two owners 
regrets not going below full cost on a large job last year, 
recognizing that the added revenue would have greatly 
exceeded incremental costs. But in general both owners 
favor maintaining full cost as a floor under price. This same 
firm seeks some work on a quality, dependability, and selling 
effort basis, recognizing that there are always some com-
petitors who will underbid them on certain classes of 
business. So this is another case of flexibility in pricing, 
limited by the unwillingness of the owners to extend that 
flexibility outside the full-cost limits. 
SEVEN HARDWARE STORES 
It is sometimes stated that hardware stores apply a 50 
percent markup on cost; this is a traditional markup in the 
industry. Critics of pricing practices in this segment of 
retailing have attacked the rigid application of the same 
markup to one item after another. They have argued for 
more flexible markups to take advantage of varying market 
and cost conditions. In the last two or three years there has 
been considerable publicity favoring more flexible pricing 
practices in hardware retailing. 
Even though the stores covered by this study are located 
in small cities and towns and are relatively small operations, 
not a single one of them adheres to a strict policy of cost 
plus a rigid markup. All of them adjust markups to some 
extent to demand conditions and turnover considerations. 
HARDWARE STORE A 
Description. A hardware store dealing in general hardware, 
toys, sporting goods, and paint. A partnership in a city of 
100,000 population. 
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Chief considerations in pricing. 1. Wholesale cost is the 
basis for pricing but a constant markup is not used. There is 
evidence that differences in demand influence the pricing of 
individual items. On those items on which competition is with 
grocery stores and drugstores, the firm meets competitive prices 
in order to create a favorable image in the mind of the public. 
2. Quality is depended on to make demand somewhat less 
elastic. A drugstore stands directly across the street, but many 
people who want better quality go from the drugstore to the 
hardware store. Another differentiating factor is advice on use 
of the product (paint, for example). 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. High turnover, 
highly competitive items carry a low markup (Spic 6 Span at 
2 cents above wholesale cost). Low turnover items carry a 
higher markup. 
2. Prepriced and suggested price items are sold at the 
marked price. 
3. High-selling time items carry a high markup. Paint 
(requiring a high explanation time) is priced on a 40-50 
percent markup on selling price. 
4. When the store gets a good buy, it sells at the usual 
price, leaving a higher than normal markup. 
Market structure. There is stiff competition from groceries 
and drugstores in the neighborhood on some items. Also, there 
is another hardware store only a block away. 
Other points. I. In order to meet competitor's prices, the 
firm buys from a cooperative wholesaler. This cooperative has no 
salesmen (sells through catalog) and only relatively large 
stores can join. Also, the retailer receives a percentage refund 
on purchases over a certain amount. Thus, because of low 
expenses and a refund arrangement, the retailer can get lower 
wholesale prices than he would from a conventional jobber. 
2. The firm would like to see more fair-trade items. 
3. The firm makes no attempt to apportion fixed costs to 
determine the percentage markup necessary to cover full costs. 
But the management does prepare a monthly income statement. 
It is possible to see at frequent intervals whether markups are 
sufficient. 
4. Price lining is used and is considered important. The 
cooperative mentioned earlier provides helpful advice. 
5. The firm does not have storewide sales. Three times a 
year, it has sales on certain items. Prices for these specials are 
never below wholesale cost. These sales increase traffic and 
enable the firm to sell many items not on sale. 
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6. The firm infrequently goes below wholesale cost if 
necessary to sell obsolete or seasonal items. In most cases, 
however, it is not necessary to do so. 
7. A special order service is provided for customers on 
items not stocked. The markup is around 50 percent plus 
postage and handling. 
Hardware store A thus illustrates flexibility of markups to 
meet both varying demand and cost conditions. This is also 
true of the others, which will receive less attention. 
HARDWARE STORE B 
The management charges a higher markup on sporting 
goods during the season, with drastic reductions at the end of 
the season. It gives a 10 percent discount to contractors. Like 
the previous store, this one applies lower markups on high-
turnover items. 
HARDWARE STORE c 
The management of this store follows the general rule of a 
50 percent markup on cost, but varies this markup according to 
market conditions. It also applies a lower markup on high-
turnover items. The firm has semiannual sales at which it 
reduces some prices to wholesale cost. The management would 
like to see more prepriced items, with less scope for price 
competition. 
HARDWARE STORE D 
The markup percentages are lower ( 25 percent on cost and 
even less) on large appliances because of the high dollar markup 
that results. The firm sometimes breaks away from suggested 
list prices and takes part in price cutting, partly as a result of 
similar action by competitors. The owner applies what he 
calls "magic prices" -for example, he thinks a price of 88 
cents has a special appeal to the public. 
HARDWARE STORE E 
This store goes as high as a 100 percent markup on cost on 
some low-turnover items and as low as 30 percent on highly 
competitive, high-turnover items (such as electric plugs). The 
owner has kept down the price of some high-turnover items, 
such as "BB's" (despite increases in wholesale cost), and has 
noticed a great increase in the quantity of sales. Such action 
indicates that he has gained some insight in price elasticities 
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by trial and error. He also stresses nonprice competition, such 
as delivery, credit, and trading stamps. He sends an employee 
out to do comparative shopping and adjusts some prices if they 
are out of line with competition. He has shifted to some lower 
quality items, because competition from such items elsewhere 
was hurting his business. 
Details on the remaining two stores would be redundant. 
The majority of the stores are familiar with and probably 
influenced by the recommendations of the National Retail 
Hardware Association on the adjustment of markups to 
different classes of business. In some localities there are 
complaints about price cutting and a desire for more 
widespread prepricing of items by manufacturers. Some of 
the managers emphasize longrun considerations in pricing, 
refraining from taking advantage of shortrun demand dif-
ferences in order to build up images of "fair" pricing. 
THREE GIFT SHOPS 
Gift shops are closely related to the hardware stores previ-
ously discussed, offering a wide variety of products in a 
relatively small space. These shops are smaller than the 
hardware stores. The first case is one of fairly mechanical 
pricing procedures: adherence to prices suggested by whole-
salers and manufacturers or application of a definite markup 
to wholesale cost. There is no doubt that the personality 
of the owner is a primary influence in accounting for this 
mechanical approach to pricing. She is not one to experi-
ment with prices. She has definite ethical objections to 
gouging the public, along with strong feelings that in the 
long run this would be bad business. She believes that the 
way to make profits is through careful management: main-
tenance of a complete inventory, establishment of a reputa-
tion for quality and dependability, treatment of customers 
as individuals, liberal credit practices, etc. Some customers 
go to this store first because it is known to be "in stock." 
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GIFT SHOP A 
Description. Sells gifts, cards, dry goods, and locally pre-
pared foods. One or two employees in addition to the owner-
manager. Located in a town of 6,000 population. 
Chief considerations in pricing. The owner prices on one 
of three bases: 
1. Markup on wholesale cost (50 percent on some items 
and 100 percent on others). 
2. Suggested price of manufacturer or wholesaler, which 
usually provides similar markups to No. 1. (In some cases the 
wholesaler lists the items at suggested retail price and then 
deducts 50 percent.) 
3. Twenty percent commission on selling price, applied to 
food items prepared by local women. 
Price differentials; variable markups. There are three main 
markup categories: 
1. "Competitive lines"-low-priced items with a high 
turnover, such as household goods and inexpensive linens and 
gifts. The markup on these is around 50 percent on wholesale 
cost. Apparently demand is more elastic on these items 
because of close competition. 
2. High-priced items with a markup of 100 percent or 
somewhat less, such as china, glass, linens on which competition 
is less severe, and also greeting cards (which have a suggested 
retail price) . 
3. Prepared food on which the store takes a commission 
of 20 percent of retail price ( 25 percent markup on cost). The 
individual housewives preparing these foods determine price-
not the store. But the store recommends this formula: Double 
the cost of ingredients and fuel to arrive at price before the 
commission. In some cases, when the item takes a great deal 
of work, there is more than a doubling of ingredient cost. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. The owner is very inflexible about varying from these 
markups on cost. She has never marked down a greeting card. 
There are no special sales at any time of the year, though 
occasionally she will "give someone a price" on an item that 
had been sitting on the shelves. 
2. It would appear that the low markup on prepared foods 
involves incremental reasoning. One other store abandoned 
this line because of low markup-it was not making money 
when the overhead was counted in. But prepared foods involve 
no inventory risk (if the item doesn't sell, it goes back to the 
person preparing it); they require no transportation costs; and 
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they draw people into the store, in this way helping sell other 
items. 
Market structure. There are five or six competitors on low 
price items (variety stores and drugstores) . There is some 
competition from stores in a nearby city of 100,000. 
On a few items-napkins, paper cups, cheap stationery-
the store follows the price set by variety stores (an example of 
price leadership) . 
Other points. The kinked-demand theory is not fully ap-
plicable. The owner believes she will lose business rapidly if 
she raises price (gets a reputation for high prices), but she does 
not fear retaliation if she reduces. She resists reduction because 
she believes that this would put price below cost and probably 
also because she believes the demand would be inelastic to price 
reductions. 
This shop has been sold to new owners, who have changed 
some pricing practices, a clear indication that the personality 
and attitudes of management have an influence on pricing. 
The new owners are more flexible. They put on special 
sales. The old owner feels that this is damaging the business, 
helping account for the lower profits that are being earned. 
She also believes that the new owners are careless about 
inventory, stocking some items that will not sell and putting 
on special sale items that will have to be replaced at once. 
The second gift shop sells a higher proportion of pre-
priced items. The owner follows a policy of a fairly rigid 
50 percent markup on cost but does reduce price to move 
out old stock. In general the policy is one of letting outside 
agencies determine the prices. Thus, this case is similar to 
the first one in that little internal judgment is applied to the 
evaluation of pricing. 
The last store in this group is larger and handles a 
greater variety of items. Its pricing policies are quite like 
those of the other two stores, except for a greater tendency 
to specials, in which there may be substantial price reduc-
tions. The management of this store does fear retaliation 
to reduced prices. It refrains from full exploitation of dif-
ferences of demand because of the longrun effects this might 
have on the "store image." 
Ill 
FOUR DEPARTMENT STORES AND 
DEPARTMENTALIZED SPECIALTY STORES 
Three cases in this section are presented in detail, since each 
presents a different pattern. They illustrate variations in 
the pricing behavior of retailers, each adopting policies that 
involve an adjustment to its environment. In the first store, 
the only department store in the strict sense, the manage-
ment adopts a flexible pricing policy aimed at high-volume 
sales of medium-quality merchandise. The management of 
the second store, a departmentalized specialty store, aims 
at a higher income market. Its merchandise mix and pricing 
reflect a desire to maintain a "store image" based on 
quality. Unlike the management of the first store, this one 
prefers to avoid pricing decisions, placing much greater 
stress on prepriced items. 
While these first two stores are probably striving for 
higher profits, in their own ways, the third store clearly is not. 
It is the best instance in the whole study of restraint in 
profit seeking. In a sense, because it is owned by a small 
college, it has placed itself in a public utilities category, 
with self-regulation of profits. 
STORE A (A DEPARTMENT STORE) 
Description. Annual sales of $3 million. The merchandise 
ranges from candies to ready-to-wear, home furnishings, and 
heavy appliances. Located in a city over 100,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. Markups on wholesale 
cost are used to determine price; these markups vary with 
departments and with types of merchandise. Price lines have 
been developed, and the store buyers attempt to buy merchan-
dise which fits into these price lines, but which yields an 
adequate markup. The price lines are set at the low-middle 
range (this fits into the image of low-price, medium-quality 
department store). 
2. Markdowns are taken on items that do not move. 
The markdown is often down to the range between direct cost 
and wholesale price. 
3. Demand is the principal determinant of prices. The 
store management attempts to set price at a level tha~ 
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generates volume. Even on price-line items the management 
moves them into lower price lines if the volume is unsatis-
factory at higher prices. There is thus considerable flexibility 
and experimentation in pricing. For example, heavy appliances 
sell at a yearend gross margin of 18 percent, which is consider-
ably below the national average. 
4. In a few cases, the store follows the manufacturer's 
suggested price; the management of this store desires to make 
pricing decisions on all items, but does carry nationally price-
advertised lines to fill out the store's offerings. 
5. Unlike most of the smaller stores studied so far, this 
store adjusts prices continuously, not waiting for a yearend sale. 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. The markup does 
vary among items. There are certain industry-wide "normal" 
markups on items. These markups are guides rather than 
absolutes. Price lining and price flexibility make it impossible 
to get a normal markup on each item. 
2. The store uses loss leaders and bargain counters to 
attract customers. 
3. In some cases prices are based on what the "market will 
bear," apparently placing shortrun profit considerations ahead of 
possible longer run effects. 
Market structure. 1. The store competes with department, 
shoe, men's clothing, women's clothing, furniture, and ap-
pliance outlets. 
2. The store attempts to maintain a reputation as the 
one-stop store with competitive prices. The offering in each 
line is restricted, yet by diversification it can attract a variety 
of customers. 
STORE B (A DEPARTMENTALIZED SPECIALTY STORE) 
Description. A medium-high price store. Annual sales of 
about $1 million. Located in a city of over 100,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. Nationally advertised 
brands are carried in the store (about 40 percent of the total), 
and on these items no pricing decision develops. The manu-
facturers' suggested prices permit normal markups. 
2. This store apparently prefers to avoid pricing decisions. 
It can do this part of the time by stocking prepriced items. 
3. On those lines of merchandise on which a pricing 
decision is made, the target markup is about 40 percent of 
retail, although this may vary with the various items. 
4. On some items which are unique in some feature, an 
analysis is made which attempts to identify variable costs of 
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the item. This was done in the case of glassware from West 
Virginia. But this did not influence price-rather it influenced 
the decision whether to stock the item. 
5. The store stocks merchandise which coincides with 
the established high-price lines. Probably the demand is in-
elastic, since customers anticipate high prices. In other words 
a "store image" has been created on the basis of quality 
merchandise, pleasant surroundings, and a fashionable atmos-
phere, and this "image" permits high prices. 
Price differentials; variable markups. I. There are variable 
markups on women's dresses. The high-price dresses have a 
higher markup than do less expensive lines, compensating for 
low volume. 
2. High-price dresses are not marked down as drastica11y 
as lower price dresses. The reason given by management is 
that a markdown from $175 to $150 or even $125 will not 
penetrate a new segment of the market. 
3. In many cases pricing is based on what the "market 
will bear." 
Market structure. 1. The store is most directly engaged in 
competition with one other fashionable department store and 
several sma11er fashion shops for women. 
2. Nonprice competition appears to outweigh price cut-
ting. Semiannual sales are the only specials run by this store. 
The store does not use loss leaders. 
STORE c (A DEPARTMENTALIZED COLLEGE STORE) 
Description. A sma11, co11ege-owned department store ( 4 
departments) with annual sales of about $325,000. A low-
profit operation. Located in a town under 10,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. An average margin for 
each department is achieved, but demand and turnover are taken 
into account on individual items. The average target margin 
is based on a budget which shows the anticipated volume of 
business and the expected expenses necessary to handle that 
volume. From the budget is calculated an average overhead 
percentage. Based on this percentage, a margin is determined 
which will cover overhead and a11ow a net profit. Then, each 
department is given a margin to maintain which, when con-
sidered with each department's volume, results in the storewide 
desired margin. An internal control is used to check on average 
margin for each department weekly. 
This system means that if volume goes up, the average 
margin required would decrease. But this is true only within 
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limits. For example, if the anticipated volume goes down 
considerably, an employee would probably be released to de-
crease expenses and make an increase in price less necessary. 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. A constant 13.6 
percent markup on selling price is used for both new and used 
books. The cost of new books is 80 percent of list price, but 
the store sells below list. The cost of used books is 50 percent 
of the new book list price. The store does not buy all used 
books-only those which are to be reused. At present, the 
margin on books does not cover average overhead ( 15 ~ 
percent of revenue). The manager's reason for this is: "If I am 
going to give students a break on anything, why not do it on 
something they must have?" 
2. On everything else the margin is variable. Demand, 
past experience, and competitive conditions determine the 
margin. Coffee, for example, is priced on a 3-5 percent margin 
because the quantity demanded would drop rapidly at any 
higher price. However, turnover may still make the item 
profitable. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. Demand is very elastic in groceries and almost perfectly 
inelastic in books. The margins are influenced by such differ-
ences in demand elasticity (except on books) . 
2. The management sets fairly high margins on some 
items to compensate for the low margin on books. 
3. Occasionally the grocery department makes a market 
survey. Several staple items are compared with the same items 
in stores in the same and adjacent towns. The form used for 
the survey lists items horizontally and stores vertically. The 
surveyor obtains the prices for each store of all the items listed. 
Two totals are obtained: the total of all items for each store 
and total of all stores for each item. Totals by store give a 
good idea as to how the overall pricing compares. Totals by 
item divided by number of stores give average prices for items 
and show whether the college store's individual prices are out 
of line with those of other stores. The objective is usually to 
keep the prices in line with those in other stores. 
Market structure. The competition is keen on clothing, 
school supplies, and groceries, but not on textbooks. On books 
probably no one else could compete because of the low margin. 
Other points. The store has a target net profit of approxi-
mately 2~ percent on sales. This is determined by the college. 
The rate of return on the investment which the college has in 
the store is more than the college's average return on investment. 
Thus the 2Y2 percent net profit is all the college desires. 
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The fourth store does not require such a detailed presenta-
tion. It is a department store catering to a low-income 
market that is highly price-conscious. This store specializes 
in "irregulars" (nationally advertised items with small flaws). 
The store faces keen price competition from other, smaller 
stores in its location and thus finds it necessary to operate 
at a low gross margin of 32 percent (national average 36.4 
percent) .2 
FIVE MEN'S CLOTHING STORES 
The preceding section suggests a hypothesis that stores 
catering to low-income or medium-income customers pay 
more attention to price policy and are more flexible in 
pricing. The five cases of men's stores support this hypoth-
esis. The first store is one dealing with the lower-middle 
income market. As the detailed summary shows, the man-
agement has continually experimented with pricing and, in 
addition, has shown flexibility and imagination in nonprice 
competition. 
MEN's STORE A 
Description. A locally owned men and boys' wear shop. 
In five years the store went from bankruptcy to a $12,000 
profit on approximately $400,000 sales under a new owner. 
The store emphasizes price competition and volume; it caters 
to middle-income and college trade. Not a member of the local 
men's clothing association in the city of over 100,000 where 
it is located. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. Throughout the season, 
the store experiments with various measures which emphasize 
price savings. For example, a full wardrobe regularly selling at 
$189 is advertised at $149. 
2. The owner emphasizes that he has no ethical feelings 
about "charging what the traffic will bear." His markups on 
suits vary from 40 percent on retail price to 60 percent on 
retail price. 
2 Malcolm P. McNair, Operating Results of Department and 
Specialty Stores, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Bulletin 157 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 2. 
116 
3. The owner readily admits selling a nationally advertised 
line at less than the advertised price to create volume. This 
practice caused a competitor to complain to the manufacturer. 
But most items are not prepriced. 
4. On many occasions, ties, socks, etc. are advertised at 
prices less than cost to get volume and possible sales of other 
items. 
5. The store always has a sale going on some items. 
Price differentials; variable markups. l. Variable markups 
are used on similar items in a price line, and also as between 
price lines. 
2. The owner tries to maintain an average 40 percent 
markup on price, although in previous years he was down to 
36 percent. In these years, losses were sustained. 
3. The owner has experimented with special discounts for 
students who purchase above a certain volume. But now that 
he is making money, he plans to become more conservative. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
l. The owner states that his advertising was 4-5 percent 
higher (as percentage of sales) than that of comparable stores. 
He states that the cost of extensive advertising was more than 
offset by additional profits. Now that "satisfactory profits" 
(owner's words) have been realized, the advertising is being 
cut back and rigidly budgeted at 3 percent of sales. 
2. The owner considers demand (at least that segment 
to which the store caters) to be quite elastic. He engages in 
aggressive advertising which emphasizes the price advantage 
offered by the store. 
Market structure. There are seven or eight other men's 
stores in the market. The management believes it has developed 
a special market of its own. But it faces competition from low-
price stores on one side and quality stores on the other. 
The second store serves an even lower income market. It 
follows the suppliers' suggestions on price to begin with, but 
it adjusts price upward or downward as the season progresses. 
One aim in pricing apparently is to remain competitive 
with other stores selling to this low-price market. 
The next two stores (stores C and D) deal with a 
higher income market. Their markups are relatively high 
(on suits, coats, etc., one sets the markup at 46 percent, the 
other at 42-43 percent on selling price). Their markups 
vary on other items, such as shirts, vests, ties, etc. Both 
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stores engage in special sales on predetermined days but are 
opposed to flexible pricing during the rest of the year. In 
fact, both have ethical objections to the price flexibility of 
competing stores. Managers of the two stores consider both 
demand and cost in setting their markups. They believe 
that their customers accept relatively high prices (their 
demand is relatively inelastic); they also believe that their 
higher servicing costs (expert tailoring, pressing, free de-
livery) justify such prices. One of the managers examines 
the lines of suits shown by salesmen and selects those he 
thinks fit into his merchandise line, without at first con-
sidering wholesale cost. Then he asks for the wholesale 
price, adds his customary markup ( 46 percent on retail), 
and decides whether the price is too high to justify stocking 
the item. Neither store has applied much detailed analysis 
in pricing nor does either experiment to get more informa-
tion on market conditions. Neither store is interested in 
price-stimulated volume. Each instead desires to maintain 
an "image" that will attract customers seeking quality. 
The last store has in the past dealt with a quality-
conscious market similar to that of the stores just discussed. 
It has followed the pattern of pricing in those stores. But 
the store is opening up a new basement department with 
lower price suits. The management hopes to maintain its 
high quality reputation on the main floor while at the same 
time it taps a new market with its basement store. It remains 
to be seen whether the store will adopt a more flexible 
pricing policy in this new department, in line with the 
suggested hypothesis. 
EIGHT MISCELLANEOUS RETAILERS 
The retailers in this group repeat patterns already discussed, 
so that each requires only a brief presentation. 
BooKsTORE 
This bookstore is privately owned. It serves an adjacent 
university. Its prices on new textbooks are the publisher's list 
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prices, allowing a 20 percent markup on retail price. On used 
textbooks, the store buys at about 50 percent of this list price 
and sells at 75 percent, providing a considerably higher markup. 
On used textbooks not required locally, the buying and selling 
prices are more variable. 
The store carries other items-supplies, cosmetics, greeting 
cards, paperback books, etc. Frequently the suggested price 
applies. The markups vary from 20 to 50 percent of retail price. 
The store discriminates in favor of faculty members by giving 
them a 10 percent discount. The store's policies are very much 
like those of its major competitor. 
FoonsuoP 
This neighborhood grocery store is located in a large city. 
The prices are determined by applying a percentage markup to 
wholesale cost. But the markups vary from one class of groceries 
to another, depending on both cost and demand considerations. 
Markups on high turnover staples are low ( 10 percent); here 
competition is a major force preventing higher prices. Markups 
on produce are high ( 30-40 percent), partly because of high 
spoilage costs. Some items are prepriced, allowing usually a 3 3 
percent markup. The owner relies on nonprice competition 
(delivery, credit, and other services) to meet the challenge of 
the chain stores' lower prices. 
FLOWER SHOP 
This shop prices its flowers at a 200 percent markup on the 
average wholesale cost. It does not vary price with each change 
in wholesale cost, but tries to stabilize prices over time. This 
follows the general practice of the industry-the management 
is content to follow outside suggestions on pricing. The other 
items are prepriced or prices are suggested by the suppliers. 
Thus the owner uses very little personal initiative in pricing. 
The owner believes that stability of prices contributes to 
customer goodwill. 
DRUGSTORE 
This store sells three categories of items: ( 1) those that 
are prepriced or fair-traded; ( 2) those on which there is a 
markup which varies from one class of items to another; and 
( 3) prescriptions for which there is a professional fee in 
addition to the markup of 40 percent on retail price. The 
professional fee is normally at least 65 cents, but for prescrip-
tions that take longer to fill, the charge is based on time ( 10 
cents per minute) . Markups are sometimes lower on large 
119 
quantities or expensive items. Sometimes there is price dis-
crimination on prescriptions in favor of low-income families. 
The manager suspects that his soda fountain does not make 
money, but it helps pull in traffic. 
SHOESTORE 
The owner follows nationally advertised prices which permit 
a 3 3 to 40 percent markup on retail price. His decisions concern 
what price lines to carry rather than what prices to set. But he 
does reduce prices drastically at end-of-the-season sales. The 
owner states that he prefers a "quiet life" and is content to 
eliminate as many decisions as possible. 
CLOTHING STORE 
The manager usually bases price on wholesale cost. An 
item costing from $7.00 to $8.50 per dozen is priced at 98 cents. 
An item costing $1.90 to $2.15 is priced at $2.98. Thus the 
manager does not use constant percentage markups but aims at 
a rough average of a 50 percent markup on cost. If an item 
looks as if it will sell, he might raise the markup. If he gets a 
good buy, he does not reduce price accordingly. A few items 
are prepriced. He puts on sales in February and August to 
clear out the old stock. The markup on some items, for 
example, work clothing and shoes, is lower primarily because of 
competition and an elastic demand. 
FEEDSTORE A 
The practices are different on branded and unbranded 
feeds. ( l) On branded feeds there is a predetermined absolute 
(rather than percentage) markup on wholesale cost. The 
markups are suggested by the feed producers; they are higher 
on lower volume items, such as rabbit feed. (2) Unbranded 
feeds, such as soybean meal, are usually priced according to 
the nearby metropolitan market, with little weight to the cost 
of the feed to the store. If the store carries a large inventory 
of such unbranded feeds, the manager makes certain he is 
not underpriced by his nearest competitor. Sometimes he sells 
off inventory below cost to clear warehouse space. 
FEEDSTORE B 
This store bases price on a "fixed absolute dollar markup 
on wholesale." The markup is on the replacement wholesale 
cost according to the latest market quotations. The store 
seldom reduces its markups, the chief exception being a 50 
percent reduction of markup for a large customer. The store 
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has no competition within 20 miles; this large customer might 
have gone this distance without the price reduction, but the 
other customers probably would not because of hauling costs. 
The firm tries to avoid charging too much above the price 
elsewhere because of the effect on customer goodwill. Also, 
tllere is the danger of high prices attracting a competitor into 
the town. 
The feed prices are changed from week to week with 
changes in replacement costs. But the markups are not changed. 
This store follows an unusual practice (for feedstores) in 
charging the same markup per ton on unbranded soybean meal 
as on branded meals, possibly because of the absence of local 
competition. There is no evidence (aside from the case 
mentioned) of discrimination among customers or of any experi-
mentation in pricing. 
TWO MIXED SALES AND SERVICE OUTLETS 
The next two firms fall into both the service and retailing 
categories and are thus presented separately. The first case 
presents evidence of considerable flexibility in pricing but 
nevertheless suggests that the owner is not exploiting his 
monopoly position fully. Both cases indicate strong demand 
influences in pricing. 
SILVER RETAIL AND REPAIR SHOP 
Description. The firm is in the business of buying, repair-
ing, cleaning, and selling used silver, repairing silver on job 
orders, and retailing and wholesaling new silver items. With 
an established clientele, it has the greatest volume of business 
in the area. Located in a city over 50,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. The owner does not sell 
at a price which is below full costs. His average gross margin 
is 30 percent of price (customary margin, 50 percent); the 
margin is less on orders from large customers, which form an 
important share of the total business. His policy is to achieve 
a large volume of business. The major determinants of prices 
of used items are weight and age; both of these are cost factors. 
A demand factor is the desire to maintain enough price dif-
ferential between new and used items of the same type to 
stimulate sales of the latter. 
2. For repairing, the charge is $5.00 or $6.00 per hour, 
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but it is sometimes higher if the owner thinks the customer 
will pay it. 
Price differentials; variable markups. l. Margins on sterling 
silver trophy cups and similar fast-selling items are less than 30 
percent. 
2. Most of the departures from the 30 percent margin are 
upward, and all are the result of demand considerations, as 
are the variations in repair charges. The owner does not mark 
prices. He believes some customers will buy at a higher price 
rather than low because to them high price means high quality. 
3. Sometimes the owner gets items at a low cost and thus 
makes a higher margin. 
4. The owner does not bargain with customers despite the 
great flexibility of his pricing practices. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
Only rarely is a slow-moving item marked down, and apparently 
the markdown never exceeds about 10 percent. The owner 
thinks that every item will find eventual sale. 
Market structure. The owner believes he has only one 
(weak) competitor for his repair business. Probably there is 
oligopoly in the new-item market, and monopoly in the used 
silverware and repair business. Apparently there has been no 
retaliation against his low prices on trophy cups. 
Other points. When asked, "Is there anything you could 
do to make more money in this business?" the owner said it 
was possible that there is, but he could not think of any specific 
actions. On the other hand, when asked, in a different inter-
view, why he did not raise prices on repair work, since he has a 
monopoly in that market, he replied that he did not know. 
vVhen asked if he feared a loss of business, he said not. Appar-
ently he has not thought through the possibility of making 
higher profits through higher prices, but he has a "feeling" 
volume might fall off at higher prices. He also comments on 
income taxes on higher profits as a deterrent to raising prices. 
It appears that he is not striving for the maximum possible 
profits. 
The other firm in this category is a distributor for a well-
known airplane manufacturer as well as a dealer in second-
hand planes. The firm also conducts a charter plane service 
and operates repair, line, storage, and inspection services. 
The firm's pricing is demand oriented, with considerable 
attention directed to competitors' prices. The firm some-
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times departs from suggested manufacturer's prices in selling 
new planes to cut inventories, to ease financial stringency, 
or to meet sales quotas. The rates on the charter service 
must meet local competition as well as that from firms m 
other cities. 
SIX WHOLESALERS 
This study covers six wholesalers, but they are so variable in 
character and behavior that generalizations are doubtful. 
The first case is one of a lumber wholesaler who marks up 
on cost but whose markups are clearly influenced by demand. 
This is one of the few cases in this study in which the 
objective is expressed in terms of a target return. 
LUMBER WHOLESALER 
Description. A family-held corporation which serves as a 
wholesale distributor of lumber and millwork to retail lumber 
dealers. The firm does a limited amount of manufacturing to 
meet demands for items not included in its line of finished 
products. Located in a city of 50,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. On readymade stock, 
the firm applies varying markups on invoice cost. The manage-
ment claims it aims at an overall margin on total sales (a target 
return). 
2. On shopwork, the firm estimates on the basis of 
materials costs plus labor plus 200 percent of labor for overhead 
(50 percent of labor on bench jobs) plus 25 percent for profit. 
This produces a price as much as three times that for standard 
items and causes frequent customer complaints. (The manager 
often makes adjustments, though he says this business is 
unprofitable.) 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. The willingness of 
the company to do unprofitable shopwork is based on the 
effect on other sales. This service makes possible the securing 
of orders that include nonstandard-size items. 
2. The markups on standard items vary according to the 
rapidity of turnover and estimated handling costs. 
The prices are listed in an annual looseleaf catalog, with 
periodic corrections on individual sheets. 
Market structure. The firm faces competition from firms in 
other locations. 
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Other points. 1. The manager says he does not try to get 
the net income of the firm into the surtax bracket. He is more 
desirous of maintaining a reputation for fair dealing and good 
product or service. 
2. This firm formerly did retail as well as wholesale 
business. The retail business was discontinued to permit 
utilizi.Rg the firm's resources in the more profitable wholesale 
level of operations. 
3. Prices must be competitive with those of more ad-
vantageously located competitors. This suggests that the mark-
ups are based not only on costs but also on demand (com-
petition). 
The next two cases are in strong contrast. The first company 
stresses cost plus; the second emphasizes demand. A third 
case (the building supplies wholesaler) falls between the two. 
HARDWARE WHOLESALER 
This firm supplies 250 hardware and variety stores. Its 
policy is to add a 9¥2 percent markup to cost, with slight 
variations in this markup. Savings from advantageous buys are 
not passed on. There is little evidence of adjustments of prices 
to demand, but no doubt the ability to charge a 9¥2 percent 
markup is based on competition and other demand considera-
tions. 
FROZEN-FOODS WHOLESALER-DISTRIBUTOR 
This firm supplies independent grocery stores ana institu-
tions. The manager places primary emphasis on demand influ-
ences on price. He recognizes that he must keep his prices low 
enough to permit independent retailers who are his customers 
to compete with the chain stores. In selling to institutions, he 
is also forced to low margins by the competition from other 
suppliers and by the possibility of direct buying by the institu-
tions. The company charges the same prices throughout its 
delivery area of a 100 mile radius. The manager is considering 
reducing prices in towns with the greatest competition (which 
are not necessarily the ones with the lowest delivery cost) . 
BuiLDING SuPPLIES WHOLESALER 
This finn buys building supplies in carload Iotg and sells 
them to builders. The price system is based on cost plus a 
markup, but in practice this system is adjusted to competition, 
by means of "deals" with builders which involve variable mark-
ups. While there is some differentiation on the basis of 
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delivery, service, and quality, the main copsideration in selling 
is price. 
The next case is different in that the sales are almost 
exclusively on a bidding basis, with a resulting emphasis on 
demand. 
STEEL WHOLESALER 
The firm warehouses and sells structural steel along with 
some small fabricated items such as metal stairs, stair rails, etc. 
Sales are mostly on a bidding basis, which means that markups 
must be variable to meet the competitive situation. The firm 
bids lower when sales are light. The firm does not have a 
breakdown of fixed and variable costs, but it is aware that a 
substantial part of the costs are fixed. The management applies 
incremental reasoning; it sets prices at levels that will build the 
volume to contribute to costs that "will run on anyway." This 
firm supplies about 15 percent of the structural steel in its 
market and considers the market to be highly competitive. 
The last case presents a similar picture, even though prices 
are expressed as discounts from "list prices." 
GLASS JOBBER 
This firm supplies retailers in a radius of 75 miles and, in 
addition, sells glass at retail in the city im which it is located. 
A national publication of list prices is used as a starting point 
in pricing, but discounts from this list are influenced by com-
petition. The discounts differ on different classes of glass (as is 
true for competitors), but there is no discrimination among 
retail customers. On contracting jobs, prices are estimated on 
the basis of a national agency's recommendations, which 
expresses labor, overhead, and profit as rates on materials 
prices. Discounts are higher for large volume customers (over 
$5,000 per year). In slack times, prices are reduced to help 
spread fixed costs over a large volume (labor costs are con-
sidered relatively fixed). 
SEVEN PRINTING COMPANIES 
Of aU the industries so far, the printing industry shows the 
strongest attention to full-cost pricing. This is not to say 
that demand influences are irrelevant. The managements of 
most of these companies admit that they use "judgment" 
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in quoting prices. They may resist breakaways from full-cost 
pricing, and resent it when other firms break away; but they 
do make concessions based on demand conditions. Further-
more some of the companies vary their markups according 
to certain categories of business, and these differentials appear 
to be based in large part on differences in demand elasticities. 
PRINTING COMPANY A 
Description. Commercial printing usually in large lots. 
Over 200 employees. Located in a large midwestern city. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. The price of a printing 
job is influenced by the cost estimate. The cost estimate is based 
on full cost plus a margin. The materials costs are charged at 
"actual" (with modifications to be noted) plus a small markup. 
The labor and overhead charges are obtained from an hourly 
machine rate. This rate is based on "budgeted costs" ( esti-
mated total labor costs and overhead divided by estimated 
volume) adjusted for recent actual experience. These rates are 
combined with time standards to arrive at the cost of the 
particular job (judgment is used in modifying these estimates). 
2. Demand conditions are an influence, though the com-
pany tries to minimize variations from a full-cost basis of 
pricing. 
Price differentials; variable markups. The company has a 
definite policy of variable markups, which are at least in part 
based on demand and market conditions but mostly on cost 
differences. Customers fall into five categories, each with a 
different markup percentage: 
1. Class 1-First run of any job requiring speculative 
creative work or any job requiring outside purchases over 60 
percent (called brokering). High markup. 
2. Class 2-Reruns of jobs originally in Class 1. First runs 
of other jobs not requiring speculative creativity. Somewhat 
lower markup. 
3. Class 3-Reruns of jobs originally in Class 2. 
4. Class 4-(not frequent). Jobs which are part of a total 
program and which may result in additional business. 
5. Class 5-Special class for magazines and other special 
publications. The company also quotes special prices for 
charitable organizations. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. Company officials are quite aware of their incremental costs, 
which they estimate at about 55 percent of sales price (labor 
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cost is fixed for shortrun changes). But the company resists 
pricing below full cost when business is poor for several reasons: 
(I) The managers believe it depresses the market (officials 
wish other companies would stick with full costs). They believe 
incremental pricing helps account for low industry profits. 
They have ethical objections to price cutting. 
( 2) The officials believe that regular customers might be 
offended by more flexible prices, feeling that the company is not 
dependable and stable in its policies. 
( 3) The officials believe that the timing of low-price jobs 
is unpredictable-there might be delays, so that the jobs would 
interfere with other work (this reflects a recognition of oppor-
tunity costs-the interference of low-price jobs with other 
work). 
2. One way the company reduces prices in effect is to 
offer special services without charge-such as editing (perhaps 
this might be called a form of non price competition). 
3. The variable markups reflect recognition of differences 
in demand elasticities, especially in Class 4. Also, it is clear that 
the company does (despite its reservations) allow business con-
ditions in general to influence its pricing. 
Market structure. There are over 80 printers in the city 
where this firm is located. On some kinds of business, however, 
this firm faces nationwide competition, while on other kinds of 
business competitors are few. In any case the demand is not 
completely elastic because of differentiation of the product 
(differentiation on the basis of quality, dependability, etc.). 
The firm does not fear retaliation by other firms as a result of 
its price policies. But it does feel that incremental pricing is 
leading to a general deterioration of profits and would like to 
see the practice halted. This situation is best described as 
monopolistic competition rather than as oligopoly. 
Other points. 1. The officials stress nonprice factors in 
maintaining customer goodwill, such as dependability and 
special services. 
2. The customers are charged for materials on the basis of 
their own quantity rather than the quantity purchased by the 
company. This is an added source of profits. In some cases the 
company compromises on this (for example, by charging on a 
ton basis even though the customers use only 1,500 pounds, thus 
passing on part of the quantity discount). 
3. Sometimes the estimators take into account the actual 
time that it probably will take an efficient worker to do the job 
rather than the average time for the department. This results 
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in a lower estimate. Higher management believes that this may 
be due to special pressures from the sales department. 
4. In some cases when actual costs are below estimates 
(as might be true when the customer orders a larger volume 
than originally planned or simplifies the job in some way) the 
company refunds part of the savings. This contributes to 
customer goodwill. 
Printing companies B, C, and D are the most adamant of 
all on full-cost pricing. Firm B makes exceptions in charging 
a lower markup on envelopes and letterheads, on which 
competition precludes a higher charge. But the manager 
resents such exceptions and claims that "profitable plants 
make a profit on every job." Firm C has exerted leadership 
in encouraging other printers to determine fully allocated 
costs in the hope that this would limit price cutting. In fact, 
the manager is insistent that a firm should adhere to full 
costs even in poor times, despite the fact that the overhead 
per unit will be larger because of the low volume. But this 
is not the entire picture. The company does vary markups. 
It lowers the markup to secure a new customer or to compete 
in bidding. Thus the manager refuses to go below full cost, 
but he is flexible on his markups. Pricing is not completely 
a mechanical application of a cost-plus formula. 
Printing company D appears to be more consistent in 
its cost-plus practices. Paradoxically, demand conditions 
appear to account for the ability of this company to apply 
its cost formula so rigidly. The firm has a reputation for 
high quality and dependability and has a strong body of 
regular customers. Thus, the firm's demand is inelastic-
much more so than the demand facing printers with stiffer 
competition. The management states, "We are slightly 
higher in price and could go even higher because of the 
quality of our work." This seems to be a case in which 
the inelasticity of demand permits a routine application of 
full cost plus a fixed margin in pricing.3 
s The company does deviate from this formula slightly on corn· 
petitive bids. 
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Company E, a smaller firm, starts with full costs (on a 
budgeted cost system) but is much less successful in 
adhering to a cost-plus approach. Competition for this firm 
is more severe and the firm probably faces high costs 
because of its less efficient equipment. The interesting point 
about this company is that, if its estimated hour costs come 
out too high to be competitive, the management adjusts the 
hour cost figure rather than the markup. This is the opposite 
of the practice of company C, which sticks strictly to its cost 
estimates but varies the markup. 
Company F, the smallest of the entire group (only two 
employees in addition to the owner), is an exception to the 
full-cost pattern. The owner does not maintain the kinds 
of records that would enable him to estimate costs on most 
of his operations. He relies heavily on a national printing-
rate book; this is the same manual used by company B, 
which, however, uses it as a check against its own costs. 
Company F does not use the national manual rigidly; it 
adjusts prices downward from the published rates because of 
competition. The situation is one of duopoly, with perhaps 
some competition on large jobs from the outside. The 
owner keeps a close watch on the prices of his competitor. 
The rates charged by both appear to be considerably below 
those prevalent in nearby cities. 
Company G is no longer in operation. This discussion 
covers its pricing policies before and after its sale to a larger 
printing concern. Unfortunately, there are differences of 
opinion as to the actual pricing practices before the sale, 
but tnese differences are of special interest. 
CoMPANY G-the president's version 
The president of the company was also the chief stock-
holder. He had inherited the concern from his father. Although 
the company did not maintain an adequate cost accounting 
system, the management did have a policy of pricing according 
to cost (often cost estimates were obtained from published 
manuals rather than internal sources). A few quotations will 
indicate the company's views on pricing. 
"We always tried to price on cost of production regardless 
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of demand. It seemed to us a means of holding customers and 
keeping a reputation for integrity. We made few exceptions 
to this rule when we were trying to get into specialty printing 
in a small way. 
"We tried not to think of competitors. I can't recall any 
instance when I felt a competitor retaliated for our having 
underbid him. Also I cannot recall ever having heard of such 
retaliation. 
"Some consideration was always given on long runs, i.e., on 
contracts, such as publications, for as such jobs were handled 
repeatedly, savings on cost of production were almost invariably 
made. 
"The percentage of profit added to costs was the same 
except on repeat work or perhaps on work which involved only 
one department or machine." 
The president's views on the ethics of pricing are of 
special interest: 
"The worst battle printers had to fight while I was in the 
business was that of trying to bring about better relations with 
other printers-trying to stamp out the cutthroat competition. 
It was easy enough to condemn other printers for this. Some-
times the drastic underbidding on a printer's part meant the 
difference between meeting his payroll and not." 
This company like the others in this group did not follow 
its full-cost policy rigidly: 
"You ask if the company sometimes bid lower than full 
costs because of the desire to use idle capacity. It seems to 
contradict some of the foregoing when I say that we did. When 
we bought the very large folder because it would take care of a 
job we had had for over thirty years, we knew we would have 
to get other work for it; we couldn't afford it for one job a month 
(a publication). Since no other printer or binder had such a 
folder, we thought we could keep it busy and we did cut the 
price drastically in order to get work for it. Also we lowered 
prices on our monotype department, which, because of invest-
ment and labor, was a tremendous drag-or we thought it was." 
The management apparently did not take advantage of 
shifts in demand. 
"We did not raise prices when demand was high-perhaps 
we should have-nor did we charge customers more because 
they could or were willing to accept the larger charge." 
Thus the overall picture is one of pricing on full cost, with 
considerable uncertainty about what the cost of the individual 
job actually was. The president expressed the view that there 
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were "so many intangibles that it seemed foolhardy at times to 
think you had definite hour costs." 
CoMPANY G-the new manager's version 
As has been stated, the company was sold to a larger 
concern. This firm appointed a manager to run the subsidiary. 
He had quite different opinions about the company's pricing. 
He regretted that the company did not have a real cost account-
ing system. If the former managers had maintained such a 
system, they would have seen that their costs were rising. He 
cited one machine on which the company was charging $7.50 
per hour; his opinion was that it should have been $13.00 per 
hour. 
The new manager started raising rates soon after he took 
over. He also stopped the practice of passing on quantity dis-
counts on materials to the customers. The result was a loss of 
business. For example, one national trade journal transferred to 
another printer when the charges were raised 30 percent. The 
manager argued that if the old management had boosted rates 
gradually, the loss in business would have been less. He was 
forced to increase price sharply, and this was hard on customer 
relations. 
The final outcome was the liquidation of the operation. One 
might argue that the subsidiary had priced itself out of 
business. But the assets were sold on favorable terms, so 
that the parent company made a gain on the purchase and 
liquidation. Since the subsidiary had not made profits on 
the average either before or after the sale, the liquidation 
decision appears to have been reasonable. The true costs 
for this operation were the opportunity costs-the value of 
the assets in other occupations-and apparently no price 
policy would meet those opportunity costs. 
The outcome of this survey of printing firms is a con-
clusion that full costs are a central concern of most com-
panies in pricing. But a close examination of the individual 
cases raises doubts about what those costs actually are and 
certainly reveals some flexibility in applying full-cost form-
ulas. We cannot say that these firms are ignoring marginal 
considerations, nor can we say the opposite, that they are 
applying marginalism to the fullest. They appear to be 
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striving for a limitation of competition by common pricing 
practices, but they are failing to enforce these practices in 
the industry and are not entirely consistent in following the 
rules of the game themselves. 
FIVE FURNITURE MANUFACTURERS 
Only one of the five furniture manufacturers gives evidence 
of strong adherence to a full-cost formula. Surprisingly, this 
is a case in which the company bids on its contracts. One 
might have expected that a bidding situation would be more 
competitive and, thus, that strict adherence to cost would 
be less possible. In the other four cases there can be no 
doubt about the central role of demand estimates in pricing; 
these managements try to adjust prices to existing conditions 
(this is especially clear in cases C, D, and E). 
Several of the managements are uncertain whether 
profit maximization is their objective. It would appear that 
the owner of furniture company A is not exploiting his 
favorable demand situation fully. He is not certain whether 
he is maximizing profits, though it would be possible to 
rationalize his decisions in terms of maintenance of customer 
goodwill and in terms of avoiding risky expansions that 
might in the long run prove unprofitable. The owner of 
company B states that his objective is not maximum profit 
but rather stability of employment and a "satisfactory" 
income (large enough, however, to help him finance expan-
sions). The remaining three cases show considerable evi-
dence of decisions to seek greater profits, exploiting demand 
differentials. 
FURNITURE COMPANY A 
Description. A manufacturer chiefiy working on contracts 
for motels, hotels, schools, and the armed forces. Special 
designs are made up for each order. The firm serves most of 
the United States. Two hundred employees. Located in a city 
of 10,000-20,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. A high proportion of 
the business is done by bids, made on a full-cost basis. In many 
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cases the bidding is not highly competitive. Direct labor and 
materials costs are added to give "basic cost." To this is added 
a 90 percent markup to cover selling costs, overhead, and 
profits. This system is deliberately kept simple because of the 
need to quote estimates on short notice. 
2. Clearly, demand conditions permit this system of pric-
ing; the company apparently has no difficulty selling all of 
capacity production at such prices. The management does 
not know how it would react to less favorable demand condi-
tions, but it would put up great resistance to anything but 
full-cost pricing. 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. The management 
claims that it operates on the full-cost basis on all jobs, taking 
no advantage of favorable markets and never experimenting 
with lower prices to tap new markets. It has not cut price 
in the five years it has been in this contract furniture business 
(in earlier years the firm produced furniture for regular retail 
outlets). 
2. There is a minor exception to the 90 percent markup. 
Sometimes the markup is 100 percent to cover the extra costs of 
working up special designs, of making up complete rooms of 
samples, etc. But this is a cost reason for variation rather than 
an exploitation of demand. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. There is little evidence of shortrun incremental reasoning. 
The company has never faced a shortage of demand in which 
it might have to cut price and does not anticipate having to do 
so in the future. 
2. The company deals with excess demand simply by 
not bidding on added business. 
3. The management believes that the larger furniture 
companies that engage in both the regular and the contract 
furniture businesses bid below full cost on contracts when the 
rest of their business is off. 
4. Apparently the company could sell much more at 
present prices. The company follows the practice of bidding on 
government contracts when its regular business is off (these bids 
are also on the 90 percent basis) . Therefore it can stabilize 
employment by the amount of effort devoted to seeking such 
extra contracts. 
5. The company prefers not to expand capacity to meet 
the demand. This gives greater security against unemployment 
and losses in bad times. 
6. The company wins the majority of the motel-hotel 
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business on which it bids. But on government contracts it is 
awarded only about one out of 15 contracts on which it bids. 
Market structure. On the motel business, this firm faces 
competition from very few firms. Some customers seek out this 
firm for designs and bids. The company has 12 contract dealer 
outlets in various parts of the country; these bid on jobs that 
require furniture, lamps, carpets, etc., only part of which are 
supplied by this company. On school jobs this company 
usually faces competition from six to eight other firms. On 
government contracts there are usually about 20 bidders. This 
company cannot predict when its bid on government jobs will 
be low; it depends on how "hungry" for business the other 
firms are. 
This company produces its own materials (has a sawmill) 
and probably is unusually successful in meeting delivery require-
ments for motels and other customers. 
Other (Joints. 1. In estimating direct labor cost, the com-
pany has worked up a "formula" based on past experience. It 
constantly compares the actual costs with the estimates from 
this formula. Sometimes the estimates are high and sometimes 
low. There is not a cost accounting system but instead a set of 
rules for estimating costs. Materials costs are estimated in 
detail according to the amount of materials required in each 
piece of furniture. 
2. The management claims it is not interested in getting 
as big as possible. It is not even certain it aims at maximum 
profits, though it agrees that a reason for not expanding may be 
the risks to longrun profits. The present conservative policies 
provide the security of a pool of business that the company can 
draw on when needed. 
FuRNITURE CoMPANY B 
Description. A sole proprietorship specializing in the manu-
facture of antique reproductions. The firm makes some direct 
retail sales, but most of the business is done through retailers 
within a radius of 200 miles. Forty employees. Located in a 
town of 10,000-20,000 population. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. The firm does not have 
a formal system of pricing. The owner is influenced by his 
overall income and by his cash position in making price 
decisions. He is also influenced by the desire to maintain 
employment in a community which is highly employment-
conscious. 
2. He keeps an eye on the volume of orders. If it were to 
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fall off, he might revise prices; but, not having faced a serious 
decline in orders in his 17 years in business, he is not certain 
what he would do. 
3. The owner believes that competition from lower quality, 
"mass-produced" furniture places a ceiling on what he can 
charge. Even though his furniture is of solid cherry with a great 
deal of craftsmanship, the general public will not pay a 
premium on his furniture. In fact, he suggests a markup on 
the retail level below that which is general because of the 
danger of being priced out of the market. Because of the low 
margin, some stores refuse to handle this furniture. 
4. Despite the heavy competition, he is influenced by 
costs. He recently increased prices by 4 percent, the first 
increase in ten years, to make possible an increase in wages. 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. The owner main-
tains a published pricelist with wholesale prices and suggested 
retail prices. He makes no attempt to enforce the suggested 
retail prices; in fact, he appears to favor flexibility. Most 
retailers buy at his published wholesale price (unless they are 
outside his normal delivery zone, in which case transportation 
costs are added). But he is willing to negotiate prices with 
individual dealers and with ultimate consumers. He feels that 
this willingness to negotiate has contributed to his success. He 
does not negotiate a special price in cases that will affect cities 
or towns where he has established "accounts"-he does not want 
to undermine his accounts. 
2. His wholesale prices to stores to the west are lower than 
in other directions. He describes this as "promotional pricing." 
His volume of sales is lower to the west, and he wants to 
stimulate retailers there to carry his line. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. There is no evidence that he takes advantage in pricing of 
a big backlog of orders when this occurs or that he lowers price 
much in poor times. 
2. His "promotional pricing" to stores to the west suggests 
he thinks demand is more elastic in that direction, but this seems 
uncertain. His willingness to negotiate prices with individuals 
and some dealers also suggests attention to elasticity considera-
tions; he no doubt makes some estimate of how urgent the 
customer's desire for the furniture is. 
Market structure. The situation is one of monopolistic 
competition. There are numerous firms, but this one has a 
highly differentiated product. 
Other points. The owner claims that his objective is not 
135 
maximization of profit. He is interested, however, in a cash flow 
that will give him a moderate income (he presented evidence 
that he lives quite modestly) and finance expansion and replace-
ments. 
The remaining furniture companies ( C, D, and E) recognize 
a mixture of cost and demand influences on pricing. Com-
pany C starts with what it calls a "scientific" formula based 
on cost, but adjusts estimates for competitive conditions by 
giving discounts to large customers and sometimes by giving 
discounts so that it can make use of idle capacity. Company 
D aims at a 10 percent profit on sales, but adjusts the mark-
ups seasonally and on particular lines. For example, its 
profit markup is only 6 percent on selling price on certain 
cabinets facing low-price competition; the profit markup on 
certain chests is 15 percent because competition is less severe. 
The company also discriminates in favor of a group of 
longtime distributors by granting them a 10 percent dis-
count. These distributors take large volumes, but the com-
pany does not grant the same privilege to new distributors. 
In 1960 the management expressed the desire to raise prices 
by 3 percent to absorb cost increases, but refrained from 
doing so in view of the excess capacity of competitors. 
The management of firm E is quite conscious of the 
complexity of pricing decisions. It computes the direct costs 
of a particular product, but adjusts the markup according 
to estimates of price-volume relationships. Markups vary 
from item to item, but so far they do not adjust to business 
conditions. The manager meets recessions by expanding 
sales effort rather than by price concessions. He is not 
certain how he would behave in a major decline, but he 
resists the idea of lowering price in such a situation. 
EIGHT BUILDING SUPPLIES MANUFACTURERS 
The eight cases of manufacturers of building supplies are 
less satisfactory than most in this study. Thus, most of the 
following discussions are tentative. 
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CLAY PRODUCTS MANUFACTURER 
The practice of this company is to quote prices as a dis-
count from "list prices." The "list prices" have a completely 
different significance from those elsewhere in this study. They 
have been established by the trade association and have re-
mained the same for several decades. The actual price varies 
from the list price according to the distance from the manu-
facturer. Each manufacturer determines its own schedule of 
discounts. This company determines its discounts on the basis 
of its own cost-demand situation. The percentage discount for 
one product may differ from that for another at the same 
destination. 
The company maintains a cost accounting system which 
aims at obtaining the full cost, including allocated overhead. 
Apparently the goal is cost plus the same percentage markup 
on all items, but this aim is not always achieved in practice. 
Price changes are infrequent, despite constant increases in 
materials costs and wages. The ability to pass increased costs 
on to the customers is dependent on what competitors are 
doing. The behavior of competing firms thus appears to be a 
primary influence on prices. This is clearly an oligopolistic 
situation, complicated by geographical differences in the relation 
of competing firms to various markets and resultant differences 
in transportation costs. 
The next case is one of a very small firm that has given 
unusually great attention to the mechanics of pricing. At 
first glance the practice appears to be heavily cost oriented, 
but a closer examination indicates flexibility in the pricing 
policy with respect to demand (including competition) and 
uncertainty. 
CONCRETE PRODUCTS FIRM A 
Description. A partnership with $40,000 annual sales in 
precast concrete products. The active partner makes most of 
the operating decisions, but on crucial decisions the inactive 
partner (the primary investor) is advised. Four production 
workers and one office clerk. Located in a city with more than 
50,000 population. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. On most jobs, a non-
competitive bid is submitted. This bid constitutes the final 
selling price. An actual bid was explained to the interviewer as 
follows: 
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Estimated cost of form (wooden) 
( 1) Cost of materials $ 100 
( 2) Cost of labor 100 
( 3) Contingency 50 
$ 250 
(Note: The labor cost includes $45 overhead cost; the con-
tingency charge is for possible errors in estimating time and 
was calculated at an amount which rounded off the cost of the 
form to $250.) 
(1) 
(2) 
( 3) (4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Cost of final product 
Cost of form 
Materials (cement and aggregates) 
Set up form (labor) 
Pour (labor) 
Strip and cleanup (labor) 
Haul to site 
Contingency (an amount equal to about 
one-twelfth of total cost in this case) 
Overhead 
Profit-markup of 25 percent 
2. The overhead is applied to jobs on the basis of man-
hours involved in the job. 
3. The contingency charge varies with the amount of 
uncertainty. This particular job was a "first done" job, and the 
contingency charge was "larger than usual." 
4. On stocked products, a 1955 pricelist was established 
and only two minor revisions have been made since that time. 
The basis of the list is cost. The cut stone industry subsequently 
reduced prices of window sills below this firm's pricelist. This 
firm did not retaliate. 
5. In one instance, the firm was $650 below a competitor's 
(cut stone) bid. An upward adjustment was not made, due to 
longer run considerations: this will help him maintain contact 
with this contractor. 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. The markup varies 
on different jobs based on ( 1) possible future business, ( 2) 
competition from cut stone, ( 3) a feeling of what is fair to the 
particular institution (such as churches), and ( 4) the degree 
of uncertainty in the bid. 
2. The contingency charge is a kind of markup and varies 
from one job to another. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. On jobs that tie up production of other products (especially 
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the process of form making), added costs are included to 
compensate for loss of flexibility. There is no systematic method 
of doing this other than being liberal with cost estimates. 
2. The demand is closely tied to construction of com-
mercial and institutional plants. It is seasonal, but no labor costs 
are avoidable during the off season. The owner does not lay 
off employees in the off season. He produces for inventory even 
though some inventory is four years old. 
Market structure. 1. The firm is the only specialty precast 
concrete firm in this location. Precut stone producers are 
competitors, but precast concrete is less expensive and has many 
of the quality features of precut stone. 
2. The market spreads to the east and southeast in a 
radius of about 200 miles. 
CoNCRETE PRODUCTS FIRM B 
The manager says that demand determines the price of his 
concrete blocks. The product is not differentiated, so that the 
demand is highly elastic. At one time the manufacturers agreed 
to increase prices, but some failed to live up to the agreement; 
also, a supply of blocks flowed in from a nearby city. On the 
basis of this experience, the manager concluded that only 
through cutting cost could he remain in business. As a con-
sequence, his price is about the same as 20 years ago. He thinks 
this price is too low, but competition prevents any price in-
creases. He does not vary his price according to the customer. 
CONCRETE PRODUCTS FIRM c 
1. Pricing septic tanks-The situation is one of duopoly; 
there is only one competitor. This firm is strictly a price 
follower. It imitates the prices of its larger competitor. It does 
estimate its full costs on septic tanks but does not take such 
costs into account in pricing, except perhaps to see whether a 
satisfactory profit is earned. When the Board of Health in this 
locality required that septic tanks must be larger than 600 
gallons, the firm faced slightly higher costs on the larger size, 
but was able to raise the price by $15, in line with the price of 
the competitor. One peculiarity is that the competitor does 
offer a 10 percent discount to some of its customers, but firm C 
does not. Apparently the reason for not discounting is to avoid 
cutting too deeply into the competitor's business, in the fear 
that he might retaliate by producing burial vaults (the other 
main line of firm C) . Also the manager says he is not a "price 
cutter." 
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2. Pricing burial vaults and other products-The firm has 
a local monopoly in the burial vault market. The pricing is 
based on direct costs (labor and materials) plus a percentage 
for overhead and a 100 percent markup on this full-cost figure. 
On this product he will pass on cost increases in the form of 
higher prices. He is under no pressure to lower the price, since 
demand is inelastic and the much more expensive metal vaults 
offer no direct competition . The owner has ethical feelings 
against raising the price. He follows similar policies on other 
secondary products on which he also has a semimonopoly 
position. 
CoNCRETE PRoDucTs FIRM D 
This firm produces concrete blocks ( 60 percent of sales), 
cinder blocks ( 10 percent), and burial vaults ( 30 percent). It 
is a single proprietorship with six employees. The firm has a 
flexible price policy, bargaining a great deal with the con-
struction firms which are its main customers. These construc-
tion firms play one supplier against the other to get the lowest 
possible price, so that the competition is severe. The firm has 
diversified its product lines, enabling it to have more freedom 
in pricing particular products. The firm makes no attempt to 
measure unit costs, so that there is no conception of markup. 
The firm is concerned with the overall cost-revenue relationship 
and tries to absorb cost increases in overall price increases. 
READY-Mix CoNCRETE SuPPLIER 
This firm quotes prices on a cubic yard basis with added 
delivery charges beyond a perimeter. While it faces only three 
competitors and while it claims superiority for its product, the 
firm has little discretion over price. It does raise price when 
its materials costs rise, but this is only possible if competitors 
do the same, which is usually the case. The firm does shade 
price somewhat in the off season. It is interesting that the firm 
has a much less flexible price policy than the previous firm, even 
though it is in the same location. It appears that the rigidity 
of price is a result of the usual desire of oligopolists to avoid 
open price cuts. This firm, however, is able to get some business 
by carefully estimating delivery times, giving it a delivery cost 
advantage at points equidistant from competitors. 
CoNCRETE PIPE CoMPANY 
This firm follows a policy of full cost plus a uniform 
margin, but it does not revise its prices continuously with cost 
changes. There has been only one price change in the past six 
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years; it was based on increased material and labor costs. This is 
an oligopolistic market limited by delivery costs. The manager 
considers the ability to service customers (he can meet pipe 
needs immediately from stock) as important as pricing in 
securing sales. 
RocK QuARRY 
This firm operates both an underground and a surface rock 
quarry. The price is set f.o.b. quarry. The product travels only 
short distances because of transportation costs. Since the product 
is relatively undifferentiated, the demand is highly elastic and 
the firm has little control over price. The problem is to hold 
down costs so that profitable operations are possible at the 
market price. There are many competing quarries nearby. The 
firm produces a high quality gravel that enables it to get some 
contracts that some firms with less dependable quality cannot 
get. 
TWO FLOUR MILLS AND A MEATPACKER 
The two flour mills covered by the study have somewhat 
different emphases in pricing. The first stresses demand; the 
second starts with cost plus a margin, but makes adjustments 
according to demand. The difference appears to be a matter 
of degree; perhaps the difference is that the second is smaller 
and has been more successful than most firms in differentiat-
ing its product and thus has more control over price. 
FLOUR MILL A 
Description. A corporate milling firm producing flour (50 
percent of volume), feeds (50 percent of volume), and small 
amounts of cornmeal. The firm sells to jobbers over a four-state 
area and direct to retail grocers within 40 to 50 miles of the 
mill. Located in a city over 20,000. 
Chief considerations in pricing. 1. Demand, which is highly 
elastic, is the primary influence on pricing. But the firm's prices 
also have a fairly stable relation to costs (grain prices) largely 
because competitors relate their prices to grain costs. 
2. The firm offers special discounts or allowances in areas 
in which competition is severe or where the firm's product is 
less well established. 
Price differentials; variable markups. 1. Prices are lower to 
jobbers than to retailers, but the manager says the difference is 
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just about equal to the difference in costs (lower selling costs, 
less delivery cost, less record keeping, etc.) . 
2. Larger retailers (chains) are given lower prices both on 
grounds of lower costs for larger orders and on demand con-
siderations. 
3. The markup is lower on relief flour, which is sold on 
bids (competition and demand require this). 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
I. Variable and fixed costs are considered separately by man-
agement in setting bids on special sales such as relief flour and 
in determining aiiowances to be made on list to introduce flour 
into a new area or meet competition which is conducting sales 
promotion in an area. This is an indication of incremental 
reasoning. 
Market structure. The firm faces competition from three 
large national miiiing firms and a number of smaiier firms. 
If it cuts price, the firm expects these competitors to do likewise. 
Normaily, however, the "big three" dominate prices. 
Other points. l. Numerous promotion schemes are used by 
competitors (such as an extra bag of flour with each twenty bags 
bought, a silver doiiar given with each purchase of a given 
quantity, a reduction of price for "merchandising," etc.) in 
selected areas. Competitor~ in some cases set prices in areas 
selected for sales promotion which are below out-of-pocket costs. 
To prevent loss of customers in such areas, the management 
sometimes reduces price to comparable levels. This is done 
with an understanding that it is only for a stated period. 
Generaily the limit on reduction below list price is 10 percent. 
2. While capacity operations are considered to be 24 hours 
a day, normal operations are on a one-shift basis which may 
reach 50-60 hours per week by staggering the working hours. 
The manager appears to consider fixed costs applicable to volume 
produced at hours worked within this range. 
The second flour mill bases its price on material cost, labor 
cost, an allocation of overhead based on labor cost, plus a 
percentage for profit. Usually this cost-plus price runs within 
5 percent of the general market. If not, the firm must 
adjust its price to meet competition. The special quality 
of the flour and a large advertising budget provide some 
protection from the market which is dominated by the large 
firms. 
The packing company is in a situation similar to that 
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for the flour mills. Its practices are similar to those of flour 
mill A. 
MEATPACKING CoMPANY 
The management describes the company as a "price fol-
lower." Its markup is only a target; its profit is essentially a 
residual. The management claims that meat prices tend to the 
levels required to clear the market, since the product is perish-
able. The firm even follows the pattern of the larger firms in 
setting price differentials to large customers (these differentials 
are justified by lower costs) . This is one of the strongest cases 
in this study of a firm that is a "price taker" rather than a 
"price setter." It is strongly influenced by the fear of retaliation 
by both the large packers and independent packers. Despite 
this pattern, the price is highly flexible over time, so that price 
decisions are necessary on each product daily. 
The kinked-demand theory appears applicable. The man-
agement expects sharp decreases in sales at higher prices and 
retaliation at lower prices. But, as has been indicated, this does 
not mean prices that are rigid over time. There are a few 
exceptions to the pattern of following the leader; sometimes 
the firm quotes special prices on cuts of meat that are over-
stocked. This is done only for short periods to prevent retalia-
tion. 
FIVE MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURERS 
The last five cases are scattered over a widely diverse area of 
manufacturing: chemicals, advertising specialties, fire clay, 
machine work, and monuments. They are presented together 
merely because they do not fit into any of the preceding 
categories. 
CHEMICALS COMPANY 
Description. A closely held corporation founded in 1959. 
There are three stockholders, one of whom is president (the 
only one active in the management of the company). The 
company competes with the large chemical companies on some 
product lines, but it also develops new products not yet supplied 
by the large companies. 
Chief considerations in pricing. The company's pricing 
takes both cost and demand into account, without clear policies 
on when one would take precedence over the other. On the 
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whole, demand considerations appear to predominate. At the 
same time, the "rule of thumb" to which the management 
sometimes refers is cost oriented. The company develops new 
products which sell at prices higher than those on the old, 
established products. On the old products, the prices are usually 
based on the prices charged by competitors. The management 
tries to charge what "the traffic wi11 bear." It takes into account 
the volumes that can be sold at various prices. The possibility 
of retaliation against reduced prices is a consideration. 
Further discussion of cost and demand considerations. 
1. The management does not allocate costs to particular prod-
ucts; therefore, the markup concept is not relevant. 
2. The president is aware of incremental costs as a floor 
in pricing, but this is not a matter for concern under present 
conditions. He is much more concerned with the allocation of 
the limited space to the most profitable lines. 
3. The differential elasticities of demand on different 
products are a primary factor in pricing. The company has a 
semimonopoly control over some products (based on patents) 
and can charge higher prices on these. But on competitive 
products it accepts the prevailing price. 
4. The kinked-demand theory seems to fit the company's 
fear of retaliation against any reduction in its prices on some 
products. 
5. The company uses a "rule of thumb" as a crutch rather 
than as an actual determinant of price. The president refers to 
these rules as "magic numbers." The rules are: three times 
raw materials costs for pricing small lots; and raw materials 
cost plus $40 per labor hour divided by volume (this would 
cover labor cost, overhead, and profits). These rules are con-
sidered helpful in deciding whether to take business. 
Market structure. This is a small firm in an industry 
dominated by a few giants, such as DuPont, Esso, etc. There 
is a pattern of price leadership on some items. On new 
products, this firm has some protection against competitors 
because of the advantages to customers of these products. But, 
because of rapid technological change, this monopoly position 
is short-lived. 
MANUFACTURER OF ADVERTISING SPECIALTIES 
The products are primarily composed of paper or cardboard, 
with printed matter on them. Many are patented items. Pricing 
is on a full-cost basis, with a varying markup for profit. The cost 
is the sum of the materials cost (at invoice) plus labor plus a 
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percentage for overhead that is the same on all jobs. The 
overhead rate is based on past experience. The profit margin 
is higher on patented items, but the management avoids charg-
ing "what the traffic will bear" in the short run to maintain 
longrun goodwill. The profit margin is reduced on large orders. 
The management insists that it would not cut below full cost 
to keep the plant busy, but it might cut the profit margin. The 
management fears that low prices in bad times might make it 
difficult to recover costs and a reasonable profit in good times. 
The firm sells in a national market where there are many 
competitors and is quite aware of what other firms are charging. 
It also sells in a local market in which the situation is one of 
oligopoly. 
CLAY REFRACTORY 
The firm is relatively new. When it opened in 1958, it 
sold its product (fire clay used by steel mills to reline steel 
ladles) below competition. The competitors retaliated. The 
firm did acquire considerable business before this retaliation 
took place. Since then, the owner has kept prices at the level 
of competition or below (which fact still bothers his com-
petitors). The firm has developed material for a new process 
which costs no more than the old material but which the owner 
prices 80 percent higher. He plans to maintain this high price 
until competition moves into production of a similar material. 
The firm sells to a firebrick manufacturer at drastically 
reduced prices in the off season. The owner feels justified in 
doing this because it "adds volume." Thus this case appears 
to be a clear illustration of marginalist reasoning. 
A MACHINE SHOP 
This firm combines machine work with warehousing. Pric-
ing is based "solely" on the cost of material plus a markup for 
overhead and profit on sales of iron and steel. Pricing is based 
on labor cost plus a markup for overhead and profit on machine 
work. The markup varies between items that require machine 
cutting and those that do not. Also, since pricing is in round 
numbers (20 cents, 25 cents, 30 cents per pound rather than 18 
cents, 23 cents, 27 cents, etc.), the markup varies. Cold rolled 
plate costing from 11 cents to 22 or 23 cents might sell at 30 
cents a pound, providing a 100 percent markup on cost as an 
average. The manager makes no price reductions to induce 
sales or reduce inventories in poor times. He does not appear to 
take advantage of his monopoly position on bronze and stainless 
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steel; he applies the same price policy on them as on his more 
competitive business. 
MoNUMENT CoMPANY 
This firm erects monuments, including the lettering and 
engraving required. The pricing policy is one of stone cost plus 
direct known costs plus a percentage for profit and overhead. 
The company does not attempt to allocate overhead costs. The 
charges on lettering and engraving are included in the price of 
the monument without extra charge, unless they run above a 
"reasonable" amount. Approximately the same percentage 
markup is charged on stones regardless of size. The owner has 
ethical objections to reducing these margins in slack seasons or 
on larger stones. Prices are expressed in round numbers because 
the manager believes that customers prefer them (they may 
object to $315 but will accept $300) . 
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